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Summary 
Forest and pasture Commons are a shared trait of Alpine rural areas, with a total 
coverage of 1,668,851 hectares, i.e. almost 10% of the total agricultural area of the 
country (Istat, 2012). 
Particularly in the Italian Eastern Alps, forest Common Properties have a long-
lasting tradition. Mostly called `Regole´ (singular: `Regola´), these were relevant 
institutions in the past, superintending to all aspects of community life and acting as 
essential regulator of natural resources use. 
Since 19th century the Italian common lands have come under relevant attack by 
central State authorities, that considered them an anachronistic remaining of a feudal 
past, and unable to promote technological and economic development in the 
agriculture and forest sectors. Only since mid of 20th century, various national 
legislative initiatives have progressively returned power to Common Properties. Taking 
cue from this new climate of supporting legislation, the Veneto Region (north-eastern 
Italy – i.e. the selected case study area for this thesis research) was first in line in the 
policy process of recognition of the collective role in managing the regional forest 
landscapes and in fostering the rural development of mountainous territories. 
Indeed, Common Properties have a long-standing tradition in the Veneto Region 
and were tenacious opponents of the fascist attempts to dismantle them. In 2012, 
Veneto counted 53 Common Properties, almost all of them located in the mountainous 
province of Belluno. Moreover, 17 Common Properties have been re-constituted since 
1996 (Gatto et al., 2012), i.e. since the enactment of a regional law in support of 
common property regime reconstitution. Where reconstitution processes were 
successful – or where they are likely to be completed in the near future – a radical 
change is on the way in the ownership structure of forest landscapes, with large forest 
and pasture assets shifting from public property regimes to common property regimes, 
with `close´ membership. 
Most of the existing bibliographic resources dealing with the Italian common 
domain limit their analyses to the historical vicissitudes that common lands passed 
through, or analyse legal issues in technical terms, or debate about some internal 
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Common Property governance and policy issues (e.g. gender balance, 
intergenerational renovation, need for statute renovation, etc.). Contrarily, very few 
published works assessed whether and how the internal Common Property dynamics 
also relate to and influence both the socio-economic and the institutional 
environments of the whole local mountain communities of residents, administratively 
identifiable with Municipalities, that Regole belong to. 
Meaningfully, Municipalities still exert an overarching administrative control and 
planning functions over the lands comprised within their boundaries, common lands 
included. The ratio for such a prescription emerges out of the fact that Municipalities 
represent the entire resident population of communities, as the local residents include 
both members and non-members of local Common Properties. Then, municipal policy 
decisions should be informed by broad territorial vision that goes beyond sectorial 
interests, e.g. forest management, in order to ensure a territorial development as most 
comprehensive as possible. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the recent, fast-paced process of re-constitution of 
Common Properties has the potential to create or increase institutional tensions at the 
local level, especially due to the new need to coordinate management rights and 
responsibilities between Common Properties and Municipalities. Florian (2004) 
reported that in some cases heavy legal disputes and institutional contrasts with local 
Municipalities were absorbing many available economic and administrative energies of 
the newly-reconstituted Common Properties. Carestiato (2008) pointed out a similar 
situation. Hampel (2012) implicitly suggested that nowadays a sort of `feeling of power 
and individual property´ over common resources by some right-holders might have 
negative consequences on the social environment that Regole are embedded within. 
Still nowadays, there are hints of disparate administrative and legal issues still pending 
among these institutions, insomuch to hinder remarkably the implementation or the 
achievement of integrated territorial development strategies. 
For the reasons above, the Veneto Region represents an interesting case to assess 
the capacity for polycentric governance of forest resources between Municipalities and 
Common Properties. In the light of the new challenges and opportunities that Regole 
are called to face and cope with, among which the ongoing institutional reforms (Gatto 
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et al., 2012) and deep societal and demographic changes (Steinicke et al., 2014), two 
main research objectives have been identified. 
Firstly, the thesis aims to describe and assess the institutional patterns which the 
institutional relationships between Common Properties and Municipalities are based 
on, trying to evaluate their mutual degree of cooperation in their own and 
interdependent statutory competences. 
The second objective corresponds to the evaluation of whether, and to what 
extent, the regional Common Properties give concrete answers to the aims and 
prescriptions that the Regional law entrusted them with, i.e. forest landscape 
management and protection and socio-economic development of rural mountain 
areas. 
Research activities have been modulated in three different phases. A prevailing  
qualitative methodological approach has been knowingly selected. 
After a broad literature review, in the first step of the field data collection, face-
to-face interviews have been carried out among the institutional representatives (e.g. 
Majors, Aldermen, Councillors, etc.) of those Municipalities including Regole within 
their administrative boundaries. It has been made use of a simple but effective data 
collection procedure and instrument, i.e. a structured survey questionnaire containing 
both closed and open-ended responses, allowing for analysis across respondents from 
organizations of the same category at similar administrative levels. Respondents have 
been asked to provide information on the institutional communication patterns 
characterising their relationship with local Common Properties. They were also 
inquired so to reveal their own perception about the Common Property capability to 
effectively stimulate the socio-economic development of mountain areas and 
proactively pursue a sound forest management. 
In the second phase, taking advantage of a secondary data analysis and through 
descriptive statistics techniques, the common and municipal attitude towards the 
active provision of environmental services have been compared. Particularly, a set of 
environmental services others than wood has been selected, i.e. biodiversity 
protection, carbon storage, soil protection and water quality regulation, tourism 
promotion and support to recreational activities. It has been assessed whether 
Common Properties and Municipalities explicitly considered such environmental 
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services among their current multi-functional forest management practices. The 
assigned priority to the supply of the environmental services was also tested, analysing 
whether they consider such provision as a primary or secondary forest management 
objective. Finally, respondents declaring no or secondary commitment to the supply of 
one or more environmental services were asked to indicate under which conditions 
they would be potentially interested in strengthening such proactive provision. 
In the third research step, a new set of interviews has been carried out to check 
and compare municipal representatives’ opinions with common representatives’ ones. 
So, face-to-face interviews have been carried out among common representatives of 
those Common Properties located in the same areas where the parallel survey had 
been conducted among Municipalities. Again, the collaborative mechanisms and the 
institutional linkages horizontally linking Common Properties with Municipalities have 
been explored, along with their self-evaluation on their own management options and 
outputs. 
An informed viewpoint is therefore discussed, disclosing whether cooperative 
institutional relationships among Common Properties and Municipalities prevail and 
their mutual institutional tensions can be considered sporadic, or deeper and chronic 
issues affect them. Prerequisites and conditions best facilitating the establishment of 
fruitful relationships between these two entities are also described. Moreover, it is 
discussed whether the ongoing regional attempts at reconciliation between public 
policies and collective strategies is likely to result in higher levels of synergies also 
through a socio-economic lens. Results suggest that Municipalities remain the primary 
institutional reference point for mountain territories, and they continue to play a 
central role in regulation of local-level socio-economic dynamics. Usually, institutional 
tensions occur when the presumption that Common Properties have nothing to do 
with Municipalities prevail (and vice versa), although both these institutions play a role 
in managing overlapping territories. From a social perspective, it seems also 
recommendable that right-holders conceive Common Properties more as essential 
tools to ensure the involvement of right-holders in the local policy processes, rather 
than as a mere legal acknowledgement of ancient property rights. Nowadays, an 
excessive closure could even threaten the same survival of some Common Properties, 
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shifted from struggling against the so-called past `enclosure of Commons´ to the 
opposite situation, i.e. the risk to downgrade to `common enclosures´. 
Informal relationships among municipal and common representatives have been 
found to play a relevant role in maintaining the institutional contacts between these 
bodies vital and properly working. Nonetheless, mechanisms to enforce stable, robust 
and enduring cooperation (e.g. joint declarations of interest, procedural and/or 
economic memoranda and agreements, etc.) are worthwhile. In this way, it would be 
possible also to overcome and prevent personal contrasts that negatively and heavily 
affect the institutional relationships. 
Finally, it is comprehensively argued whether or not the outcomes of the re-
assignment of former municipal forests to Common Properties can be considered 
positive in terms of improved forest management practices and environmental 
services supply. A general consensus has been found, that forest management has 
improved since Common Properties newly gained control over local forest resources, 
probably because it represents their statutory and vocational core business. 
Particularly, the re-establishment of `new´ Common Properties may reinforce the main 
provisioning services. However, the dichotomy `Common Properties focussed on 
market-based activities (i.e. wood harvesting) vs. Municipalities focussed on provision 
of environmental services´ does not seem appropriate. 
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Riassunto 
Gli assetti fondiari collettivi forestali e agricoli rappresentano un aspetto tipico e 
diffuso delle aree rurali, in particolar modo alpine, per una estensione complessiva di 
1.668.851 ha, pari quasi al 10% della complessiva superficie agraria italiana (Istat, 
2012). 
In particolare nelle Alpi dell’Italia orientale, le Proprietà Collettive vantano una 
lunga tradizione: principalmente chiamate `Regole´, esse in passato si configuravano 
come rilevanti istituzioni territoriali, sovrintendendo e agendo da essenziali regolatori 
dell’uso delle risorse naturali. 
A partire dal XIX secolo, gli assetti fondiari collettivi italiani hanno subito l’attacco 
delle autorità centrali statali, che li consideravano anacronistiche rimanenze di un 
passato feudale ed incapaci di promuovere lo sviluppo tecnologico ed economico del 
settore forestale. Solo dalla metà del XX secolo varie iniziative legislative hanno 
progressivamente restituito titolarità istituzionale alle Proprietà Collettive. Nel solco di 
questo nuovo clima legislativo favorevole, la Regione del Veneto fu in prima linea nel 
processo politico di rinnovato riconoscimento del ruolo collettivo nella protezione 
ambientale e di gestione dei paesaggi forestali. Inoltre, la Regione del Veneto (Italia 
nord-orientale) – ossia l’area di studio selezionata ai fini del presente lavoro di ricerca 
– si pose in prima linea nel processo politico di nuovo riconoscimento di tale ruolo 
collettivo nel gestire i paesaggi forestali regionali e nel dare impulso e sostegno allo 
sviluppo rurale dei territori montani. 
Le Proprietà Collettive `chiuse´ vantano una lunga tradizione nella Regione del 
Veneto, e furono tenaci oppositrici del tentativo legislativo fascista mirato alla loro 
soppressione. Nel 2012, il Veneto contava 53 Proprietà Collettive, quasi tutte situate 
nella provincia montana di Belluno. Inoltre, 17 Regole erano state ricostituite dal 1996 
e fino al 2012, cioè a partire dal varo di una legge regionale a supporto della loro 
ricostituzione. Laddove i processi di ricostituzione hanno avuto successo – così come 
dove è probabile che essi giungano a compimento nel breve periodo – si è verificato un 
cambio radicale nella struttura della proprietà terriera, con ampie superfici boschive e 
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pascolive passate dal controllo e dalla proprietà pubblica a quella collettiva, 
caratterizzata da criteri di accesso e membership spesso più restrittivi. 
La maggior parte delle risorse bibliografiche esistenti in tema di assetti fondiari 
collettivi limita le proprie analisi alle vicissitudini storiche attraversate dalle Proprietà 
Collettive, oppure analizzano questioni legali in termini tecnicistici, o approfondiscono 
alcune dinamiche di governance e di policy interne alle Proprietà Collettive (ad 
esempio, la parità di genere, il ricambio intergenerazionale, la necessità di revisione 
degli Statuti, ecc.). Al contrario, davvero poche pubblicazioni hanno analizzato se, e 
come, le dinamiche interne alle Proprietà Collettive siano in grado di influenzare 
l’ambiente socio-economico ed istituzionale delle intere comunità locali, 
amministrativamente identificabili nei Comuni, a cui le Regole appartengono. 
Significativamente, i Comuni esercitano ancora un controllo sovraordinato e 
complessivo dei territori ricompresi all’interno dei loro confini amministrativi, inclusi 
gli assetti fondiari collettivi. La ratio di una simile prescrizione scaturisce dal fatto che i 
Comuni rappresentano l’intera popolazione, residente e non, dal momento che sia 
regolieri (titolari di diritti collettivi) sia non-regolieri costituiscono la cittadinanza 
locale. Inoltre, le politiche municipali dovrebbe conformarsi ed essere ispirate da 
visioni ampie che superano largamente interessi specifici e di settore, quale ad 
esempio la sola gestione forestale, in modo da assicurare uno sviluppo del territorio 
quanto più comprensivo ed inclusivo possibile. 
Tuttavia, sembra che il recente e repentino processo di ricostituzione delle 
Proprietà Collettive abbia il potenziale per creare o aumentare alcune tensioni 
istituzionali a livello locale, specialmente in ragione della nuova esigenza che Comuni e 
Proprietà Collettive coordinino i propri diritti e le proprie responsabilità in termini di 
gestione del patrimonio. Nel 2004, Florian osservò come, in alcuni casi, pesanti dispute 
legali e contrasti istituzionali con le municipalità locali stessero assorbendo molte delle 
energie economiche ed amministrative disponibili delle neo-ricostituite Proprietà 
Collettive. Carestiato (2008) osservò una situazione simile. Hampel (2012) suggerì 
implicitamente che, oggigiorno, una sorta di `sentimento di potere e di proprietà 
individuale´ applicato agli assetti fondiari collettivi da parte dei regolieri potrebbe 
avere conseguenze negative sull’ambiente sociale in cui le Regole sono inserite. Ancora 
oggi, vi sono indizi di disparati problemi e contenziosi legali e amministrativi ancora 
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pendenti, tanto da ostacolare la realizzazione o il raggiungimento di strategie di 
sviluppo territoriale integrato. 
Per le ragioni in premessa, la Regione del Veneto rappresenta un caso 
interessante per esplorare la capacità di governance delle risorse forestali 
`policentrica´ tra Comuni e Proprietà Collettive. Alla luce dunque delle nuove sfide e 
opportunità con cui oggigiorno le Regole sono chiamate a confrontarsi, tra cui le attuali 
riforme istituzionali (Gatto et al., 2012) e profondi cambiamenti sociali e demografici 
(Steinicke et al., 2014), sono stati identificati due obiettivi di ricerca principali. 
Innanzitutto, il presente lavoro di tesi mira a descrivere e valutare i pattern 
istituzionali che caratterizzano e su cui si basano le relazioni istituzionali tra Comuni e 
Proprietà Collettive, provando sostanzialmente a valutare il grado di mutua e reciproca 
cooperazione in riferimento alle competenze statutarie, proprie ed interdipendenti, di 
queste istituzioni. 
Il secondo obiettivo corrisponde ad una valutazione di come, e se, le Proprietà 
Collettive regionali diano risposta concreta agli obiettivi e alle prescrizioni assegnategli 
dalla legge, ossia la gestione e la protezione dei paesaggi forestali e lo sviluppo socio-
economico delle aree montane. 
Le attività di ricerca sono state modulate in tre fasi differenti. È stato 
scientemente adottato un approccio metodologico piuttosto qualitativo. 
Nella prima fase, sono state condotte interviste tra i rappresentanti istituzionali 
(es. Sindaci, Assessori, Consiglieri, etc.) di quelle municipalità all’interno dei cui confini 
amministrativi insistono Regole. È stato fatto uso di procedure e strumenti di raccolta 
dati semplici ma efficaci, cioè un questionario strutturato che prevedeva risposte sia 
chiuse sia aperte, permettendo un’analisi di confronto tra diversi rispondenti, afferenti 
a diverse organizzazioni poste a pari livello amministrativo. Agli intervistati è stato 
chiesto di fornire informazioni ed evidenza dei pattern istituzionali che caratterizzano e 
su cui si basano le relazioni istituzionali tra il Comune e le Proprietà Collettive. Ad essi è 
stato anche chiesto quale sia la loro specifica percezione in merito alla capacità delle 
Proprietà Collettive di stimolare effettivamente lo sviluppo socio-economico delle aree 
montane, così come di perseguire una gestione forestale equilibrata e responsabile. 
Nella seconda fase di ricerca, traendo vantaggio dall’analisi di dati già disponibili 
(analisi secondaria per mezzo di usuali tecniche di statistica descrittiva), è stata 
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comparata l’attitudine municipale e collettiva nell’erogazione proattiva di servizi 
ambientali. In particolare, è stato preso in considerazione il seguente panel di servizi 
ambientali, diversi dalla provvigione legnosa: protezione della biodiversità, accumulo 
di carbonio, protezione del suolo e regolazione della qualità delle acque, promozione 
turistica e supporto alle attività ricreative. È stato valutato se le Proprietà Collettive e i 
Comuni includessero esplicitamente tali servizi ambientali all’interno delle loro attuali 
pratiche di gestione integrata e multi-funzionale delle foreste. È stata anche testata la 
priorità assegnata a tali funzioni, analizzando se la loro erogazione fosse considerata di 
primaria o secondaria importanza. Infine, ai rispondenti con scarso o nullo interesse 
nell’erogazione proattiva di questi servizi ambientali è stato chiesto di indicare a quali 
condizioni sarebbero stati potenzialmente interessati a rafforzare il loro impegno in tal 
senso. 
Nella terza fase di ricerca, è stata lanciata una nuova campagna di interviste per 
verificare e comparare le opinioni dei rappresentanti collettivi con quelle analoghe dei 
rappresentanti istituzionali municipali. Pertanto, le interviste faccia-a-faccia sono state 
condotte tra i rappresentanti di quelle Proprietà Collettive situate nelle stesse aree 
dove era stata condotta la prima fase d’indagine. Nuovamente, sono stati esplorati i 
meccanismi di collaborazione e le connessioni istituzionali che intercorrono 
`orizzontalmente´ tra Proprietà Collettive e Comuni, insieme all’autovalutazione dei 
rappresentanti regolieri circa le proprie opzioni e risultati di gestione forestale. 
Vengono quindi presentate alcune considerazioni circa la prevalenza di relazioni 
istituzionali improntate alla cooperazione, e se le mutue tensioni e contrasti possano 
considerarsi sporadici, o se sussistano problemi più profondi e cronici. Vengono anche 
discussi i prerequisiti e le condizioni che meglio facilitano lo stabilirsi di relazioni 
proficue tra questi due Enti. Inoltre, viene discusso se è plausibile che gli attuali 
tentativi regionali di riconciliazione tra le politiche pubbliche e le strategie collettive 
possano risultare in più alti livelli di sinergia anche in un’ottica socio-economica più 
ampia rispetto al solo settore forestale. 
I risultati suggeriscono che i Comuni siano ancora punti di riferimento istituzionali 
di prima importanza per i territori montani, e che continuino a giocare un ruolo 
centrale nella regolazione delle dinamiche socio-economiche a livello locale. 
Usualmente, si verificano contrasti e tensioni istituzionali quando prevale la 
11 
presunzione che le Proprietà Collettive non abbiano nulla a che spartire con i Comuni 
(e viceversa), sebbene entrambe queste istituzioni concorrano alla gestione dei 
medesimi territori. Adottando una prospettiva di natura sociale, sembra anche 
raccomandabile che i regolieri concepiscano le Proprietà Collettive più come strumenti 
fondamentali che assicurino il loro coinvolgimento nei processi decisionali e di politica 
locale, piuttosto che come mero riconoscimento di antichi diritti di proprietà. 
Oggigiorno, un’eccessiva chiusura delle comunità regoliere potrebbe finanche 
minacciare la sopravvivenza stessa delle Proprietà Collettive, passate in breve 
dall’opposizione alla riduzione degli assetti fondiari collettivi (`Enclosure of Commons´) 
ad una situazione opposta, ossia il rischio di regredire ad `enclavi collettive´ (`Common 
enclosures´). È anche emerso come le relazioni di carattere informale tra i 
rappresentanti comunali e collettivi giochino un ruolo rilevante nel mantenimento di 
contatti istituzionali vitali e funzionanti tra questi enti. Nondimeno, meritano d’essere 
instaurati meccanismi stabili, duraturi e robusti di collaborazione (ad esempio, 
mediane dichiarazioni congiunte d’interesse, memorandum, accordi, ecc.). In questo 
modo, sarebbe anche possibile superare e prevenire i contrasti di natura personale, 
che tanto influenzano negativamente i rapporti istituzionali tra Comuni e Regole. 
Infine, viene ampiamente dibattuto se i risultati della riassegnazione alle Proprietà 
Collettive di foreste precedentemente a gestione comunale possa considerarsi positiva 
in termini di miglioramento delle pratiche gestionali e di fornitura di servizi ambientali. 
È stato rinvenuto un ampio consenso circa il fatto che la gestione forestale sia 
migliorata da quando le Proprietà Collettive hanno ottenuto un rinnovato controllo 
delle risorse forestali locali, probabilmente perché la gestione forestale costituisce una 
loro finalità principe, ed un loro cardine statutario. In particolare, la ricostituzione di 
`nuove´ Proprietà Collettive può rinforzare l’erogazione dei principali servizi di utilità 
generale. Per queste ragioni la dicotomia tra Proprietà Collettive focalizzate su attività 
di mercato (produzione legnosa) e Comuni concentrati sull’erogazione di servizi 
ambientali non sembra essere appropriata. 
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1. Introduction 
This introductive chapter consists of three sub-chapters. In the first one, 
preliminary and basic concepts and definitions are recalled and described, as they 
directly or indirectly relate to the Commons theory lato sensu. 
In the following section, information on Commons are provided through a 
historical lens. A specific focus is introduced too, either concerning the Italian common 
domain, and also Common Properties standing within the administrative boundaries of 
the Veneto Region (north-eastern Italy), i.e. the selected case study area for this thesis 
research work. 
In the final section, a theoretical framework on the nested (institutional) 
polycentric systems is discussed, within a general overview on the new challenges and 
opportunities that nowadays the Italian Common Properties – and specifically those in 
the Veneto Region – have to face and cope with. 
In Annex III some Author’s written contributions are listed, that include further 
discussions on the contents presented in this thesis research monograph work. 
1.1. Basic concepts and definitions 
Samuelson (1954) was the first to define non-rivalry in consumption as a 
characteristic of public goods, describing it as a situation where each individual's 
consumption of one resource does not lead to any subtraction from the someone 
else’s consumption possibility. He also indicated rivalry in consumption as a 
discriminating feature in the theoretical good classification. Rivalry obviously refers to 
the opposite situation, i.e. that one where each individual's consumption prevents the 
others’ consumption, by `subtracting´ some resource portion: subtractability is 
therefore directly connected to rivalry. 
Differently, Musgrave (1959) stated that goods can be categorized according to 
their excludability, i.e. the possibility to impede others’ access to the resource. Table 1 
shows the classic economic classification of goods, as a result of merging rivalry in 
consumption and excludability. Thus, by definition, common goods are characterized 
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by non-excludability and rivalry in consumption, the former feature being shared with 
public goods, whereas the latter with private ones. 
Table 1 – Classic economic classification of goods (categories). 
 
Excludability in 
consumption 
Non-excludability in 
consumption 
Rivalry in 
consumption 
Private goods Common goods 
Non-rivalry in 
consumption 
Club goods Public goods 
 
Following this primary and fundamental categorization, common goods can be 
further classified, according to their nature, in tangible or intangible, material (also 
called natural) or immaterial, local or global, and limited, unlimited or renewable. 
Scott (1954) firstly referred to `common-pools´ to indicate natural common goods. 
Common-pool resources therefore became synonymous with common goods. 
Whereas the vast literature concerning common goods traditionally refers to 
natural of common-pool resources, e.g. fish shoals, forests and pastures, other key-
subjects gradually increased their presence in such literature. Particularly, Bravo and 
De Moor (2008) noted that the environmental services recently began a new 
fundamental matter of discussion within this bibliographic corpus, such as biodiversity, 
air quality, water quality, soil erosion, etc. 
Moreover, other new goods, facilities and services recently began to be further 
approached as common goods as well, being labelled as `new Commons´. Although 
this definition might reveal some ambiguities in distinguishing what good actually are 
common or public, it usually refers to technology-driven and human-made common-
pool resources, e.g. Internet or genetic pools, according to the definition proposed 
during the 8th IASC (International Association for the Study of the Commons) 
Conference (Hess, 2000). Indeed, immaterial common resources, like knowledge and 
access to education, had ever been explicitly taken into account in the common-pool 
resource literature. 
In her seminal work `Governing the Commons´, Elinor Ostrom (1990) defined 
common-pool resources as those natural or man-made resource systems that are 
sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential 
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beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from their use. Again, the non-excludability 
feature was there clearly recalled. Also man-made resource systems were included in 
the common good category, along with the natural resources sensu stricto. As but an 
example, a water basin could belong to the former case (natural resource), whereas an 
irrigation system to the latter (man-made resource system), but they still can be both 
considered common-pool resources. Moreover, the Author highlighted that, although 
exclusion is difficult or unlikely to happen, it still remains possible: for this reason, in 
the literature concerning common-pool resources, sometimes `low´ or `weak´ 
excludability are terms preferred to non-excludability. 
Mosimane et al. (2012) indicated common-pool resources as those natural 
resources that, subject to joint-use forms, also support human well-being across 
multiple levels of social organization. Nonetheless, two other features add to non-
excludability and rivalry in consumption here, i.e. joint-in-common use and multiple-
level governance. Definitely, a subtle shift toward the common property regime 
definition can be acknowledged here, as discussed here below. 
The adoption of common-pool resources as synonymous with `common good´ has 
been worldwide accepted since Scott’s definition (1954). Jodha (1986) was one of the 
firsts to adopt common property resource as synonymous with common-pool 
resource. Differently from the previous case, this latter is more controversial, i.e. 
equalling `common property resources´ to common-pool resources and therefore, 
transitively, to common goods. In fact, Ostrom (2000) argues that there is not 
necessarily a link between a type of resource and a specific regime that should govern 
it. Thus, whereas both the definitions of common-pool resource and common goods 
only recall non-excludability and rivalry in consumption, the concept of `property´ 
differently calls for other further key-issues, i.e. property rights definition and the 
establishment of an institutional framework, further characterized by some specific 
governance mechanisms. 
According to Bromley’s definition (1990), property is a benefit stream, whilst right 
is “the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a benefit 
stream”. Subsequently, a property right is a claim to a benefit stream that a third 
entity – let’s say ´the State´ – will agree to protect through the assignment of duties to 
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any subject other than the right claimant. Definitely, a right is a relationship between 
the claimant and those having related duties with reference to a specific object. 
Nevertheless, rarely property rights and related duties are straight and linear 
when concerning natural common-pool resources. So, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
coined the expression `bundle of rights´, to depict the possible existence of multiple 
and overlapping claims, rights and duties over the same resource. A set of five main 
relevant property rights have been identified: 
1. Access: right to enter a resource delimitated in space. Entrance also allows to enjoy 
not subtractive benefits, e.g. aesthetic features, recreational activities, cultural 
heritages; 
2. Withdrawal: right to get possession of subtractive goods produced by the 
common-pool resource, also respectively named `resource units´ and `resource 
system´ (Ostrom, 1990); 
3. Management: right to regulate the common-pool resource-associated benefit 
streams and to make the unit system better, undertaking ad hoc and proper 
actions; 
4. Exclusion: binding possibility to define which individuals are allowed to enter the 
resource, therefore regulating withdrawal activities too; 
5. Alienation: right to transfer one or more of the abovementioned rights. 
So, people can be grouped on the basis of which property rights they are entitled 
to, with reference to a specific common-pool resource. Thus, the following categories 
of rights-holders can be identified on the basis of an increasing order that ranges from 
the entitlement with access right only to the entire set of rights (Ostrom, 2003): 
1. authorized entrants; 
2. authorized users; 
3. claimants; 
4. proprietors; 
5. fully owners. 
Individuals and groups may therefore hold different sets of rights within a 
particular system, possibly resulting in mutually opposite claims – all of them equally 
rightful. These distinct sets of rights are known as a tenure (Bruce, 1989). 
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Ostrom (1990) also observed that the distinction between the resource system 
and the resource units (i.e., the flow) is functional to understand `the process of 
organizing and governing common-pool resources´. Through this reasoning, Ostrom 
clearly remarked the distinction between good-categories (e.g. common goods) and 
their management forms, in terms of different possible governance processes, 
institutional framework and tenure arrangements. In other words, she clearly stressed 
the difference between the resource and an associated management regime. 
Even the meaning of `institution´ can vary according to the discipline it relates to. 
North (1990) defined the institutions as `the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction´, whilst 
Ostrom (1999) differently referred to institutions as `shared concepts used by humans 
in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies´. Whatever the 
definition preferred, no univocal tenure arrangements directly relate to one 
institutional arrangement, whether public, private or common property. In fact, 
neither public, private nor common property exactly denote which bundle of rights the 
right-holders are entrusted with (Ostrom, 2003). 
Also governance concept remains multifaceted, although attempts to define 
common features have been advanced (Secco et al., 2011). Generally, it could be 
thought as a set of processes, procedures, resources, institutions and actors 
determining how decisions are taken and implemented within a specific system 
(Saccone, 2010). 
Thus, by exploring the literature on Commons, Common Properties can be 
generally defined as institutional frameworks where the exploitation of a common-
pool resource is jointly performed by right-holders that generally share rights over the 
resource, according to some regulations (Short, 2008), either legislation, Commons’ 
register, and/or local custom and practice. Beside to `common property regime´, also 
`common property institution´ can be found in the literature (Rudel, 2011). 
Right-holders form groups various in nature, size, and internal structure across a 
broad spectrum. They are social units with defined membership and boundaries, with 
certain common interests, with at least some interaction among members, with some 
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common cultural norms, and often their own endogenous authority systems (Bromley, 
1991). 
Definitions aimed to conciliate the distinction between common-pool resources 
and their related governance and institutional processes or functions exist too. In 
these cases, the main focus concerns the resource system, composed by the resource 
and its management. Short (2008) noted that, in the traditional meaning of 
`Commons´, the resource system is something shared among ‘providers’ and 
‘producers’ (that might also coincide), whereas the resource unit cannot be shared, 
but also `allocated´ amongst the ‘appropriators’, because of the rivalry in 
consumption. McKean (1992) defined Commons as resource systems too, observing 
that common lands equal to pure common property resources where the institutions, 
rules and processes developed to manage the resource equate to a ‘club good’, and 
where right-holders operate largely as a club. 
Cheria and Edwin (2011) provided a different approach to define the `Commons´, 
more colloquial than technical, but pleasantly evoking and suggestive: `Commons are 
the gifts of nature, managed and shared by a community, which the community is 
willing and able to defend. They are resources not commodities, possessed not 
property, managed not owned´. 
Noteworthy, and differently from the Ostrom’s approach, here a restricting 
definition of common-pool resources can be detected, given that human-made 
systems (e.g. irrigation systems) are intended to be common-pool resource 
management forms, and not common-pool resources per se. 
Secondly, in the Cheria and Edwin’s definition also the right-holders’ ability and 
willingness to defend the common resources are recalled. The former concerns the 
attitude of the right-holders’ community (Helfrich, 2012), that is the main responsible 
for deciding under which regime (private, public or common) the resource should be 
put, to `prevent´ it from being an open access regime. Nevertheless, willingness 
sometimes is not sufficient and external pressures, as well as internal dynamics within 
the common property regime could cause the common system collapse under 
endogenous or exogenous drivers and barriers (Ostrom’s eighth principle, 1990). 
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Furthermore, this definition explicitly mentions the fundamental link between the 
common-pool resource with its reference community. Indeed, the same concept of 
`resource´ implies that someone has the possibility to obtain a benefit stream (e.g. a 
means of subsistence) from that particular resource. Olson (1965) was the first to 
elaborate the `group theory´, introducing the idea that non-excludability is a social 
constraint built up by a reference community. Put differently, it is the group to decide 
which category a specific good has to be assigned in (private, public, common, club), 
since institutions (that are men-made) are able to set down tenure arrangements so as 
to define the relevant good category, especially for those goods with a clear and well-
defined geographical dimension. 
A right is meaningless if the State is unwilling, or unable, to ensure compliance 
with related duties (Bromley, 1991). With special reference to common properties, this 
means that once right-holders commonly decided to share a common resource, it 
should be no more possible for a single right-holder refute the resource as jointly 
owned and invoke rights on his own share, at least until previous common decision 
would have been changed or infringed. In other words, a common-pool resource is not 
a simple sum of private shares: it is an undivided resource, commonly managed and 
possessed by individual shares, by means of governance dynamics and mechanisms 
occurring and established within the community institutional framework. Therefore, 
possess does not equal to full ownership, and it only relates to the use of the resource. 
In other words, the Ostrom’s distinction between proprietors and fully owners echoes 
in the Cheria and Edwin’s definition too. 
However, an univocal definition of community is still far from being acknowledged 
– if ever it were possible. Of particular relevance for the communities’ stake remains 
the possibility and/or their willingness to exclude those living beyond the boundaries 
of the community from the governance processes, either de facto or formally. In fact, 
different individuals or communities may have also different expectations and claims 
over the same resource, both in terms of objectives and management actions to be set 
up and undertaken. Thus, by increasing the number and type of actors, the diversity of 
and asymmetries in interests, claims and influences, and problems of exclusion and 
subtractability characterizing common-pool resources (Mwangi and Wardell, 2012) 
might dramatically intensify. Typically, such a situation affects natural common-pool 
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resources, as they provide multiple beneficiaries with a set of environmental services 
and functions, each of those having various related claims that go far beyond the 
boundaries of the right-holders’ communities. 
Definitely, several complex interactions between biophysical, demographic, 
economic, and institutional factors come along with ecosystem complexity (Poteete 
and Ostrom, 2004): several of those that Poteete (2012) calls `multiples´, i.e. levels, 
scales and linkages, affect natural resources both in functional and jurisdictional terms. 
Ultimately, global, regional, national and sub-national influences are all mediated at 
the local level (Wardell and Lund, 2006) and often small-scale institutions are thought 
to be better than larger ones, also thanks to the more incisive possibility to involve 
local stakeholders. By the way, an excessive jurisdictional atomization may lead at the 
same time to an extremely difficult manageability in situations where a broad and 
large-scale perspective is required (Murphree, 2000). 
`Polycentric governance´ (Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012), if well implemented, 
seems a reliable solution to balance these opposite issues. That is, some degrees of 
`co-management´ are to be defined, that is a continuum of arrangements relying on 
various degrees of power and responsibility shared between government agencies and 
local communities (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). It is argued that both vertical and 
horizontal, as well as inter-temporal integration between different institutions, can 
enforce and stimulate a better overall resource management, also granting a deeper 
resilience capacity based on adaptive management. 
1.2. The Commons throughout the history 
1.2.1. The origins of Commons and the `de-commoning´ process 
Few Authors explored the real or presumed origins of the Commons. Just to cite 
two of the most important contributions on this topic, Karl Marx identified the so 
called `original accumulation´ as the turning point in the creation of property, with that 
referring to the progressive historical separation of the human workforce from the 
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natural resources. Adam Smith somehow expressed the same idea, but pushing it back 
to a mythical past (Bandyopadhyay, 2011). 
Differently, many Scholars focused their attention on the `de-commoning´ 
process, that common-pool resources progressively went through over the time. 
To this end, a set of key-issues should be preliminarily recalled, as they are the 
key-stones that many scholars moved from. These, are the followings: 
 tenure arrangements are always of man-made origins, and come along with a logic 
of exclusion (either to access, withdrawal and/or management); 
 logics of exclusion take their origins from the need to cope with scarce resources; 
 common property is only one out of four `general´ property forms, i.e. private, 
public and common property regimes and open access, each of them further 
characterized by possibly different tenure (re)arrangements. 
In synthesis, this means that selecting one of the possible institutional forms and 
tenure arrangements is nothing else that a matter of choice, based on some socio-
economic factors, that several Authors assigned different weights to. Heller (1998) 
argued that either explicit and implicit costs (e.g. transaction costs) and their 
distribution are the most important factors to be considered in the `selection´ of a 
specific institutional arrangement and property regime. Schlueter (2008) considered 
that personal and collective preferences and attitudes should not be disregarded as 
well, although a matter of price can be detected in almost every circumstance, even 
with reference to `unpriceable´ or intangible resources. Bromley (1992) explained the 
emergence of many common property regimes in the developing countries with the 
fact that the (economic) returns coming from the resource are not high enough to 
finance the definition of exclusive private property rights. This would explain the 
emergence of common property regimes where a natural resources-based subsistence 
economy often still prevails. 
These observations find confirmation in the European experience, where a wide 
array of social, economic and technological changes have occurred since the industrial 
revolution seriously challenged the joint-use and management of many common-pool 
resources (De Moor et al., 2002). In fact, since the middle of the 18th century, many 
European common property regimes had begun to face an increasing State opposition, 
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as they were considered inefficient resource management systems. As a result, most 
historical Common Properties have been suppressed by the end of the 19th century, at 
least in the north-west Europe (Bravo and De Moor, 2008). 
Along with the modern State hostility against this institutional regime, it seems 
plausible that also other endogenous and exogenous pressures concurred to change 
the internal equilibrium that many common property regimes were based on. 
Particularly, a remarkable increase in societal heterogeneity might have weakened the 
traditional collective identity (Nkhata et al., 2009), finally leading to their de-
establishment. Likewise, a spatial expansion of trade flows led to new economic 
opportunities, so that reducing the salience of common-pool resources in community 
livelihoods satisfaction (Mosimane et al., 2012). 
Meaningfully, some other Authors suggested that disappearance is not the only 
historical destiny for common property regimes. Rudel (2011) argued that macro-
sociological events can play relevant role in the arising of new common property 
regimes, as well as for the fate of the ancient ones. He also discussed that business 
cycles typically oscillate between boom and bust conditions: the former weakening 
common property regimes, whereas the latter enhancing them, thanks to the 
weakening or disappearance of livelihoods alternatives to common-pool resources. 
Moreover, sporadic disastrous events, mainly environmental ones, would promote the 
appearance of new common property regimes. Ostrom (1990) provided examples in 
which new Commons were built up, too. All such circumstances originated from the 
following pre-conditions: 
 scarcity in a specific common-pool resource; 
 considerable importance of that resource for a set of human activities; 
 willingness to solve a `common´ problem (mainly, unbalanced property rights 
distribution), so as to overcome equity- and cost-issues. 
Definitely, disappearance is not the solely, ineluctable destiny of common 
property regimes. 
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1.2.2. Does the tragedy concern the Commons? 
`Natural resource problems are property rights problems; 
natural resource policy is property rights policy´ (Bromley, 1991). 
In 1968, Hardin presented the so-called `Tragedy of the Commons´ theory, 
discussing about a pretended ineluctable ruin-path that human beings enter when 
they are free to take management decisions over a common-pool resource. 
Particularly, the tragedy would happen when humans will try to `rationally´ maximize 
their own interests without external pressures as severe as to limit the possibility to 
reach their individual management goals. Hardin took a pasture as a paradigmatic 
example of his theory and outlined a situation where no constraining factors (e.g. war 
conflicts, illegal hunting and diseases) set appreciable limits to both human and animal 
activities. In such a situation, he observed that each herdsman will follow an alleged 
individual `rationality´ by adding new cattle to his own herd in order to reach higher 
income. Nevertheless, as every herdsman will be pushed to do the same, this general 
behaviour will soon lead the total livestock beyond the carrying capacity of the land. As 
final consequence, the overgrazing activities will cause a reduction of the total pasture 
utility, and each herdsman’s utility as well. Hardin concludes that `freedom in a 
Commons brings ruin to all´. 
The `tragedy of the Commons´ theory was tackled by numerous authors. Bromley 
(1991) rejected it moving from the theoretical idea that in the Hardin’s example an 
open access regime had been considered, rather than a common property regime. In 
an open access regime situation, `free riding´ behaviours are actually likely to occur, 
leading to the common-pool resource impoverishment. Ostrom (1990) refused the 
Hardin’s theory too, pragmatically demonstrating that in some circumstances some 
people succeeded in solving common-pool resources-related issues, by means of 
different degrees and forms of social organization – ultimately, establishing a well-
defined common property regime. On the contrary, she also gave evidence that in 
some other circumstances common property regimes failed, therefore reasoning on 
which principles and (pre)conditions make the birth and survival of common property 
regimes more likely to occur. 
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Nevertheless, it is undeniable that, often, many natural resources, along with their 
management solutions and governance mechanisms, face dramatic conservational 
issues. As but an example, it’s the case of the ichthyic ocean resources, as their stocks 
dropped in the last decades. Bravo and De Moor (2008) observed that the ‘common 
fisheries policy’ is one policy area where a significant power amount is allocated to the 
EU, so that this really configures like a `tragedy of the public property´. 
Likewise, a dramatic property fragmentation occurred in some forestry areas 
under private property regime across Europe, resulting in severe mismanagement 
problems (particularly underutilisation) and difficulties in ensuring homogeneity in the 
active supply of a wide set of ecosystem services. In synthesis, too many owners 
entrusted with the right to exclude other (neighbouring) owners from each one’s own 
benefit stream, led to almost unsolvable issues on management coordination 
(Schlueter, 2008). This phenomenon can be thought as the `tragedy of the anti-
Commons´ (Heller, 1998), and it clearly relates to the private property regime. 
Ascertained that neither the open access nor the common regimes are the only 
property regimes that a common-pool resource can be subjected to, the `tragedy of 
the natural resources´ does not specifically affect any specific property regime. 
1.2.3. The common domain in the Italian legal framework 
The Italian legal framework distinguishes three different situations, according to 
the different tenure arrangements characterising the national common lands. These, 
briefly, are the following: 
 customary rights (usi civici): 
 civic lands (terre civiche); 
 common property regimes sensu stricto, either `open´ or `close´ (proprietà 
collettive). 
`Customary rights´, also named `civic uses´ (Bassi, 2012), refer to rights that a 
community is entrusted with and that enable right-holders to benefit some utilitates 
(benefit streams) provided by a common-pool resource, owned by someone else, 
other than the right-holders. Put differently, it means that the owner cannot prevent 
the right-holders to enter the common land, such as the forest, and benefit some 
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particular benefits, e.g. collecting wood, mushrooms or leaves, grazing, hunting, 
fishing, etc. Civic uses can stand on a piece of land regardless of the property regime 
that the common-pool resource is subjected to, i.e. public or private property. Such 
situations usually derive from historical vicissitudes that confirmed access and 
withdrawal rights to local communities after the resource had been gained by a new 
owner, typically new landlords, liege lords – generally speaking, a new conquer. Thus, 
it is as if common rights were historically `frozen´ and handed down until the present 
days. 
 `Civic lands´ represent the second Commons’ Italian category. In this case, as well 
as for the former, the adjective `civic´ takes its origins from the Latin noun Civis, i.e. 
citizen, therefore remarking the direct link between the inhabitants (cives) and the 
common-pool resource (the common land). The institutional regime associated with 
civic lands is a situation where whoever lives in the common-pool resource-affected 
area is rightfully considered a right-holders’ community member, having therefore the 
right to join the resource exploitation. Who gives up living in the common-pool 
resource-affected area quits also the right-holders’ community, while on the contrary 
new dwellers automatically obtain the right (`open´ system). Often, the resource is 
managed, and `owned´ de facto, by the local Municipalities `on behalf of´ the local 
communities, that formally owns the common lands. Alternatively, in some other 
cases, a progressive shift toward an open access regime can be detected (with possible 
free-rider behaviours), especially where the historical ties between the local 
communities and the common-pool resources loosen, and begin to disappear from the 
common memory. 
Finally, common property regimes (proprietà collettive, literally: Common 
Properties) sensu stricto correspond to the third legal distinction among the Italian 
common lands. The Italian Proprietà collettive fully represent a common property 
regime sensu Bromley (1991); right-holders are actually the real proprietors of the 
common resource. The system can be still open, but often a blood-line constraints 
exist to identify new right-holders, in addition to the residence criterion. This means 
that only offspring of the ancient inhabitants (originarii) can be part of the right-
holders’ community, apart from new entrants possibly accepted by the common 
Assembly, maybe after paying an entrance fee. These, are `close´ systems. Hereinafter, 
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close common property regimes will be always referred as Common Properties – if not 
differently specified. 
The following table summarises how common lands are distinguished in the 
Italian legal framework, according to the main tenure arrangements established over 
those resources. 
Table 2 – Common lands in the Italian legal framework (Bassi, 2012, modified). 
 
Customary 
rights lands 
Civic lands Common Properties 
Ownership 
Government 
OR private 
entities 
Formally, the community 
Community with 
legal status of association 
Administr. 
entity 
(accountable 
to) 
Depending 
on the owner 
a) 
Municipality 
(Municipality) Board 
(Community) 
b) 
Separate Administration 
(Community/Municip.) 
Membership 
(Criteria) 
Open (residence) 
a) 
Open – registration 
(residence) 
b) 
Mostly close – 
registration 
(lineage) 
 
A recent statistical survey (Istat, 2012) revealed that the number of bodies 
(organizations, associations, Municipalities, various etc.) managing common lands in 
Italy equals 2.233, with a total coverage of 1,668,851 hectares, i.e. almost 10% of the 
total agricultural area of the country. Unfortunately, it has not been possible so far to 
distinguish usi civici lands, common lands (terre civiche) and Common Properties 
(either open or close), so as to have more detailed information on their respective 
number and extension. 
Although still vital, well-rooted and long-lasting Common Properties can be 
detected in Italy, they suffered a progressive and broad decline over the time (Rinaldi, 
2011), and it can be hardly stated that this unfavourable trend is completely reversed. 
In fact, since 19th century, Italian common property regimes have come under attack 
by pre-unitarian States, that considered such Institutions unable to promote 
technological and economic development in the agriculture sector. Definitely, common 
property regimes were considered anachronistic remaining of a feudal past. 
Meaningfully, still nowadays a jurisprudential saying survives, i.e. `Ubi feuda, ibi 
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demania´, meaning that often common lands exists there, where in the past an ancient 
feud existed. 
On these premises, in 1927 the fascist government tried to definitively dismantle 
all alpine common property regimes, through the national law no. 1766/1927 that 
forcibly privatized common lands suitable for agriculture, and placed forests and 
pastures under control of the Municipalities. 
Notably, the law also introduced some legal constraints that still nowadays affect 
the Italian common-pool resources. These, are the followings: 
 Inalienability: the property of the resource cannot be transferred from the right-
holders to someone else, nor become a private good, given that its integrity is 
considered of public interest. Thus, right-holders cannot be considered full owners, 
sensu Schlager and Ostrom (1992). 
 Indivisibility, i.e. the legal common-pool resource ownership cannot be divided 
between single right-holders, but only considered as a whole, single property unit. 
Because of this feature, originating from the ancient German right, common 
property regime has been defined as a `tertium genus´ (a third way) within the 
Italian legal framework (Cacciavillani, 2012 in Cacciavillani et al., 2012). 
 Inusucapionability: coherently with the fact that full ownership is not 
acknowledged, adverse possession is precluded; 
 fixed land use destination: it cannot be changed because of the high values, both 
environmental and socio-cultural ones, that make the resource worth of 
protection. 
Following the law no. 1766/1927, Municipalities were entrusted with 
management responsibilities over the former common lands. As a consequence, every 
municipal citizen gained the right to benefit from the resource exploitation, regardless 
of former right-holders’ communities, and previously existing acceptance rules. 
Strongest and longest-lasting Italian Common Properties, particularly those set in 
the north-eastern part of the Alpine region, energetically reacted to the fascist law. 
Since mid of 20th century, various national and regional legislative initiatives have 
progressively returned power to Common Properties. In 1948, the Decree no. 1104 
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gave them back the faculty to manage their common-pool resources, but such a 
disposition applied to few cases only. 
In 1952, by means of the so-called `First Law on the Mountain´ (law no. 
1979/1952), the Common Properties’ statutory autonomy was recognized by law. 
Nevertheless, some following odd jurisprudential verdicts impeded a full application of 
the law. 
In 1971, the Italian Parliament enacted the Second Law on the Mountain (law no. 
1102/1971), finally declaring the inapplicability of the fascist law no. 1766/1927 to the 
`close´ Common Properties. Not less important, these were entrusted with a private 
legal personality – albeit their common property regime, and their public interest. 
Finally, in 1994 the Italian Parliament tackled again the issue concerning common 
property regimes (law no. 97/1994, third Law on the Mountain), assigning them a 
relevant public role, i.e. the concurrence to the environmental protection and the 
socio-economic enhancement of mountainous areas. Again, the national law 
appointed the Italian Regions the responsibility to define and reorganize the legal 
discipline concerning local Common Properties. 
1.2.4. The peculiar case of the Veneto Region 
The national law also gave Italian regions the power to define and reorganize the 
regulations concerning regional common property regimes. Taking their cue from a 
climate of supporting legislation, some Italian regions began to support participation of 
Common Properties in regional forest and landscape management processes. 
The Veneto Region was first in line in the policy process of new recognition of the 
collective role in rural development and forest landscape management. In fact, 
through the regional law no. 26/1996 and its following integrations (through R.L. 
9/2008 and R.L. 13/2012), the Veneto Region recognized the regional Common 
Properties as subjects concurring in the environmental protection and in the socio-
economic development of mountainous territories. Indeed, in the Veneto Region 
Common Properties have a long-lasting tradition. Mostly called `Regole´ (sing. Regola), 
these institutions can also assume different names, like Vicinia, General Convicinia, 
Colonnello (Bortoli, 2005) – several other names occur along the country. 
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The exact historical moment when Italian Common Properties were set down is 
not precisely known, and it certainly varies for each specific case (geographical and 
historical peculiarities). Specifically focussing on the Veneto Region case study area, 
the most ancient written documents testify their existence before 1000 BC (Zanderigo 
Rosolo, 1982, in Florian, 2003). Someone suggests that this kind of institutional 
management dates back even to the early origins of human colonization of the Alps, as 
people were forced to strong ties and living together to face strong and challenging 
environment conditions (Tomasella, 2001). 
Furthermore, the Region enhanced the reconstitution of past Common Properties 
firstly dismantled by the adoption of the Napoleon Civil Code in early 19th century, and 
then by means of law no. 1766/1927. In order to obtain the legal recognition, Common 
Properties have to provide the Region with their statutes, the list of the right-holders 
entrusted with the common property rights and the list of goods and resources 
commonly owned. 
As a consequence of the R.L. 26/1996 approval, Common Properties have been 
restored when local citizens succeeded in giving evidence of their original tenure 
rights, set in place before past land property reforms and subsequent hostile legislative 
initiatives. 
The aim of such a reconstitution was to promote investment choices in the 
forestry-, pasture- and agriculture-related sectors. To this point, Gatto et al. (2012) 
suggested that the regional Common Properties, that usually operate at a smaller 
geographical scale than municipal administrative units, actually demonstrate a positive 
commitment in actively managing their forests and pastures, and in making 
investments to improve or maintain the quality of commonly-held assets. Noteworthy, 
the regional explicitly stressed which public interests the regional Common Properties 
are called to pursue. Coherently with the national legislation, and despite their 
common regime, the regional law confirmed the legal status of private personality is 
assigned to Common Properties. 
Data provided by Gatto et al. (2012) show good feedbacks following the regional 
law, since 17 Common Properties have been re-constituted after its enactment. The 
total Common Properties number in the Veneto Region equals to 54, but other 
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processes of formal recognition are currently ongoing and, therefore, that figure is 
expected to increase. 
The regional law also regulated the coordination between Common Properties 
and public bodies, especially Municipalities, prescribing that the latter should always 
pre-emptively inform and involve the former in public initiatives and consultations 
concerning local territorial development. 
The need for this latter prescription emerges out of several observations: 
 First of all, Municipalities represent the entire resident population of communities. 
Residents of Municipalities include both members and non-members of local 
Common Properties. 
 Municipal decisions and actions must be informed by broad territorial vision that 
goes beyond sectorial interests such as forest management to ensure 
comprehensive territorial development. 
 Historical dimensions come into play in that Municipalities were held responsible 
for managing common-pool resources prior to re-constitution of local Common 
Properties, meaning that Municipalities also had to adapt to new governance 
dynamics once Common Properties were re-constituted. In fact, where the 
reconstitution processes succeeded, a considerable change occurred in the forest 
land ownership structure, with large forest assets shifting from public property and 
management to the common ones. Nonetheless, Municipalities still exert an 
overarching administrative control and planning functions over the lands 
comprised within their boundaries, common lands included. 
 Yet, the regional law also regulates the coordination between Common Properties 
and public bodies, particularly Municipalities, prescribing that Common Properties 
should be pre-emptively informed and involved in an array of policy procedures 
concerning the local territorial development. 
For all the reasons above, the Veneto Region represents an interesting case for 
assessing the capacity for polycentric governance between Municipalities and both 
long-running and newly re-constituted Common Properties. At the same time, the 
recent, fast-paced process of re-constitution of Common Properties has the potential 
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to create or increase institutional tensions at the local level, especially due to the new 
need to coordinate management rights and responsibilities between these institutions. 
1.3. Managing socio-economic and institutional complexity: 
the polycentric governance approach 
1.3.1. Challenges and opportunities between past and future 
Socio-economic inclusiveness 
In the common-pool resource public management imposed by the fascist law, the 
right-holders’ community forcibly corresponded to the whole local citizenry, i.e. all 
people living within the municipal administrative boundaries people could advance 
righteous claims over common-pool resources exploitation. Notably, the right-holders’ 
number considerably decreased when the national and regional laws assigned the 
private legal personality to the Italian Common Properties. In fact, through reinstating 
these ancient institutions, stricter entrance rules characterizing such systems (mainly, 
lineage) have been reinstated too, therefore lowering the right-holders’ corpus. 
On the one hand, for sure this `new´ situation led to more favourable common-
pool resource management and governance conditions, e.g. higher control levels by a 
well-defined group of people over `their´ resource exploitation, therefore discouraging 
free-riding behaviours. On the other hand, such a restriction may also result in a 
reduction in the variety of interests to be considered in such governance processes 
and management options. 
In fact, smaller number of people involved in and linked with the resource itself, 
less the number of stakeholders’ interests and perspectives to be possibly considered 
in the common-pool resource management. In the most critical scenario, that is in case 
of few right-holders, and low interest and participation to the common governance 
processes even within the (small) right-holders’ community, the common management 
would suffer a kind of shift toward `private´ (i.e. few more than personal) management 
conditions. In such a situation, pursue of public interests that Common Properties are 
entrusted with could be threatened as well. Figure 1 summarises this speculation. 
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Figure 1 – Reverse correlation between third parties’ involvement and number of interests 
considered in managing the resource (Schurr, 2011). 
 
To this point, Carestiato (2008) remarked that Common Properties partially lost 
their social and economic functions under the pressure of the current liberal economic 
model, while it maintained a strong cultural connotation “useful to maintain some 
traditional activities but not always sufficient to protect environmental and landscape 
features protected by law” (in the Author’s words). 
Maybe less explicitly, also other Authors suggested the risk that some right-
holders’ communities experienced such a similar situation. Florian (2003) stated that 
some household members feel so much to belong to a long-lasting traditional system 
(the Regola) that they would like to restore it irrespective of the demographic and 
environmental conditions currently characterizing mountainous areas. 
To this point, Steinicke et al. (2014) demonstrated that the recent inflow of 
newcomers (retired people, non-EU immigrants, distance workers, commuters, young 
urban `alternatives´, etc.) appears of real importance in the Alps (Figures 2 and 3), as it 
seems capable of reversing the demographic decline in many mountain areas, due to 
emigration and ageing population. 
Somehow, these recent demographic changes, along with their socio- economic 
drivers and consequences, mirror the changes that in the last decades deeply affected, 
and still influence, the Alpine forest landscapes, with special reference to the role that 
forests play in the so-called rural development. In fact, at least until the Fifties, the 
Italian forests and agriculture landscapes played a fundamental role in ensuring basic 
means of subsistence to the mainly rural country population. Especially in the 
mountain areas, local people used to satisfy almost every need through an intensive 
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exploitation of forests (house building, house heating, cooking, etc.). As a consequence 
of the deep socio-economic developments occurred throughout the country after that 
period, i.e. urbanization, development of tertiary sector, new road networks and 
connections, etc., forests progressively lost their fundamental role in ensuring 
livelihoods of local mountain and rural populations. Definitely, forests landscapes 
experienced a dramatic change in their physiognomy (pasture extension decreased, 
whilst forests doubled in size). At the same time, whereas traditional forestry lost its 
traditional salience, demand for `new´ and complementary forest environmental 
services and functions, others than the provisioning one, is continuously increasing. 
Among the others, protection from natural hazards (>90% of Italian forests extend 
over areas with high hydro-geological risk), biodiversity protection, health care-related 
services such as water quality and carbon storage, protection and promotion of 
cultural heritages and values, recreational activities, aesthetic and existence values are 
worth of mention. Notably, although these environmental services somehow 
counterbalanced the loss of salience of the traditional timber-related activities, often 
they are difficult to be valued and priced, and their markets are only at an early 
development stage, and few examples exist (e.g. carbon credit markets, payments for 
environmental services). 
As a consequence of such a process, potential right-holders and claimants over 
natural resources substantially increased too, given that more people pretend to have 
a `right´ over common-pool resources and to join their benefit streams, i.e. not only 
people living in the mountain areas. Definitely, this new environmental awareness 
about the far-reaching public role of forests triggered the adoption of new 
environmentally-friendly legislations. These, sometimes introduced some limitations to 
Common Property activities, including administrative procedures and constraints to be 
followed and fulfilled by Common Properties in their day-by-day and traditional forest 
management. For instance, the national law protecting the landscape heritage, i.e. the 
so called legge Galasso (law no. 431/1985), applies to common lands. To this point, 
Carestiato (2008) remarked the paradox that a virtuous management carried out by 
Common Properties throughout the history led to more imposed constraints than for 
those situation where past management was not such as virtuous and righteous as 
common management. Contrarily, some experiences suggest that through direct 
34 
involvement of local communities in the management of Parks and protected areas 
excellent goals can be achieved, there is a high incentive to maintain the resource in a 
good status and Common Properties can find new stimuli to further enhance their 
management skills (Carestiato, 2008; Gatto et al., 2012). A similar disclosure of new 
challenges and possibilities, along with the imposition of some management 
limitations, has been detected at a supranational level, following the international 
commitments toward biodiversity protection (Kothari et al., 2012). 
For these reasons, the Common Properties’ capability to effectively pursue the 
objectives and responsibilities that the regional law entrusts them with, i.e. 
environmental conservation and management and socio-economic development of 
mountain areas, is worth to be evaluated. Particularly, the Common Properties’ 
attitude toward the proactive supply of a `new´ set of environmental services and 
functions, complementary to the traditional forestry, seems worth of analysis. Indeed, 
a general lack of information extends over the real management actions undertaken 
by the regional Common Properties in their day-by-day forest management. With the 
almost only exceptions of data and figures provided by Gatto et al. (2012) and 
Zanderigo Rosolo (2012), the operative outputs and collective performances remain 
almost unknown as well. Yet, Branca and Perone-Pacifico (2003) argued that, at the 
Italian national level, a deplorable lack of accurate information on common-pool 
resource systems impedes to design and implement relevant policy instruments, 
adequate to support the national common-pool resource systems, both in 
administrative and operative terms. 
This assessment should be also performed in the light of the deep societal and 
demographic changes that the Italian Alps have gone through, either in the past and 
still at present days. Reflections on the Common Properties’ capability to ensure social 
inclusiveness should not be therefore neglected. In fact, it might be speculated that, if 
a common strong collective identity more anchored to the past than projected to the 
future would prevail, such a kind of socio-economic common `closure´ would 
undesirably conflict with the achievement of the public interests that the regional law 
entrusted Common Properties with, i.e. a socio-economic development of 
mountainous areas. On the other hand, the same survival of excessively `close´ 
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Common Properties would be threatened, because of their incapacity to react and 
adapt to broad societal changes. Indeed, on these point some doubts have been 
already raised. Gatto et al. (2012) argued that “the traditional tools which the 
communities have given themselves to manage their resources might be today not 
always sufficient to adapt to external change and disturbances, thus sometime leading 
to non-resilient socio-ecological systems”. 
Figure 2 – Population development in the 
Italian Alps between 1951 and 1991. 
Modified from Steinicke et al. (2014). 
 
Figure 3 – Population development in the 
Italian Alps between 2002 and 2010. Modified 
from Steinicke et al. (2014). 
 
The institutional framework 
The current need to reduce public expenditures is fostering widespread 
institutional reforms in Italy. This has specifically been manifested in the progressive 
loss of the lowest levels of public and private-public multi-utility companies 
administrative units, including the merging local government institutions 
(Municipalities) and the parallel dismantling of supra-local administrative units – 
Mountain Communities (alliances of Municipalities) and provinces. This institutional 
reform process is seriously calling into question the existing governance models and 
mechanisms that currently typify mountain areas (Gatto et al., 2012). In this situation, 
concerns have been raised about the capacity of the public administration to ensure 
subsidiarity in environmental and natural resource management policies and to deal 
realistically with management issues at the local level. 
In this present changing governance context, the revival, re-constitution and 
empowerment of traditional forms of local management, above all Common 
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Properties, could help counterbalance, or at least mitigate, the turmoil of re-
organization of local public institutions. 
Nonetheless, a better understanding of the positioning of these institutions is 
needed to appreciate how this might proceed. In particular, the role of Common 
Properties and municipal administrative units at the local level needs attention, as 
decentralized governance has resulted in a situation in which management 
responsibilities are sometimes unclear and occasionally contested between these local 
institutional actors. 
To this point, most of the existing bibliographic resources that deal with the Italian 
common domain limit their analyses to the historical vicissitudes that common lands 
passed through, or analyse legal issues in technical terms, e.g. discussing legal verdicts 
concerning ownership and tenureship rights peculiarly characterising common lands. 
The Scialoja-Bolla archive collects several of these contributions 
(http://www.usicivici.unitn.it/scialoja-bolla/). 
Some other publications discuss about internal governance and policy issues of 
Common Properties, mainly concerning gender balance, inter-generational renovation, 
need for statute renovation amongst others. Recently, Zanderigo Rosolo (2012, in 
Cacciavillani et al., 2012) depicted a comprehensive review of the ongoing debates 
inside right-holders’ communities. 
Contrarily, very few published works assessed whether and how, the internal 
collective dynamics also relate to and influence both the socio-economic and 
institutional environments of the whole local mountain communities of residents, 
administratively circumscribable to Municipalities, that Regole belong to. 
Florian (2004) reported that in some cases heavy legal disputes and institutional 
contrasts with local Municipalities were absorbing many available economic and 
administrative energies of the newly-reconstituted Common Properties. Carestiato 
(2008) pointed out a similar situation. 
More Recently, Hampel (2012) focussed on the `cultural´ adaptive internal process 
that is currently occurring within many Common Properties in the Veneto Region, and 
pointed out that often Common Property members now perceive resources more as 
their individual property, through a `feeling of power ´. She implicitly suggested that 
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this attitude might have negative consequences on the broader surrounding social 
environment that Regole are embedded within. To our knowledge, no other authors 
further analysed the institutional relationship patterns occurring between Common 
Properties and municipal administrations, although there are hints 1 of disparate 
administrative and legal issues still pending, insomuch to hinder remarkably the 
implementation or the achievement of integrated territorial development strategies. 
We understand institutional tensions to arise when both Municipalities and 
Common Properties claim their administrative jurisdiction over a specific task or role. 
Indeed, chronic tensions could compromise the effectiveness of Common Properties in 
managing the landscape for environmental conservation and local socio-economic 
development. 
Notably, in her seventh design principles, Ostrom (1990) highlighted the 
importance that common institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities, potentially capable to overturn rules and commonly devised systems. 
Thus, whereas the institutional nesting criterion can be considered substantially 
fulfilled at the Italian national level, likewise at the regional level in the Veneto Region 
too, some uncertainties still may affect the lowest administrative levels, i.e. at 
municipal level. 
Then, the polycentric governance seems functional to deal with situations of 
decentralized power and decision-making, and is appropriate for an analysis of the 
relationship between the Common Properties and Municipalities of the Veneto Region. 
1.3.2. Polycentric governance 
Environmental and natural resource management problems rarely manifest 
themselves at a single scale such that management responsibility divided among 
different levels is perceived as desirable (Armitage, 2008). This type of institutional 
arrangement has been termed multilevel governance, and is considered a key feature 
of adaptive resource governance. Although desirable management practices may 
result from coordination of management powers across scales, outcomes are often 
                                                          
 
1
 Mainly, personal and informal communications with representatives of public administrations. 
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unpredictable and analytical approaches are best advised to incorporate themes of 
power relations and their mediation across scales (Armitage, 2008). 
In complex natural resource management contexts, different actors may hold 
different bundles of rights and powers. Furthermore, interaction due to increasing 
number and heterogeneity of actors involved in management of a resource may 
exaggerate already well-studied problems of excludability and subtractability 
characteristic of common-pool resource management dilemmas (Mwangi and Wardell, 
2012). Growing attention to polycentric schemes in the Commons literature may 
better capture these dynamics in situations featuring multiple levels of governance but 
also multiple centres of power (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). The literature on 
Commons points to the likelihood of positive outcomes in polycentric systems when 
users have decision-making power to modify rules, and when these local institutions 
are nested in hierarchical governance arrangements that can provide support for local 
needs and circumstances (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom makes special reference in her 8th 
design principle for enduring common property regimes to the necessity of 
organization in `multiple layers of nested enterprises´ (Ostrom, 2005: 269). Such 
nested systems can be considered polycentric when decision-making power is 
distributed among actors. However, institutional hierarchies may not involve a clear 
multi-level structure nested in territorial jurisdictions (Poteete, 2012). Poorly 
coordinated polycentric decision-making situations may feature contested authority, 
access regimes, and benefit sharing arrangements. 
The division of territorial management responsibilities across institutional levels 
sets up situation of cross-scale interaction and institutional interplay, described as the 
process by which potential synergies or conflicts come into being among different 
institutional layers (Marshall, 2007; Young, 2002). Gruby and Basurto (2014) argue that 
situations of interplay may emerge around control that actors gain or lose over specific 
parts of decision-making processes through linkages across organizational levels, and 
the relative autonomy of actors in polycentric governance arrangements. Coordination 
of decision-making and collaboration across polycentric systems requires actors to 
take decisions on how to coordinate governance tasks across levels. The principle of 
subsidiarity leaves some doubts as to how this might be done, especially in rapidly 
changing governance contexts, as multiple institutions with different aims at local level 
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may be thrown together to resolve complex management dilemmas. In such 
situations, the polycentric governance literature might by developed upon because it 
references the interaction of overlapping networks of institutions vs discreet territorial 
levels (Bache and Flinders, 2004 in Mwangi and Wardell, 2012). 
Often, polycentric governance issues strictly relate to cross-scale interactions. 
Adaptive dynamics in environment-society relationships involve changes in 
technologies, practices and institutions in response to perturbations at different scales 
(Davidson-Hunt et al., 2013). Some types of change may require coordination among 
institutions, involving the rescaling of governance arenas in order to respond to 
perturbations at the appropriate scale (Davidson-Hunt et al., 2013). Where complex 
governance arrangements exist, adaptation requires linking horizontally and vertically 
across institutional levels. 
We adopt terminology from Berkes (2002) to classify interactions across scales. 
Horizontal linkages refer to interactions across spatial scales but within the same 
organizational level, while vertical linkages refer to interactions across levels of 
organization (Berkes, 2002). Commons associating at the level of valley, Municipality, 
region and/or State when we refer to vertical links and internal exchange among 
members of a common or any other abovementioned level when referring to 
horizontal links. 
A related issue is the collective definition of problems if actors must agree on the 
appropriate scale (Adams et al., 2003). Difficulties may be encountered in the way 
change is perceived across organizational scales. Furthermore, trade-offs may be 
perceived in forming linkages across scales, both horizontally and vertically. 
Adaptation requires local actors to deal with the mobilization of power of diverse 
actors and stakeholders (Adger et al., 2006), especially as new resources or 
opportunities to control management and economic development processes are 
perceived at various scales. In changing action situations, scale issues potentially 
constrain or enable collective action to resolve resource management dilemmas 
emerging in the context of a changing environment or changing socio-economic or 
socio-ecological system. 
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As a final remark, to further stress the fit with a polycentric governance analysis, 
in the observed cases Common Properties sometimes nested neatly into higher 
institutional levels (i.e. Municipalities), but this was not always the case. 
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2. Research questions, objectives and methodology 
2.1. Research questions 
In the light of the new challenges and opportunities that nowadays the Italian 
Common Properties are called to face and cope with, two main research objectives 
have been identified. These, have been further described through sub-research 
questions: 
1. Which institutional patterns and communication channels characterize the existing 
institutional relationships between common property regimes and municipal 
administrations in the Veneto Region? 
a. Do cooperative relationships prevail, and can be institutional tensions 
considered sporadic, or do deeper and chronic conflicts affect their mutual 
institutional relationship? 
b. Which prerequisites and conditions best facilitate the establishment of fruitful 
and cooperative relationships between these two institutional entities? 
c. Are the ongoing regional attempts at reconciliation between public policies and 
collective strategies likely to result in higher levels of synergies and 
coordination, not only within the forest sector, but also with reference to a 
wider set of related socio-economic activities? Alternatively, which currently 
underlying tensions are likely to disclose in the future, being detrimental to 
such institutional collaboration and coordination? 
2. Within the Veneto Region, do the Common Properties give concrete answers to 
the aims and prescriptions that the Regional law entrusted them with? 
a. Can be the outcomes of the re-assignment of former municipal forests to 
Common Properties considered positive in terms of improved forest 
management practices and environmental services supply? 
b. Do Common Properties actually commit themselves to actively promote the 
socio-economic development of the regional mountainous areas – also beyond 
the boundaries of the right-holders’ communities? 
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2.2. Objectives and research steps 
Thesis objectives can be synthetized as follows: 
- Description and assessment of the institutional patterns which the institutional 
relationships between Common Properties and Municipalities are based on, trying 
to evaluate their mutual degree of cooperation in their own and interdependent 
statutory competences; 
- evaluation of whether, and to what extent, the Common Properties in the Veneto 
Region give concrete answers to the aims and prescriptions that the Regional law 
entrusted them with, i.e. forest landscape management and protection and socio-
economic development of rural mountain areas. 
Then, research activities have been modulated in three different phases: 
1) The institutional representatives (e.g. Majors, Aldermen, Councillors, etc.) of those 
Municipalities including Regole within their administrative boundaries have been 
contacted in the first step. Through an interviewing campaign, they have been 
asked to provide information on the institutional relationship patterns 
characterising their institutional relationship with the local Common Properties. 
They were also inquired so to reveal their own perception about the Common 
Property’s capability to effectively stimulate the socio-economic development of 
mountain areas and proactively pursue a sound forest management; 
2) In the second phase, taking advantage of some available data not analysed yet, the 
latter key-issue has been deepened, i.e. the Common Properties’ attitude towards 
the active provision of environmental services, particularly those others than 
wood. This step foreruns the following, ascertained that the related results would 
have been informative for the last research phase; 
3) To check and compare municipal representatives’ opinions with common 
representatives’ ones, a new set of interviews has been carried out, targeting 
Common Properties’ representatives. Again, the collaborative mechanisms and the 
institutional linkages horizontally linking Common Properties with Municipalities 
have been explored, along with their self-evaluation on their own management 
options and outputs. 
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The following Table summarises cross-links among the different research steps, 
along with their connections with the above-mentioned research questions. 
Table 3 – Cross-links among different research steps, and connections with the research 
questions. 
 Research phase #no. 
 Phase #1 Phase #2 Phase #3 
Methodological approach Qualitative 
Quali-quantitative 
(descriptive statistics) 
Qualitative 
Data collection Field data collection 
Secondary data 
analysis 
Field data collection 
Correspondence with 
(research questions no.) 
Research question #1 
Research question #2 
Research question #2 
Research question #1 
Research question #2 
Research step informative for 
(research phase #no.) 
Research phase #2 
Research phase #3 
Research phase #3 --- 
Research step informed by 
(research phase #no.) 
--- --- 
Research phase #1 
Research phase #2 
Cross-check with 
(research phase #no.) 
Research phase #3 
Research phase #1 
Research phase #3 
Research phase #1 
Research phase #2 
According to such three-step work subdivision, in the following `Methodology´ 
sub-chapter, the description of the adopted methodological approach has been split 
and presented in three different sections, one for each research phase. 
For the same reason, the `Result´ chapter has been divided too, calling again 
attention to the three-phase research subdivision. 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Qualitative approach: ratio of choice 
The decision whether a quantitative or qualitative approach should have been 
preferred, adopted and implemented to answer the research questions has been 
carefully pondered. 
One possibility would have been the adoption of an analytical and quantitative 
approach, accompanied by the development of a conceptual framework based on a set 
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of dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators to be measured and estimated, to finally 
perform an evaluating assessment and quantitatively answer the research questions. 
Nevertheless, few bibliographic resources have shed light on either strategic and 
day-by-day pragmatic activities usually carried out by the regional Common Properties, 
definitely causing a lack of knowledge, at least empirical, on the matter of study. How 
collective governance dynamics and strategies relate to, and influence, either the 
socio-economic and institutional environments of the local mountain communities 
they belong to, was worth to be further explored too. Setting up a well-informed 
conceptual framework has been thought possible secondarily to this preliminary 
explorative research, in order not to build criteria and indicators more on partial and 
possibly biased information, rather than on robust and `factual´ key-factors. A 
qualitative approach has been therefore selected, as in-depth described hereinafter. 
2.3.2. First research step: the municipal perspective 
This study made use of a simple but effective data collection procedure: a 
structured survey instrument administered during face-to-face interviews. The 
instrument contained both closed and open-ended responses, allowing for analysis 
across respondents from organizations of the same category at similar administrative 
levels. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that only the municipal side is 
represented here, and that it would be worth conducting other surveys in the future, 
in order to do a cross-check between municipal and collective (right-holders’) 
positions. 
Closed-ended responses called for exactly worded questions and multiple choice 
answers, sometimes variable according to initial yes-no queries or other funnel 
questions. Probing questions were adopted when a full exploratory approach was 
particularly needed, therefore eliciting thoughtful answers, also possibly through 
follow-up questions. Generally, interviewees were encouraged to highlight causes and 
motivations, and provide evidences of their statements, possibly integrating also 
closed-ended responses with further open reasoning. Qualitative information were 
mainly collected, though exceptions exist (e.g. Likert scales). 
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Interviews (duration: 1-1.5 hour) have been carried out in Spring and Summer 
2013 by one researcher, also assisted by a young Master student. Answers have been 
written down, and only later transcribed on a database, as interview recording could 
have refrained respondents from answering freely. Notably, to prevent strategic 
answers, interviewees have been also granted that all the collected data and relevant 
information would have been elaborated aggregately. 
Every Municipality with one or more Common Properties standing within its own 
administrative boundaries has been contacted; response rate equalled to 70%. Thus, 
representatives of 14 out of 17 Municipalities were interviewed. Three municipal 
administrations renounced to answer the questionnaire, without advancing any exact 
reason - political reluctance was implicit. Although they represent only ~17% of the 
total Common Property-affected municipal population, 16 Common Properties stand 
within their boundaries, i.e. ~30% of the regional Common Properties’ population. 
Table 4 shows in which Municipalities the interviews actually occurred. 
A purposive respondents’ sampling strategy has been pursued as well, aimed to 
select the officer most responsible for, or at least well informed about the formal and 
informal relationships occurring between Municipalities and local Common Properties. 
Preliminarily, each municipal secretariat has been contacted by phone and email to 
give forth the research objectives and methodologies, then asking for the municipal 
representative most apt to answer the questionnaire. Interviewees covered different 
roles in the municipal administrations: namely 10 mayors, 2 council members, 1 
municipal secretary and 1 office manager. 
The key-issues to be assessed were mainly identified through informal 
communications with representatives of public administrations, and according to 
personal knowledge and experience. The following themes were investigated with the 
help of the survey instrument. Table 5 further descripts them. 
 Main communication channels existing between municipal and collective 
administrations: (i) institutional coordination patterns, (ii) Common Property 
members’ representation on the town council, (iii) reference persons in formal 
relationships and prevalence of formal or informal contacts in such relationships. 
Our hypothesis was that the higher the representation of Common Property 
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members in the municipal administration, the greater the robustness of 
institutional linkages between Municipalities and local Common Properties. 
 Administrative constraints that Municipalities need to deal with by law, due to the 
compulsory nature of interfacing with Common Properties on some particular 
policies concerning territorial management decisions, such as urban development 
plans (cf. paragraph `Urban and territorial management and development´). 
 Projects, activities and situations in which Common Properties and Municipalities 
cooperated, distinguishing four policy fields: (i) environmental management and 
conservation, (ii) local economic development, (iii) urban and territorial 
management and development and (iv) promotion of the local culture, customs 
and practices. The selection of these areas of interest was driven by the fact that 
the regional law prescribes that Municipalities have to pre-emptively inform and 
involve Common Properties in their initiatives concerning these issues. 
 Economic effects suffered by Municipalities due to the reconstitution of former 
Common Properties, as these began to collect forest management revenues; Our 
hypothesis was that the abrupt shortfall of these incomes – due to the changes in 
the property regimes – generated negative impacts on the economic balances and 
budget of Municipalities, particularly for those lying in mountain areas where mass 
tourism is not well developed and the local economy is still partially based on 
traditional agro-forestry activities. 
 Present or past occurrence of legal disputes, and the occurrence of institutional 
tensions, if any. 
 Presence and magnitude of social tensions due to the exclusion of non-rights-
holders from common-pool resource benefits. Here, social tensions refer to 
attitudes, actions and decisions on the part of Common Properties discriminating 
between right holders and non-right-holders, which are perceived by many non-
members as generating detrimental rifts in the local community that the Common 
Property members belong to. 
 Responses related to efficiency and effectiveness of local Common Properties in 
promoting (i) environmental conservation, (ii) social development, (iii) local 
economic development and (iv) tourism. Although promotion of tourism can be 
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considered a sub-distinction of economic development, it has been treated 
separately, given the major role that it plays in shaping and defining the latter. 
The whole questionnaire is reported in Annex I. 
Table 4 – Municipalities affected by Common Properties’ existence, no. of 
Common Properties standing within each municipal boundaries, and 
municipal administrations contacted during the interviewing campaign. 
Municipality 
Common Properties within 
municipal boundaries (no.) 
Interviewed 
Auronzo di Cadore 2 Yes 
Borca di Cadore 1 Yes 
Chies d’Alpago 5 Yes 
Colle Santa Lucia 3 Yes 
Comelico superiore 4 Yes 
Cortina d'Ampezzo 11 No 
Danta di Cadore 2 Yes 
Forno di Zoldo2 See footnote See footnote 
Pedemonte (VI) 1 Yes 
Pieve di Cadore 3 Yes 
San Nicolò di Comelico 2 No 
San Pietro di Cadore 4 Yes 
San Vito di Cadore 3 Yes 
Santo Stefano di Cadore 4 Yes 
Selva di Cadore 3 No 
Vigo di Cadore 1 Yes 
Vodo di Cadore 2 Yes 
Zoldo Alto 2 Yes 
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 In Forno di Zoldo no Common Properties had been already re-established when the interviews were 
carried out, but at that time four reconstitution processes were actively ongoing. One municipal 
representative and one regoliere (collective right-holder) have been interviewed, thanks to a sort of 
unintended “snowball” selection method. In these cases, interviews were very similar to informal talks, 
and an unstructured approach definitely prevailed. Thus, answers have been taken into account in 
shaping general reflections, but they have not been explicitly considered in the results section. 
 Table 5 – Main assessed issues, sub-issues, main collected information and adopted methodology (first research step). 
Legend: Mc: open-ended question with multiple choice; Ls: open-ended question with Likert scale; OEq: open-ended question. 
Main issue Sub-issue Main collected information Methodology 
Identity records and 
preliminary data 
Interviewee identity records 
Name; role within the municipal administration; reasons for being 
designated as questionnaire respondent 
(-), OEq 
Municipality identity records  
Name; extension; forest and pasture assets still owned/under 
municipal control 
(-), Mc 
Representatives & 
institutional 
coordination 
Double-representativeness (both in the Town 
Council and Common Property administration) 
Roles respectively covered in the municipal administration and 
Common Property boards 
Mc 
Institutional privileged spokesmen 
Interlocutors responsible for both formal and informal Municipality-
Common Property communications: roles and positions 
Mc 
Institutional 
coordination 
 
+ graphic 
questionnaire 
Institutional coordination mechanisms Existence of written memoranda; typologies (if any) Mc, (OEq) 
Municipal dependence on Common Properties’ 
action, and vice versa 
Subject usually taking the institutional initiative; political and 
administrative constraint/freedom dependent on each other’s 
institutional activities 
Mc, (OEq) 
Common Properties’ involvement by the 
Municipality, and vice versa, in projects, actions, 
activities, concerning (i) urban development and 
territorial strategies; (ii) economic development; 
(iii) forest and environmental management; (iv) 
social development 
Projects, actions, activities, circumstances when such involvement 
occurred; prevalence of formal/informal contacts in the institutional 
coordination; co-management and/or co-funding; possible issues 
(if any) OEq, 
Mc 
(if no) Mc, 
(OEq) 
Other agreements and coordination between 
the Municipality and Common Properties 
Municipality managing common assets through ad hoc mandate, and 
vice versa; any other projects, actions, activities, circumstances when 
mutual coordination came to light 
OEq 
Common Property 
reconstitution and 
financial impacts on 
municipal balance 
sheets 
Assessment of the existence of impacts 
Causes; magnitude; Impact patterns: positive vs. negative, direct vs. 
indirect, continuous vs. una tantum 
Mc 
Consequences and adaptations to financial 
impacts 
Administrative and policy adaptations; consequences for the whole 
local community 
OEq 
Reinvestment rate Former municipal reinvestment rate on forest assets prior to Common Mc 
 Property reconstitution 
Institutional SWOT 
analysis 
Institutional coordination assessment 
Reality vs. potentiality in the Municipality-Common Properties 
coordination  
Mc, Ls 
Institutional SWOT analysis OEq 
Municipal policy processes & Common 
Properties’ internal life dynamics 
Municipal involvement in Common Properties’ internal life and 
governance 
Mc, (OEq) 
Dependence of municipal policy processes on internal Common 
Properties’ governance mechanisms 
OEq 
Assessment of 
Common 
Properties’ 
effectiveness 
Common Properties’ skills assessment, 
concerning (i) forest management and 
environmental conservation; (ii) economic 
development; (iii) tourism promotion; (iv) social 
development 
Projects, actions, activities; motivations; possible issues OEq, SSa 
Evaluation and rate justification Ls, Mc, (OEq) 
Benefit coverage 
Extension of Common Properties’ action benefits beyond the right-
holders’ community;  
Mc, (OEq) 
Outlooks and future 
expectations 
Institutional relationship patterns between 
Municipalities and Common Properties, and 
among different Common Properties 
Positive and/or negative expectations and related opinions Mc, OEq  
Strengthening of the institutional coordination 
Actions to be possibly implemented to reinforce Municipality-Common 
Properties coordination 
OEq 
Legal disputes, 
institutional 
contrasts and other 
issues 
Legal disputes 
Past/current existence of Municipality-Common Properties legal 
disputes; reasons; foreseeable solutions 
(if any) Mc, 
OEq 
Institutional contrasts 
Past/current existence of Municipality-Common Properties institutional 
contrasts; reasons; possible solutions 
Mc, Ls, OEq 
Social issues and non-right holders’ opinions on 
Common Properties 
Existence of social frictions due to Common Properties’ activities; 
reasons; magnitude; expected evolution 
Mc, Ls, OEq 
(Indirect) assessment; positive and negative acknowledgments 
concerning Common Properties’ activities 
Ls, OEq 
Any other relevant 
issue 
Any other relevant sub-issue Any other relevant information OEq 
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2.3.3. Second research step: which proactive supply for the environmental services? 
The municipal and collective commitment and attitude towards the provision of 
environmental services others than wood, have therefore been assessed and 
compared. The following environmental services were selected: biodiversity 
protection, carbon storage, soil protection and water quality regulation, tourism 
promotion and support to recreational activities. 
In particular, it has been assessed whether Common Properties and Municipalities 
explicitly consider the selected environmental services among their current multi-
functional forest management practices. The assigned priority to the supply of the 
environmental services was also tested analysing whether they consider such provision 
as a primary or secondary forest management objective. Finally, respondents declaring 
no or secondary commitment to the supply of one or more environmental services 
were asked to indicate whether they would be potentially interested in strengthening 
their attitude towards such provision, and under which conditions. 
This research step consisted in a secondary data analysis, taking advantage of the 
data collection connected to the EU-FP7 Newforex Project (New Ways to Value and 
Market Forest Externalities). Analysed data were collected through a structured survey 
instrument administered during face-to-face interviews. 
Within the regional boundaries, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
private, public, and collective (Common Properties) forest owners and managers. The 
total number of respondents equalled 197, randomly selected from among the whole 
regional forest owners’ population. Of these, 18 interviews were selected first, all 
those with Common Property representatives – mostly Presidents or Secretaries (out 
of 53 regional Common Properties; coverage: 34%). Interviews with municipal 
representatives were then selected, according to a geographical closeness criterion 
linking Municipalities with those Common Properties lying within their administered 
areas. 11 interviews with municipal representatives were therefore considered (carried 
out within these mountain areas: Zoldano, Ampezzano, Comelico, Cadore and Alpago), 
whereas 12 others were excluded as no information on Common Properties had 
previously been collected in the surrounding areas, and particularly Agordino, Feltrino 
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and Longaronese mountain areas. Table 6 summarises both selected Common 
Properties and Municipalities. 
Table 6 – Newforex questionnaire: sampled Common Properties and 
Municipalities also considered in this research work (secondary data 
analysis) 
Common 
Properties 
Regola di Borca di Cadore 
Regola di Campolongo 
Regola di Candide 
Regola di Cortina D'Ampezzo 
Regola di Costalissoio 
Regola di Costalta 
Regola di Costalta3 
Regola di Funes, Pedol e famiglia Munaro di Molini 
Regola di Mareson 
Regola di Padola 
Regola di Presenaio 
Regola di San Pietro di Cadore 
Regola di San Vito di Cadore 
Regola di Tutta Danta 
Regola di Villagrande di Auronzo di Cadore 
Regola Grande di Coi 
Regola Grande di Colle Santa Lucia 
Regola staccata di Vodo di Cadore 
Municipalities 
Auronzo di Cadore 
Calalzo di Cadore 
Forno di Zoldo 
Ospitale di Cadore 
Perarolo di Cadore 
Pieve D'Alpago 
Tambre D'Alpago 
Valle di Cadore 
Zoldo Alto 
Zoppè di Cadore 
 
The EU-FP7 Newforex Project encompassed a variety of objectives and research 
questions going far beyond the aims and purposes of this research work (see also 
www.newforex.org). Therefore, the research design, data collection and the sampling 
methods were not specifically designed to cover the regional Common Properties 
population, possibly introducing some degrees of statistical inaccuracy in Common 
Property sample representativeness. Nonetheless, it should be here recalled that the 
results analysis followed a qualitative and explorative approach, rather than a 
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 Common lands jointly-owned by 4 different Common Properties (consortium). 
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quantitative one (no other similar surveys had previously been conducted on the same 
topic), and the main findings were also cross-checked and validated with those 
obtained during the other research steps. Thus, any possible representativeness 
inaccuracy of the sample does not seem to be causing any relevant misrepresentation 
of the main figures and results. 
2.3.4. Third research step: the Common Property perspective 
The outcomes of the previous survey suggested that the dominant literature 
exalting Regole and their commitment toward the whole set of responsibilities that the 
national and regional laws entrust them with, might not be always fully well-
motivated. However, the opinions and evaluations by municipal representatives 
needed to be cross-checked with Common Property representatives’ ones, to avoid 
partial and potentially biased conclusions. To check and compare municipal opinions 
with collective ones, directly targeting Common Property representatives an 
explorative approach has been adopted with a focus on the collaborative mechanisms 
horizontally linking Commons with Municipalities, i.e. the institutional linkages (Berkes, 
2002) between the two institutions. 
Face-to-face interviews have been carried out among Common Property 
representatives of those Common Properties located in the same areas where the 
parallel recent survey had been conducted among Municipalities. 
Selected sampling criteria were the following: 
 balanced geographical representativeness, according to the different regional 
mountain areas; 
 inclusion of both long-lasting and newly reconstituted Regole, adopting the 
Regional Law 26/1996 as time rupture; 
 Common Properties–Municipality relationship patterns previously emerged 
from prior data collections and surveys (Favero et al., 2013 and 2014); 
 political and economic Common Properties’ significance. To better define this 
key-point, the most recent Common Property balance sheets were 
preliminarily collected, and informed regional policy stakeholders were also 
inquired. 
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Globally, representatives of 18 different Common Properties (out of 54 regional 
Regole, i.e. 33.3% of the total population) were contacted and interviewed. Table 7 
displays sampled Regole. 13 interviews were with the Common Property Presidents, 
one with a vice-President, 4 with administrative Common Property assistants. 
Table 7 – Sampled and contacted Regole, with information on reference Municipalities, 
formal establishment (whether before or after R.L. 26/1996 enforcement). 
Common Property extended name Municipality 
Common Property establ. 
(before/after R.L. 26/1996) 
Magnifica Regola di Villagrande Auronzo di Cadore After 
Regola di Borca di Cadore Borca di Cadore After 
Regola di Funes, Pedol e famiglie 
Munaro di Molini 
Chies d’Alpago After 
Regola del Monte Salatis Chies d’Alpago After 
Regola Grande di Colle Santa Lucia Colle Santa Lucia Before 
Regola di Casamazzagno Comelico Superiore Before 
Magnifica Regola di Nebbiù Pieve di Cadore Before 
Regola di Tai e Vissà di Cadore Pieve di Cadore After 
Regola di San Pietro San Pietro di Cadore Before 
Regola di Costalta San Pietro di Cadore Before 
Regola Generale o Granda 
Regola di Chiapuzza e Costa 
Regola di Vallesella, Resinego e 
Serdes 
San Vito di Cadore 
(1 single interview) 
After 
Regola di Campolongo Santo Stefano di Cadore Before 
Regola di Costalissoio Santo Stefano di Cadore Before 
Regola di Santo Stefano Santo Stefano di Cadore Before 
Magnifica Regola di Vigo, Laggio con 
Piniè e Pelos di Cadore 
Vigo di Cadore After 
Magnifica Regola Grande dei Monti 
di Vodo 
Vodo di Cadore After 
Regola Grande di Mareson Zoldo Alto After 
Regola di Casotto Pedemonte (VI) After 
 
Again, a semi-structured questionnaire has been developed and adopted in the 
interviewing process, so as to collect coherent and comparable information. Similarly 
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to the research instrument adopted in the first research phase, the following key-
issues have been explored: 
 forest and landscape management; 
 economic development initiatives; 
 tourism promotion, because of its peculiar relevance within the surveyed areas; 
 social development (i.e. initiatives for the welfare of the Common Property 
members and the local community); 
 formal and informal relationships with local Municipalities. 
For each key-issues, Common Property interviewees have been asked to provide 
evidence of the activities they have promoted and implemented. They have been also 
stimulated to reply to some specific critiques by municipal representatives, stating 
how they evaluate such remarks (based on real evidence, controversial, motivated by 
strategic observations, etc.). In any case, they were encouraged to develop complete 
reasoning, highlighting causes and motivations of their actions. 
Notably, to prevent strategic answers, interviewees have been granted that all the 
collected data and relevant information would have been elaborated aggregately. It 
should be also noted that the assessed key-issues were not further defined in more 
details, in order to let interviewees to stress any element they considered worth to be 
emphasized, either factual or more subjective. 
The whole questionnaire is reported in Annex II. 
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3. Results 
According to what stated in the previous ` Objectives and research steps´ section, 
this chapter consists of three sub-chapters, that make reference to the three-phase 
research subdivision. 
Thus, the first `The municipal perspective´ section contains the results of the 
interviews carried out among the institutional representatives of those Municipalities 
that, in the Veneto Region, include Regole within their administrative boundaries. 
In the second section (`Environmental services: which proactive supply?´), results 
concerning the municipal and common attitude toward the active provision of some 
selected environmental services are shown. 
Finally, in the third `The Common Property perspective´ section, the outcomes 
from the interviews carried out among the Common Property representatives are 
discussed. These, are not only relevant per se, but they also allow to compare the 
common representatives’ opinions, positions and answers with the municipal ones. 
3.1. The municipal perspective 
3.1.1. Main communication channels 
Institutional coordination patterns 
Municipal representatives indicated a substantial lack of coordination (rare and 
weak institutional linkages) with local Common Properties in three out of fourteen 
cases (21.4%), involving six common properties standing within their municipal areas 
(case A, Figure 4). Differently, five municipal representatives (35.7%) reported well-
established institutional linkages (case B, Figure 4) with local Common Properties – a 
total of 14 Common Properties. In one case (7.1%) the municipal representative 
suggested that local Common Properties (no. 2) usually fully coordinate their action in 
the institutional relationships with the Municipality (case C, Figure 4). Finally, in five 
other cases (35.7%) local Common Properties coordinate their institutional 
representativeness, but they also maintain specific and single contacts with the 
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Municipality (case C+B, Figure 4), depending whether the policy issues to be discussed 
affect all the local Common Properties, or just one of them. Note that no information 
about the quality of these institutional relationships (positive and fruitful or 
problematic and detrimental) are described here, but only their stability over time. 
Figure 4 – Institutional coordination patterns between Municipalities and Common 
Properties standing within the municipal areas. Case A: rare and weak institutional linkages 
between Municipality and Common Properties, regardless the degree of cooperation among 
different Common Properties; Case B: well-established institutional linkages between Municipality 
and each single local Common Property; Case C: Common Properties fully coordinating their 
representativeness in the institutional relationship with Municipality. Case B+C exist as well. 
 
Representation of Common Property members within the Town Council 
Results demonstrated that in every town Council, at least one Councillor, 
Alderman4 or even the mayor (nine cases, 64.3%) was also a Common Property 
member. Then, ascertained that these representatives are offspring of a household 
head, they also had the possibility to participate to the common Assembly as full right-
holders, or on behalf of the household head. In only two cases (14.3%), neither the 
mayor nor any of the Aldermen were members of a local Common Property. 
A full overlap in institutional responsibilities was observed twice, where municipal 
representatives had responsibilities within the local Common Property administration 
(i.e. as President or administrative board member). Often, lack of representation on 
the part of individuals across these two organizations was due to the statutes of the 
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 In Italy, municipal Aldermen are members of the executive Board that superintends the main 
administrative life policy issues. To certain conditions, the Town Council accepts, integrates or rejects 
policies undertaken by the executive Board. Whereas the Aldermen are directly nominated by the 
Major, Councillors – that constitute the town Council – need to be democratically elected. Thus, one 
might also cover the double role of Councillor (elected) and Alderman (nominated). 
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Common Property, which explicitly impeded administrative overlap in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
Reference persons in formal relationships, prevalence of formal or personal contacts 
In six cases (42.9%), only one person was found to be responsible for maintaining 
formal contacts with local Common Properties at the municipal level (the mayor in five 
cases, the deputy mayor in one case), whereas in four other cases (28.6%) a Council 
member or the deputy mayor reinforced the mayor’s role. In only three cases (21.4%), 
the institutional contacts originated from a collegial effort, through the involvement of 
the entire town Council. According to the municipal interviewees, on the side of the 
Common Properties, a main role in maintaining institutional linkages was played by 
Presidents (42.9%), and was sometimes found to be supported by the vice-President 
(21.4%), the secretary (14.3%), or the administrative board members (21.4%). 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether municipal and collective 
representatives mainly shared ideas, projects, strategies, through formal or informal 
contacts. Results revealed that only twice (14.3%) the institutional relationship 
entailed high formality levels, with official documents testifying meetings, proposals or 
mutual requests. Such situations emerged where relevant institutional tensions 
existed. Contrarily, in other two cases (14.3%) informal contacts prevailed, with 
municipal and Common Property representatives that are not used to formalize their 
agreements (in one case, a substantial lack of institutional communication channels 
has been also revealed). In all the other cases (71.4%), Common representatives stated 
that preliminary informal contacts usually forerun formal decisions, that give evidence 
of which agreements have been already reached. 
3.1.2. Administrative constraints 
Unexpectedly, in the majority of cases interviewees responded that they did not 
feel severely constrained in their management duties by the existence of Common 
Properties within their municipal boundaries (see Figure 8). 
Municipalities were pretended to be the main promoters of a continuous and 
close relationship with local Common Properties (42.5% of cases), whereas the latter 
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took initiative in creating ties in only one case (7%). In the other cases, a balanced or 
irregular situation has been described. In these cases, municipal representatives 
suggested that, substantially, Common Properties ask for municipal cooperation when 
they needed to solve administrative and bureaucratic issues, e.g. land use destination 
changes to convert former pasture huts into new commercial activities (agricultural 
tourism enterprises). On the contrary, Municipalities tended to involve Common 
Properties through proposals and projects to be implemented within the Common 
Property-owned territories. In fact, 70% of surveyed Municipalities lost the ownership 
of the majority of forest lands with the process of Common Property re-constitution. 
Thus, although theoretically the majority of municipal representatives did not feel 
administratively constrained by the existence of Common Properties, they also stated 
that there were difficulties related to the implementation of their strategies and 
actions, as these almost inevitably need to be applied on common lands. In fact, these 
have been returned to the former (and smaller) groups of right-holders, which might 
have different management objectives than Municipalities, first of all satisfying the 
needs of the right-holders’ community, rather than on the whole local citizenry. 
Notably, in their remarks municipal representatives referred to fields possibly liable to 
institutional coordination, others than those the regional law calls Municipalities for 
compulsory involvement of Common Properties. Particularly, amongst the others, they 
mentioned footpaths development and various initiatives to sustain rural tourism. 
3.1.3. Fields of institutional contact 
Environmental management and conservation 
Issues of environmental conservation and forest landscape management revealed 
high levels of coordination between Municipalities and Common Properties, with the 
latter often active promoter of joint initiatives frequently co-funded by the former. 
Only in two cases (14.3%) no institutional contact has occurred in the last five years, as 
Common Properties preferred to practice in full autonomy from Municipalities. 
Maintenance of the existing forest roads and the construction of new ones are the 
most frequent matters of discussion (57%), followed by the joint application to Rural 
Development Plan measures (35%), maintenance of existing real estate (e.g. pasture 
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huts) and agro-forestry maintenance, such as pasture mowing and countering forest 
expansion (35%). Sometimes, forest plans were drawn up together (21.4%) and 
Common Properties and Municipalities stipulated agreements in order to jointly 
employ forest rangers (14.3%). 
Local economic development 
Often, plans, strategies, and activities targeting local economic development have 
been found to be embedded in the `Ten-year Plans for future urban and territorial 
development´ adopted at a municipal, provincial or even regional scale. Most 
commonly, institutional contacts focused on the creation of new ski areas and slopes 
(28.6%, i.e. four cases: three agreements and one opposition), or management of 
existing ski facilities (14.3%). Discussions often arose about the advisability of 
establishing hydroelectric plants (eight cases, 57.1%), with four favourable cases 
(executive or still to be implemented projects), one preliminary project and three cases 
where Common Properties and Municipalities successfully cooperated to prevent a 
plant being built, collectively perceived as detrimental for the environment. Often, the 
possibility of constructing bioenergy plants using local wood as fuel was under 
discussion, but no projects in this direction have so far been realized. In two situations 
(14.3%), beginning with an initiative on the part of a Municipality, there was an 
attempt to construct a stable coordination among the Municipality, Common 
Properties and other local associations or private businesses. The ultimate purpose of 
this initiative was the common management of local forests and the joint application 
to forest certification schemes. The other initiative was concerned with upgrading of 
local tourist services and facilities. Only one respondent reported no incidence of 
cooperation concerning economic development. 
Urban and territorial management and development 
As easily expected because of the regional law prescriptions, in many cases (85%) 
Municipalities involved Common Properties in projects or plans concerning urban 
development, mainly through participative processes aimed to legally adopt `Ten-year 
plans for future urban and territorial development´ at a municipal scale. 
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More than this, in five cases (35.7%) Common Properties also participated in (and 
co-funded) joint maintenance and improvement of urban decor, ranging from minor 
acts (e.g. provision of Christmas trees), to the restoration of public spaces, such as the 
town square paving. No cooperation on urban and territorial management and 
development was reported in only one Municipality. 
Promotion of local culture and customs 
Promotion of the local culture and customs was demonstrated to be the weakest 
field of institutional contact: in three cases (21.4%) there were no relationships in the 
last five years, whereas in seven cases (50%) Common Properties and Municipalities 
cooperated only for minor events. Interesting activities emerged in about 30% of 
cases, ranging from the joint management of visitor centres, promotion of the local 
dialect, to co-funded maintenance of school buildings. 
Nevertheless, municipal respondents also indicated that Common Properties 
often carried out other activities autonomously, ranging from cultural to gastronomic 
and religious ones, some of them noteworthy. Particularly, they mentioned the 
organization of historical carnivals and thematic days dedicated to local customs, and 
cultural events aimed to disseminate knowledge about Common Properties and local 
traditions. Municipal representatives demonstrated appreciation toward these 
Common Property initiatives, stating that in such circumstances Municipalities 
provided Common Properties with administrative and bureaucratic facilitation. 
3.1.4. Reconstitution of Common Properties: economic effects on Municipalities 
As already mentioned, where the reconstitution process succeeded, a 
considerable change occurred in the ownership structure, as most of the time the 
forest area remained in the hands of Municipalities is negligible. Common Properties 
also began to collect revenues from timber selling, leasing of pastures, management of 
alpine huts and concessions for quarry sites and ski areas. Despite the high variability 
of such revenues, depending on the extent and quality of the resources involved, they 
were always quite relevant (on average around 200,000 €/year/Municipality, ranging 
from ~50,000 up to ~700,000 €/year). 
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Results suggested fewer negative effects than expected. In four cases (28.6%), 
municipal representatives stated that no relevant changes occurred in the 
number/quality of services provided to the citizens. In fact, the municipal balance 
sheets were robust enough to afford lower revenues, and the necessary financial 
resources were simply drawn from other non-essential balance items. In three cases 
(21.4%) they argued that lower incomes substantially equal lower annual expenditures 
(resource maintenance, bureaucratic issues). In other four cases (28.6%), the 
Municipalities had never gained through forest ownership, given that Common 
Properties continued de facto to manage local forests, therefore no economic 
contingencies came out of the re-constitution process. Only two interviewees (14.3%) 
stated that Municipalities suffered a severe shortage of capital resources, and this led 
to a lower level of services and higher tax pressure on the citizens, in the worst case 
even with the layoff of a municipal worker. 
3.1.5. Disputes and disagreements 
Although major disputes were generally averted, the size and quality of some 
forest assets led to legal disputes concerning rights to these resources, often triggered 
by the inaccuracy in cadastral information available. 
Figure 6 shows occurrence of disputes: in 7 of cases (50%) no legal disputes had 
arisen, whereas in three cases (21.4%) they have been solved. In four other situations, 
disputes were ongoing, even if it appeared that there was mutual willingness to reach 
a friendly agreement. Resolution of pending legal issues was demonstrated to be a 
relevant driver for a progressive and significant bettering of mutual institutional 
relationships. 
In addition to legal disputes, the existence of other tensions has been assessed, in 
terms of allocation of institutional competences. Figure 6 shows that there were such 
divergences in 6 cases (~43%), the majority of which were considered reasonably 
serious (Figure 9). Interviewees argued that institutional tensions might arise from the 
`dominant´ attitude of some Common Properties that were disinclined to recognize 
the administrative role played by Municipalities in their area. A pertinent example of 
this was the municipal duty/right (established by the forest law) to issue access 
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permits for forest roads. Since these roads often crossed common lands, even if not 
entirely, some Common Properties claim the right to decide who should or should not 
be granted an access permit. 
In the light of all the above remarks, municipal respondents indicated whether, 
and to what extent, they positively considered the compulsoriness and the opportunity 
for Municipalities to debate and interface with Common Properties. Grey bars in 
Figure 10 represent their evaluations. Differently, black bars display analogous 
assessments, but referred to an ideal point of view – rather than the reality. A certain 
tendency to give strategic answers was detected, ascribable to the polarization of 
answers, mostly concentrated on worst and best options. On average, positive 
evaluations counterbalanced negative ones, but the real, current situation is judged 
less positively than the potential one. 
3.1.6. Social issues 
From a social perspective, interviewees suggested that social tensions were more 
frequent and serious, compared to institutional tensions (Figure 9). Several reasons 
underlie this situation, among others: (i) the difficulty in being accepted as a Common 
Property member for those who are not descendants of ancient local households, even 
if they have been living in the local community for several decades; (ii) some Common 
Property members’ hostile attitude towards outsiders; (iii) the absence of gender 
balance within the right-holders’ communities, as in some cases women are still not 
accepted as right-holders; (iv) the exclusion of non-members from the possibility of 
enjoying some resource benefits, either through direct exploitation (i.e. fuelwood) or 
indirectly, e.g. access to grants for young newly married couples, to scholarships, to 
building subsidies, etc.; (v) human discord originating from trivial differences of 
opinion concerning the institutional relationships between Common Properties and 
Municipalities (in the most negative situation reported, one Council member resigned). 
For the same set of reasons, interviewees often suggested that non-right-holder 
citizens perceive Common Properties as institutions rather poorly or not at all 
integrated into the local, social environment (Figure 11). Even though most of the time 
neither public protests nor evident verbal attacks emerge, these situations give raise to 
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personal controversies that undermine the social cohesion within the local community, 
respondents said. 
3.1.7. Effectiveness of Common Properties 
Municipal representatives qualitatively assessed the effectiveness of local 
Common Property in pursuing the objectives stated by that the regional law, i.e. the 
environmental conservation and management and the socio-economic development 
of mountain territories. Figure 5 shows the results, displayed in ascending order, from 
the worst to the best overall evaluation. 
Environmental conservation and management 
The most positive judgements concerned environmental conservation and 
management: interviewees often observed that forest landscape management has 
improved since Common Properties have taken up management responsibilities, 
mainly because this is at the `core´ of the perceived focus of Common Properties. 
Above all, municipal representatives suggested that the Common Property 
reinvestment rate of forest management revenues on forest assets increased, 
compared to the former public management. In fact, the minimum reinvestment 
threshold that Municipalities need to accomplish is defined by law, i.e. 10% of forest 
management revenues have to be rolled over forest and pasture resources. Often, 
municipal representatives stated that they precisely respected the due threshold, 
therefore allocating the majority of their economic resources to other balance sheet 
items. Differently, the common statutes identify the forest management as the core 
Common Property scope, this of course leading to higher reinvestment rates. 
Criticisms have been raised twice: in fact, it was reported that the State Forest 
Police levied fines against Common Properties because of harvesting activities that had 
not received authorization. On this point, impatience with bureaucratic procedures 
and an overly practice-oriented traditional mentality have been stressed. 
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Social development 
The worst judgments on the part of municipal representatives concerned 
Common Properties’ effectiveness in promoting social development: 78.5% of opinions 
were negative. This figure was in line with the issues listed above. Municipal 
representatives often highlighted the `closed mentality´ of some right-holders, 
especially the elderly, who still have a great influence in the Common Property 
assembly. Moreover, and no less important, municipal representatives argued that 
Common Properties should commit themselves to more actively support 
Municipalities in their welfare strategies, especially because they are targeted to the 
whole local community and not just the right-holders. 
Nevertheless, they also observed that Common Properties allow local politicians 
to have direct feedback about their choices from the local population, or at least a part 
of it. In fact, often right-holders constitute a relevant share of the local population, 
insomuch that Common Properties are potentially able to strongly influence local 
elections, even steering the Major’s election. Therefore, they can indirectly also 
heavily influence local policy processes and decisions. 
They also admitted that increased participation prevents possible political 
speculation that could be detrimental for the local environment. In fact, respondents 
observed that the General common Assembly exerts high levels of control even for 
ordinary decisions concerning environmental issues, undertaken by Municipalities. 
Moreover, in some cases, to validate particular decisions (i.e. land use changes) 
Common Property statutory rules call for variable quorum thresholds to be reached in 
the common Assembly, and higher consensus levels are needed than the simple 
majority. From this point of view, the occurrence of some social friction is maybe the 
price to be paid in order to increase the participation of local people in the municipal 
administrative life. 
Local economic development 
With regard to local economic development, favourable remarks nearly balanced 
negative ones. Again, a dichotomical situation and contradictions appeared, with 
positive cases contrasting with other rather discouraging ones. 
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The municipal interviewees recalled their positive remarks concerning the 
Common Property environmental management. Particularly, they suggested that 
Common Properties stimulated an increase in timber prices and revenues, and the 
establishment of new local forest enterprises too, through a more careful planning of 
timber selling activities and the extensive application to Rural Development Plan 
funding to maintain and further develop the forest road network. 
Nonetheless, often they also suggested that Common Properties are inclined 
towards an `ordinary management´, rather than being focused also on innovative 
management options, e.g. branch wood and harvesting residues were not extracted 
from the forest and no bioenergy plant projects have so far been realized. They also 
observed that a well-established cooperation among different Common Properties is 
still largely missing, as testified by the lack of local sawmills or bioenergy plants fuelled 
by local wood resources. Interestingly, the `attendant attitude´ of some Common 
Properties has been criticized, since many relevant proposals have so far been 
launched by Municipalities. 
Tourism promotion 
Negative remarks prevailed with reference to the promotion of tourism: municipal 
representatives observed that right-holders were tied to old logics, closely related to 
forestry and pasture management, and therefore not oriented towards supplying 
`new´ complementary goods and services, recreational services included. A certain 
hostile attitude toward foreign people was recalled, maybe driven by a sort of `feeling 
of power´ of some right-holders with regards to the common-pool resources, as if 
these were their own individual property. 
In some cases, positive comments emerged, especially when Common Properties 
proposed their direct involvement in the management, and possibly further 
development, of local new ski slopes and ski facilities. On the contrary, in another 
locally well-known circumstance the Regole opposed to such a similar project, this 
leading to sharp contrasts with the local municipal administration. With regards to 
summer tourism, positive remarks concerned a renewed attention by Common 
Properties toward pasture management, aimed to produce and promote typical 
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mountain cheeses. The frequent refurbishment of traditional alpine huts in modern 
agritourist buildings has been mentioned as well. 
Key results are summarized in Table 8. 
 Table 8 – First research step, summary results. 
Main issue Main collected information 
Institutional representativeness 
and communication channels 
Almost all Common Properties represented in the local Town Councils: Councillors, Aldermen, often even the 
Major are also right-holders. 
Double institutional representativeness is rare, due to statutory limitations and convenience. 
The Major is the main institutional spokesman; collegial institutional communications are rare. 
Informal communication broadly prevailing: more stable institutional coordination mechanisms are worth to be 
implemented. 
Institutional coordination 
Coordinated initiatives often launched by Municipalities. 
Municipal representatives do not perceive their own administrative life and managerial competences severely 
constrained by the compulsory nature of interfacing with Common Properties on some particular policies 
concerning territorial management decisions. Some issues are still perceived existing `on the ground´, in the real 
policy and strategy implementation. 
Institutional coordination came to light with particular reference to maintenance and building of the local forest 
road networks (coordinated application to Rural Development Plan funding possibilities), and local hydroelectric 
power plants establishment. Secondarily, for urban development and social events. 
Municipalities do not manage common assets through ad hoc mandate, and neither vice versa. 
Common Property reconstitution & 
financial impact on municipal 
balance sheets 
Impacts ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 €/year/Municipality; high variability among different areas and Common 
Properties. 
Fewer negative effects on municipal balance sheets than expected: rare severe shortages of municipal capital 
resources. Often, no relevant consequences for the whole local community in terms of number/quality of services. 
Reported higher reinvestment rates (>10%) by Common Properties on forest resources, compared to former 
municipal levels. 
Institutional SWOT analysis 
On average, positive evaluations counterbalanced negative ones, but the real, current situation is judged less 
positively than the potential one. A certain tendency to give strategic answers was detected. 
Common Properties able to strongly influence local politics, policy processes and decisions. Municipalities never 
involved in Common Properties internal life and governance mechanisms. 
Municipal assessment of Common 
Property effectiveness concerning 
From the worst to the best overall evaluation of Common Property: 
- Forest management and environmental conservation: forest management as Common Properties `core´ action; 
 (i) forest management and 
environmental conservation; (ii) 
economic development; (iii) 
tourism promotion; (iv) social 
development 
higher reinvestment rates; VS. overly practice-oriented traditional mentality. 
- Economic development: increase in timber prices and revenues; establishment of new local forest enterprises; 
application to Rural Development Plan funding to maintain and further develop the forest road networks; VS. 
`ordinary management´, rather than introducing innovative management options (branch wood and harvesting 
residues are not extracted from the forest and no bioenergy plant projects have so far been realized); `attendant 
attitude´ of some Common Properties. 
- Tourism promotion: some right-holders not oriented to supply `new´ complementary goods and services, 
recreational services included; hostile attitude toward foreign people; VS. some Common Properties directly 
involved in managing local ski facilities; renewed attention by Common Properties toward pasture management 
(production and promotion of typical mountain cheeses); refurbishment of traditional alpine huts in modern 
agritourist buildings. 
- Social development: difficulties for non-right holders in being accepted as new Common Property members; 
hostile attitude towards outsiders; weak gender balance; exclusion of non-members from the possibility of 
enjoying some resource benefits; according to municipal representatives, Common Properties should commit 
themselves to more actively support Municipalities in their welfare strategies. 
Legal disputes, institutional 
contrasts and other issues 
Size and quality of some `returned´ forest assets led to legal disputes concerning rights to these resources, often 
triggered by cadastral inaccuracies. Recently, some pending legal issues were solved, with a progressive and 
significant bettering of the institutional relationships. 
Other institutional tensions exist, mainly concerning the allocation of institutional competences, e.g. duty/right to 
issue access permits for forest roads. 
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3.2. Environmental services: which proactive supply? 
Interviewees were asked to indicate whether they considered the provision of 
environmental services others than wood compatible with the ongoing forest 
management practices, along with their inclusion in the current management goals 
and their assigned `priority level´. Table 9 shows the related results. Interestingly, 
almost all the interviewees, both Common and municipal representatives, were 
convinced that current forest management practices are compatible with the supply of 
selected environmental services. A few municipal representatives gave negative 
answers referring to carbon storage (9.1% of times conflicting with current forest 
management actions) and soil protection (20.0%). The judgment was clearer 
concerning the inclusion of the investigated environmental services within the current 
forest management goals and plans: somehow, environmental services are always 
taken into consideration, with the only exception being carbon storage (6.7% of 
negative answers among municipal representatives). Nonetheless, municipal and 
collective representatives’ positions differed considerably with reference to the 
assigned `priority´ given to provision of each single environmental service. In fact, in 
many cases municipal representatives designated such environmental service as `main´ 
forest management objectives; on the contrary, Common Property interviewees often 
described them as subordinate to wood supply. This particularly applies to tourism and 
recreational activities and carbon storage. Figures are summarised in Table 10. 
Other figures confirmed a rooted Common Property commitment to wood supply: 
timber selling revenues have been described as representing almost the entirety 
(71.4% of times), or a relevant share (21.4%), whereas municipal representatives 
described them as `not very relevant´ (28.6%, opposed to 7.1% for Common 
Properties), or `negligible´ (71.4%) if referred to the whole municipal financial budget. 
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Table 9 – Compatibility between environmental services (ES) provision and ongoing forest 
management practices, ES inclusion in the current forest management goals, and related 
assigned `priority level´. 
ES types Organization 
ES supply 
compatibility 
with current FM 
ES supply as 
current FM goal 
ES supply priority 
among FM goals 
(main or secondary) 
No Yes No Yes Main Secondary 
Tourism and 
recr. activity 
Municipalities 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 88.9% 11.1% 
Comm. Properties 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 14.3% 85.7% 
Biodiversity 
Municipalities 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 90.0% 10.0% 
Comm. Properties 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 66.7% 33.3% 
Carbon storage 
Municipalities 9.1% 90.9% 6.7% 93.3% 50.0% 50.0% 
Comm. Properties 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 7.7% 92.3% 
Soil protection, 
water quality 
Municipalities 20.0% 80.0% 0.0% 100.0% 80.0% 20.0% 
Comm. Properties 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 66.7% 33.3% 
 
Interviewees declaring no inclusion of environmental services within current 
forest management objectives, or who assigned secondary relevance to such services 
and objectives, were also asked to indicate whether they were potentially interested in 
strengthening their commitment to supply such services, and under which conditions. 
Table 10 shows the related results. Uncertainty prevailed with reference to tourism: 
most interviewees, both Municipalities (100%) and Common Properties (66.6%), 
demonstrated that they do not know how recreational activities could be better linked 
with forestry interventions. Notably, 26.7% considered the proactive increase of 
biodiversity levels not applicable within their forest areas, or were not interested in 
such a commitment (13.3%). However, many interviewees were potentially favourable 
to further focussing on biodiversity even without direct earnings, simply by adjusting 
their forest management actions. On the one hand, interviewees broadly considered 
carbon storage compatible with current forest management actions, but they 
definitely saw it as secondary to timber provision; on the other hand, many stated that 
they would commit themselves to provide higher carbon storage levels only if 
associated to direct earnings (50% among Municipalities and 40% among Common 
Properties), and many others considered this goal not applicable to their forest areas 
(40% Municipalities and 33.3% Common Properties). Differently from the other 
environmental services, in the vast majority of cases soil protection and water quality 
were described as primary forest management objectives, and highly compatible with 
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current forestry practices. Nonetheless, the future interest in higher proactive supply 
levels of environmental services followed similar trends to those for carbon storage, 
that is little interest in doing more without direct payments. Table 10 summarizes 
these figures. 
Table 10 – Potential interest in supplying higher levels of environmental services (ES), and 
under which conditions (question targeting respondents declaring no ES inclusion within 
current forest management objectives, or assigning them secondary relevance). 
ES types Future ES supply (attitude) Municipalities 
Common 
Properties 
Tourism and 
recreational activities 
Yes, with direct earnings - 16.7% 
Yes, also with no direct earnings - - 
Yes, with indirect profits - 16.7% 
No, I think it is not applicable - - 
No, in any case - - 
I don’t know 100.0% 66.6% 
Biodiversity 
Yes, with direct earnings 10.0% 20.0% 
Yes, also with no direct earnings 60.0% 26.7% 
Yes, with indirect profits - 6.7% 
No, I think it is not applicable 30.0% 26.7% 
No, in any case - 13.3% 
I don’t know - 6.7% 
Carbon storage 
Yes, with direct earnings 50.0% 40.0% 
Yes, also with no direct earnings - - 
Yes, with indirect profits 10.0% - 
No, I think it is not applicable 40.0% 33.3% 
No, in any case - - 
I don’t know - 26.7% 
Soil protection, 
water quality 
Yes, with direct earnings 33.3% 40.0% 
Yes, also with no direct earnings 33.3% 13.3% 
Yes, with indirect profits - 13.3% 
No, I think it is not applicable 22.2% 33.3% 
No, in any case - - 
I don’t know 11.1% - 
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3.3. The Common Property perspective 
3.3.1. Forest management 
In their self-evaluation, right-holders attributed the best rates to the 
environmental management (Figure 7), and often they proudly claimed that 
management practices have bettered since local Regole gained the direct control over 
the local forest and pasture land. In fact, they noted that their `core business´ and 
main statutory scope precisely consist of forest landscape management, whereas 
Municipalities have many other duties and tasks to fulfil and to cope with. 
The minimum reinvestment threshold over forest assets that Municipalities need 
to accomplish is defined by law, i.e. 10% of forest management revenues have to be 
rolled over forest and pasture resources. Often, Municipalities precisely respected the 
due threshold, therefore allocating the majority of their economic resources to other 
balance sheet items. In reason of the fact that Common Property statutes identify 
forest management as the core common scope, 75% of right-holders suggested that 
their reinvestment rate of forest management revenues on forest assets increased, 
compared to the former public management. Contrarily, 16.7% declared it remained 
unchanged; 8.3% preferred not to answer. 
Almost all Common Property interviewees listed both maintenance and new 
building of forest roads among the main activities that the common management is 
based on. They also stressed that this is a basic and primary way to raise the timber 
value, and to encourage new forestry practices, e.g. collection of wood residues for 
energy uses. Moreover, developing a proper road network facilitates the introduction 
of new forest mechanization, and the proactive supply of some environmental 
services, e.g. recreation, tourism and hydrogeological risk protection. 
Interestingly, some right-holders stated that Regole took some years to 
completely assume administrative and operative control over forest management after 
their formal recognition following the regional law 26/1996 enforcement. So, they 
have been mainly focussing on forestry for almost a decade. Nonetheless, recently 
they began to conceive forest management in a wider and more integrated way, and in 
the last years many Common Properties made relevant investments to improve their 
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rangeland assets, e.g. pasture restoration after the past abandonment of grazing 
activities, renovation of tumbledown alpine huts and refurbishment of still serviceable 
ones. Results displayed in the Gigante’s survey (2013) reinforce these statements. 
Common Property representatives mainly reacted in two divergent ways with 
regard to the remark that their forest management would focus just on the ordinary 
practices, therefore without realizing the Common Property full potential 
entrepreneurship. Whereas some of them energetically and definitely rejected such 
critique, the majority indirectly validated such presumption, strategically preferring to 
describe which difficulties challenge their forest management-related activities. 
Many right-holders stressed that disproportionate bureaucratic requirements 
hinder the Common Property capability to achieve a more efficient and effective forest 
management. In fact, they blamed the extensive body of environmental laws and 
related administrative and bureaucratic duties. Often, such requirements were 
considered unreasonable. Some other negative remarks moved from the evidence that 
only few right-holders have enough willingness and time to dedicate to the Common 
Property administration, and often they are retired people. To this point, some 
Common Property Presidents demonstrated consciousness of the need to increase the 
internal participation, and also to make recourse to new competences and skills, 
eventually external to the Common Property administrative boards. 
Nonetheless, some of them also argued that restraining from an intensive 
harvesting does not equal low Common Property entrepreneurial ability, since the 
environmental management should not be driven solely by pure economic 
perspectives. For this same reason, some wistful regolieri perceive modern 
sylvicultural interventions as `aggressive´ and harmful for forests, if compared to 
traditional and low technological ones, but necessary to properly remunerate modern 
forestry enterprises. 
Regardless of whether or not they adopted conciliating positions, almost every 
contacted right-holder observed that even the mere prosecution of regular 
sylvicultural interventions can be considered more than `ordinary´ management 
practice, as proved by the vast abandonment suffered by many private and also pubic 
forests. Indeed, data from previous research activities (Gatto et al., 2011) validate the 
Common Property remarkable commitment toward wood provision: usually in the 
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common lands harvesting activities take place every year, whereas in public lands they 
tend to be more sporadic, i.e. performed every 2-3 years (29.2% of times) or 
occasionally (8.3%). 
Interviewees also claimed that the Common Property control over local common-
pool resources resulted in added confidence by the local citizenry – both right-holders 
and non-right holders – that forest landscapes will not easily suffer from `speculative 
policy actions´. This conviction particularly emerged when Common Property statutory 
rules call for variable quorum thresholds to be reached in the common Assembly to 
validate some decisions. In fact, these can vary according to the matter under 
discussion: whereas the simple majority is sufficient to validate ordinary decisions, 
higher consensus is needed to approve more relevant issues, e.g. land use changes. 
Possible thresholds equal to two thirds of right-holders participating to the Assembly, 
or even the right holders majority, regardless they whether or not participate to the 
Assembly and to the discussion. Meaningfully, implicit or even structured 
considerations on the juxtaposition between different democratic regimes developed 
on the backdrop of these main observations, i.e. collective direct democracy vs. 
municipal representative democracy. Particularly, Common Property representatives 
observed that their Assembly exerts high levels of technical control even for ordinary 
decisions compared to the municipal Town Council, where decision are frequently 
taken merely on the basis of the Council members’ political position. 
3.3.2. Economic development 
Along with better forest management performances, Common Property 
representatives also claimed that their timber selling activities are more carefully 
planned. In fact, in few cases Regole began to sell harvested timber on the road side, 
whereas Municipalities used to sell standing trees. By doing so, timber prices and 
Common revenues increased, and the establishment of new local forest enterprises 
was facilitated too. This new conscientiousness probably mirrors how significant 
timber selling revenues are with respect to Common financial annual balances. In fact, 
these represent almost the entirety (71.4% of cases) or relevant shares (21.4% of 
cases) of the Common Property annual economic turnover, whereas municipal 
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representatives described them as `not much relevant´ in 28.6% of cases (7.1% for 
Common Properties) or `negligible´ (71.4%), compared to the whole municipal 
financial budget. 
Right-holders observed that many of their rental contracts were more 
remunerative, compared to previous municipal management conditions based on 
lower rental fees for pasture land and rural buildings, such as refuges, alpine huts, 
agritourisms, etc. To this point, they observed that such fees can be a relevant source 
of income for Regole, whereas they are negligible for municipal budgets, and maybe 
therefore not fully appraised. Frequently, new clauses were recently introduced in the 
rental contracts of common alpine huts, therefore permitting the tenants to organize 
new accommodating possibilities and establish agritourism services. Sometimes, 
Common Properties took also advantage of the opportunity that the regional law 
provides forest owners with, i.e. introducing fees that people willing to collect 
mushrooms on common lands have to pay. Whereas, right-holders are exonerated 
from this payments, non-right holders have to comply with this requirement, 
regardless whether or not they are local citizens. Thus, although discounted fees were 
introduced for non-right-holders local citizens, such disparity raised some discontents 
among them (cf. social development issue). 
Neither statutes nor legislative prescriptions impede Regola to invest on activities 
that fall outside forest management practices. In one interesting case, economic and 
social aims merged together: the local Common Properties actively promoted the 
establishment of a coffee bar in the hamlet, creating a meeting place able to support 
the community social cohesion. Urban restaurants and other tourist accommodations 
have been established as well. Once, the local Regola was found to purchase and rent 
several flats in the nearest city, quite far from the Common Property hamlet and 
located in the plain. The Common Property President explained such unusual activity 
with the intention to maintain the Common Property income high, even after the local 
quarry site closure, which the Regola used to earn money from. In few cases, a 
potential contribution to the development of new ski slopes and ski facilities has been 
hypothesized. On the contrary, in another well-known case (Municipality of San Vito di 
Cadore), local Regole opposed to one similar project, as they considered it 
economically unfeasible and environmentally detrimental. 
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Interestingly, right-holders highlighted that in some cases Regole act as `economic 
multipliers´ simply thanks to their private legal personality, e.g. when hydroelectric 
power plants or quarry sites are established on common lands. In fact, in these cases, 
licensees have to provide both Municipalities and Common Properties with monetary 
compensations, whereas only Municipalities should be compensated if common lands 
were publicly owned. Furthermore, Common Properties can autonomously apply to 
Rural Development Program funding available only to private organizations, therefore 
increasing the use at local level of European Union funds. To this aspect, appreciable 
degrees of coordination with Municipalities came to light, with these local institutions 
acting together to maximize the use of subsidies to be spent on the rural road 
maintenance. Some returns to scale in investment costs would be obtained as well 
thanks to a strict Common Properties-Municipalities cooperation. 
Nonetheless, common representatives also stressed some difficulties in 
establishing robust synergies both with other neighbouring Common Properties, and 
with Municipalities as well. Mainly for this reason, average rates prevailed in their self-
evaluation (Figure 7). Interviewees particularly stressed that higher levels of Common 
Properties-Municipalities coordination would facilitate the achievement of 
comprehensive local economic development strategies. Maybe, it is not a fortuitous 
case that one outstanding entrepreneurial project, i.e. the establishment of a new 
thermoelectric power plant to be fuelled with wood from local common lands, is being 
currently developed by a consortium of 5 different neighbouring Regole. 
3.3.3. Tourism development 
Interestingly, many right-holders observed that the main Common Property target 
and objective consist of managing forest landscapes, rather than `promoting´ them 
through territorial marketing activities. With this attitude, tourism development would 
fall outside their statutory competences. Some right-holders also demonstrated a 
certain passive attitude toward local tourism, stating that Common Properties simply 
`do not impede´ tourist events (e.g. alpine marathons, bike races, snowshoes walking, 
etc.) to be realized on common lands by whomever else. 
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At the same time, they also clearly stressed that forestry and pasture 
management implicitly stimulate forms of rural tourism, assuming that well-managed 
forest landscapes attract tourists. To this point, alpine hut restoration or 
refurbishment, and their reorganization for agritourism housing purposes, were 
described as preeminent and intentional initiatives linked with and targeted to tourist 
promotion. In addition, maintenance of footpaths, creation of picnic areas and didactic 
boards placement were also cited. An appreciable number of cultural activities was 
also recalled, amongst which one week-long events or single thematic days dedicated 
to wood carving, sculpture and revival of ancient crafts and local customs. A couple of 
local ethnographic museums were established as well. Notably, one Common Property 
President recalled a recent project aimed to develop a `diffused hotel´5 system 
(including right-holders’ houses) in order to increase the accommodation capacity of 
the local village. 
So, whereas often right-holders suggested that the tourist promotion would go 
somehow beyond their statutory aims, on the other hand they also claimed the 
relevant Common Property role in enhancing the territorial tourist attractiveness, both 
indirectly (forest management) and directly (ad hoc initiatives). 
Despite these interesting initiatives, in the self-evaluation right-holders declared 
to be conscious of the fact that Regole could actually strengthen their commitment 
toward tourist promotion (Figure 7). To this end, scarcity of human resources, both in 
terms of available time and personal skills, was pointed as one of the most heavy 
constraint and challenge that Common Properties have to face. For this reason, 
interviewees suggested that Common Properties consortia would be worth to be 
established, and Common Properties-Municipalities synergies to be reinforced as well. 
Indeed, administrative and institutional disputes between local Regole and 
Municipalities and, even more, personal contrasts between their representatives 
(Majors, Presidents), revealed to be the heaviest barriers for the tourist development 
of some specific areas. 
                                                          
 
5
 The “albergo diffuso” is an innovative accommodation system invented in North-Eastern Italian 
Alps based on a network of rooms and flats in a (usually, semi-abandoned) mountain hamlet with a flat 
used for the reception services and as dining room. 
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Finally, a pair of Presidents complained that Common Properties do not have the 
possibility to apply to some regional public funding and incentives targeting tourist 
promotion activities, because of their rural organization legal profile. For this reason, 
and due to high investments needed, they have not been able to purchase some 
specific buildings so far, e.g. one alpine refuge and an ancient windmill to be restored 
and used as a local museum. 
3.3.4. Social development 
Municipal representatives and right-holders showed deeply divergent opinions 
about the Common Property capability to locally foster social development, as the 
latter asserted that their effectiveness in promoting the local welfare system covers 
the second position in the self-evaluation ranking (Figure 7). 
Right-holders mainly stressed the fact that Common Properties induce social 
cohesion within local inhabitants, increasing the community identity, a factor of 
particular importance for the stability of small and isolated mountain villages. To 
reinforce the local social cohesion, they also recalled their proactivity in the 
organization of several events and public initiatives, ranging from cultural to 
gastronomic and religious ones, e.g., among others, local and historical carnivals, 
street singing of Christmas and Easter traditional songs, fairs and cultural events aimed 
to disseminate knowledge about local customs and historical vicissitudes endured by 
alpine Common Properties throughout the centuries, sometimes also involving school 
classes. Almost every Common Property representative listed numerous local 
associations they regularly subsidize, i.e. fire-fighters, sport associations, Italian Alpine 
soldiers’ association, local choirs. Local schools and public libraries were mentioned 
too: Common Properties funded the purchase of various IT devices. Sometimes, 
Common Property buildings also serve as public halls. 
Other relevant activities were listed too, such as interventions to local churches 
(ceiling maintenance, heating system installation, restoration of the traditional 
Christmas nativity scenes), or economic incentives to rebuild houses after a destructive 
urban fire. Interestingly, the intention to cooperate with the local Municipality and 
church to establish a social fund has been reported, in order to support impoverished 
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people and facilitate the access to favoured financial loans by right-holders and local 
citizens. 
Nevertheless, right-holders variously recalled some difficulties to deal with in their 
social commitment: above all, they mentioned: (i) scarcity of human resources, (ii) 
limited economic availability and (iii) administrative issues and bureaucratic 
constraints challenging `whatever Common Property does, or wants to do´. 
Although direct monetary profits cannot be generally distributed among right-
holders, Common Property members can be relieved of some economic burdens 
thanks to social grants that Regole provide them with. The most common social 
interventions are grants covering the costs for children school transport and for school 
books purchase, grants for young married couples, for new babies, and for non-self-
sufficient people. Once in their life, right-holders have also right to obtain a limited 
amount of timber to build or restore their own houses (the so-called right of 
rifabbrico), mostly receiving money rather than wood. Noteworthy, often right-holders 
observed that some benefits (e.g. wood fuel provision) or social grants are bestowed 
to non-right-holders too. Nonetheless, high variability among Common Property 
statutes exists: patchy situations came to light and they can be hardly generalized. 
Meaningfully, 53.3% of right-holders indicated that the Common Property social 
commitment target is represented by the whole local community, therefore including 
non-right holders. Differently, 26.7 % of them stated that benefits are limited only to 
the right-holders, whereas 20.0% indicated a `balanced situation´. 
Common Properties consortia have been created to co-manage common lands 
jointly-owned by different Common Properties; such new joint institutions have their 
own new statutes, that integrate those of each Common Property member. Notably, 
sometimes new joint statutes extended benefit to non-right-holders, that single 
Common Property statutes would exclude from (see also specific paragraph, 
hereinafter). 
In some other cases, single Common Properties renovated their own Statutes too, 
also tackling the gender balance issues, as already discussed by Zanderigo Rosolo 
(2012). Nonetheless, interviews suggested that critical situations still exist, as few 
Common Property representatives explicitly proposed male chauvinist considerations 
– in the Author’s opinion, it is definitely not an accidental case that these Common 
80 
Properties have not updated their ancient statutes yet. Common Property 
interviewees also reported that relevant debates are currently ongoing among right-
holders and common assemblies, concerning the opportunity to modify or introduce 
new criteria to regulate the admittance of non-right-holders to the right-holders’ 
community. In few cases, through statutory renovation processes, Common Properties 
lowered the number of years that non-right holders need to live locally before being 
possibly accepted as right-holders. Also in this case, close attitude against foreign 
people and non-right-holders cannot be considered definitely overcome, and many 
Common Properties still do not accept new right-holders if they are not right-holders’ 
offspring. Alternatively, `new comers´ are requested to live in the local Municipality 
many decades (up to 80 years) before being accepted as right-holders; this means that 
only their descendants will have this opportunity. 
Though some Regole called into question such ancient statutory regulations, often 
the eldest right-holders show tenacious resistances against possible statutory changes. 
Remarkably, they still have a great influence in the Common Property Assembly, as 
statutory changes require, as already mentioned, high quorum thresholds to be 
validated. Some Common Property Presidents suggested that sorts of `political 
minorities´ still strongly support `self-sufficient´ and close attitudes in the common 
Assemblies and within the Common Property administrative boards. They also 
observed that this fact gives evidence that social changes occurred within Regole and 
regolieri over the time, as it is a matter of fact that just few years ago such positions 
were predominant within the Common Property Assemblies. Nevertheless, as it 
happened for gender balance issues, few interviewees explicitly argued that Common 
Properties should neither interfere with the municipal welfare state, nor commit 
themselves toward social aims that go beyond the right-holders’ community – 
revealing that thorny situations still definitely exist. 
Some interviewees observed that the ongoing debates on the Common Property 
`openness´ partially originate from disinterested considerations regarding the 
widespread and deep societal changes occurred throughout the mountain 
communities, but on the other hand they are also driven by urgent demographic issues 
affecting Common Properties and their future survival. Indeed, in line with the 
prevalent demographic trend characterizing mountain population, i.e. marked ageing 
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and low birth rates, many Regole began to experience slight decreases or worrisome 
drops in the right-holders’ number. Even worse, participation to the common matters 
by young people is considered weak (50% of cases), either because of their lack of 
interest or due to few young forces: in the most dramatic situation, the interviewed 
Common Property President gladly announced that a baby was born in the local 
village, after 20 years since the last birth. Thus, the vast majority of Common Property 
representatives revealed awareness that such demographic trends will push Common 
Properties to react, possibly adopting new mechanisms to secure their survival and not 
to risk their own `extinction´. 
3.3.5. Collective consortia and horizontal Common Property cooperation 
Horizontal communication between Common Properties could be distinguished 
from local to national levels. Associations at local, regional, and national levels exist, 
with representative roles for individual Common Properties. Examples include the 
regional directorate of the national association of common property regimes in the 
Veneto Region (Coordinamento Regionale del Veneto della Consulta Nazionale della 
Proprietà Collettiva) and ARCFACO (Associazione Regole Comunioni Familiari 
Comelico). Whereas the former aims to represent all the regional Common Properties 
at the regional and national level, the latter represents a more specific geographical 
focus, as it counts 16 Common Properties located in the northern part of the Veneto 
Region (Comelico). 
On a smaller scale, adjacent Common Properties have recently began to organize 
themselves into associations. Such associations have set up shared administrative 
structures in order to jointly manage land under common ownership. Although single 
Common Properties maintain statutory autonomy, the integration between single 
Common Properties has led to a progressive increase in management coordination. In 
the Municipality of Cortina d’Ampezzo, such an organization comprises 11 Common 
Properties that share managerial responsibilities for a Regional Park (Parco Naturale 
Regionale delle Dolomiti d’Ampezzo) that extends over their commonly-held lands. In 
this case, the administrative structure shared among the various Regole (Comunanza) 
is also provided with its own statute. 
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Similarly, four Common Properties in the Municipality of San Pietro di Cadore 
established a consortium defined by a new associative statute in order to better 
pursue common objectives, to mitigate administrative burdens on each single 
Common Property, and to jointly manage certain commonly-owned lands. These same 
four Common Properties, along with five others, jointly own common lands in the 
Visdende Valley. Each Common Property oversees management on its own lands, but 
because these lands have not been formally recognized in the official cadastre, 
landscape management needs to be discussed and agreed upon by all Common 
Properties involved. Similar structures exist in the Municipalities of Selva di Cadore and 
San Vito di Cadore too, respectively involving four and three Common Properties, that 
either jointly share the ownership over some common lands, and also `singularly´ own 
some other forest assets. 
Though statutes of such associations or consortia must ultimately be compatible 
with those of each single Common Property, associations have revealed themselves to 
be a powerful means by which new constitutional and operational rules and 
regulations can be introduced into individual member Common Properties. In some 
cases new statutes for associations led to the extension of certain benefits to non-
right-holders that were excluded from individual statutes. This is significant in that in 
some cases, Regole were able to overcome resistance to statutory changes from 
powerful actors. One representative stated that according to the statutes of his 
organization, only children of rights-holders were eligible to receive scholarships, 
however, rights to scholarships were extended to others thanks to decisions taken by 
the Consorzio (the association of Regole). 
Where there were no formal linkages between Common Properties (neither 
Comunanze nor other types of associations), interview informants often demonstrated 
their willingness to establish joint management arrangements with other contiguous 
Common Properties to address both for short term or long term priorities. Some 
informants expressed the need to communicate horizontally with other Common 
Properties on legal issues or constraints, although these may occur bilaterally between 
organizations in the absence of formal protocol dedicated to these types of interaction 
(Deutsche, field-notes, 06/2014). Repeated interaction have been found between 
adjacent associations, between newly reconstituted Commons regimes, and between 
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Common Properties that have experienced major episodes of historical discontinuity 
and Commons that could draw upon significant historical and recent experience. For 
example the Regole of Cortina, with their long uninterrupted history, are often 
consulted on a range of issues by other Common Property administrations. 
3.3.6. Common Properties-Municipalities institutional relationship patterns 
Collected data confirmed the high recurrence of legal disputes between Common 
Properties and Municipalities. Often litigations have been triggered by cadastral 
information inaccuracies, as they mainly concern property right definition over some 
forest resources, assets or buildings. In some cases these controversies have been 
already solved, but many of them are still ongoing. Other institutional contrasts 
concerning the formal allocation of some particular competences (e.g. permission 
release to access forest roads), came to light as well. The severity of such institutional 
frictions was mainly described as reasonable (57.1%), whereas it was considered 
relevant or heavy respectively in 14.3% and 28.6% of cases. 
Worth to be recalled here, the regional law designates Common Properties as 
institutional subjects `concurring´ both to forest management and socio-economic 
development of mountain areas, and it also prescribes some mandatory mechanisms 
of institutional coordination with Municipalities. Thus, interviewees were asked to 
indicate to what extent they perceive as limited their own management 
responsibilities because of such law prescriptions. Unexpectedly, the consciousness 
that a sort of `compulsory coordination´ based on a top-down law prescription does 
not pose heavy limitations to the each one’s autonomy and ordinary management 
prevailed (Figure 8). 
Nevertheless, Common Property representatives mainly complaint that often the 
Common Properties-Municipalities institutional relationship is simply reduced to a 
series of administrative procedures and bureaucratic requirements that Regole have to 
follow and fulfil. To this point, they acquiesced that it is justifiable for Municipalities to 
exert pre-emptive and ex post controls over private entities, but frequently they 
objected that Common Properties are peculiar private subjects. In fact, Common 
Properties own the vast majority of forests and rural lands within the municipal 
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boundaries. Thus, interviewees argued that Municipalities should share visions and 
projects concerning the territorial development in stricter cooperation with Regole, 
rather than just technically verifying, approving or denying Common Property 
interventions. Interestingly, often right-holders described themselves as `territorial 
volunteers´, stressing that their role should be more conscientiously considered by 
Municipalities. 
Also on this point, few right-holders even took a clear position against the 
potential mutual Common Properties-Municipalities cooperation, stating that these 
two different regimes should not interfere with each other. Finally, other more 
balanced and structured opinions were expressed, revealing high variability among 
interviewees’ opinions on this matter of discussion: on the one hand Common 
Property representatives recalled and firmly claimed Common Property statutory 
autonomy, on the other hand they admitted that forestry clearly relates to the 
landscape management theme, over which Municipalities still maintain an overarching 
administrative and planning control. 
Regardless the different attitude toward Common Properties-Municipalities 
cooperation, all right-holders specified that municipal representatives have never been 
formally involved on discussions concerning Common Property internal life, dynamics 
and governance rules. Eventually, municipal representatives limited themselves to 
informal and personal suggestions (37.5%), whereas they usually abstain (62.5%) as 
they are not supposed to deal with such issues. 
Some argumentative right-holders quibbled over Municipalities, stating that these 
are willing to involve Common Properties only when some financial support is needed, 
like in the case of co-funded investments. Relevant examples were restoration of 
urban fountains, paving of the local square, Christmas decorations supply, rural and 
urban road network maintenance. Nevertheless, other milder right-holders observed 
that such interventions embellish their living place, and through such interventions 
Regole gladly concur to strengthen the community’s identity. 
Right-holders have been asked to indicate which institutions they consider their 
main territorial actors, with reference to their statutory objectives. Surprisingly, in 
55.6% of cases Municipalities were explicitly disregarded: some interviewees even 
bemoaned that Municipalities somehow lost the clear perception on which 
85 
interventions the territory would really need. The following institutions have been 
therefore mentioned: the regional Forest Services (88.9%), other regional offices, 
departments and agencies (50%) such as the Hydro-geological Service, the Soil 
Protection Service, the regional Road network Agency, and the regional Agency for 
payments in the agriculture sector. Then, private environmental consulting service 
companies (16,7%) followed, along with the State Forestry Corp (11.1%), other local 
rural development agencies (5.5%) and the farmers’ unions (5.5%). 
Interestingly, forms of political interference between Common Properties and 
Municipalities have been revealed. In fact, often right-holders constitute a relevant 
share of the local population, therefore Common Properties are potentially able to 
strongly influence local elections, even steering the Major’s election. Indirectly, they 
can also heavily influence local policy processes and decisions. As but an example, in 
the Municipality of Pieve di Cadore, local Regole jointly opposed to the projected 
establishment of a natural park, proofed that they would have been excluded by the 
Park Administrative Board and their usual forest operations might have been limited. 
As a consequence of the joint Common Properties’ opposition, Municipality 
abandoned its resolution to apply to the project. Generally, Common Properties seem 
more capable to influence municipal policies (several cases) than vice versa (only one 
case). 
Interviews carried out among municipal representatives had already suggested 
that often just one single municipal representative is responsible for maintaining 
formal contacts with local Regole – mostly the Major. Likewise, the same happens for 
Common Property: Presidents assumed this responsibility 94.4% of times (in one case, 
the Common Property secretary was delegated), eventually assisted by the vice-
President (33.3%), the secretary (22.2%) or various administrative Board members 
(16.6%). 
More than half times (12 out of 18), statutes do not impede Common Property 
representatives to cover at the same time the municipal Councillor role. Thus, it has 
been investigated what right-holders thought about potential conflicts of interest. 
Right-holders belonging to those Common Properties whose statutes preclude the 
institutional overlapping always defended such choice. Elsewhere, neither defence or 
critic positions clearly prevailed, and right-holders mainly adopted a pragmatic 
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approach, taking advantage of such fruitful opportunity where possible, or avoiding to 
exacerbate already wound-up institutional relationships. To this point, in one 
circumstance it has been revealed that a local citizen covering the double role of 
municipal Alderman and Common Property Board member resigned from both his 
positions because of the bipartisan political `pressures´ he was exposed to. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees stressed that most of the time institutional litigations 
are not really due to administrative reasons or policy issues, but they originate from 
personal contrasts, misunderstandings and peevish relationships between 
Municipalities and Common Property representatives. As but an example, in one 
circumstance the Common Property President had been also candidate to the 
municipal elections, competing against the elected Major. Thus, the Common 
Property-Municipality institutional relationship was evidently suffering from the 
existing hostility between their respective representatives. 
Moving from the firm belief that public and common (private) regimes should not 
interfere with each other, some right-holders argued that their statutory and 
managerial autonomy is so much separate from the municipal one that they consider 
useless a potential strengthening of their operative coordination. Differently, 
municipal representatives always looked positively at this eventuality. Nevertheless, in 
72.2% of cases a possible improvement in mutual relationship was considered positive, 
or alternatively (5.6%) already optimal. Various motivations have been provided to 
justify this opinion. First of all, Common representatives declared to be aware that a 
relevant social overlapping between right-holders’ and municipal communities exists, 
as right-holders belong to the whole local citizenry. Thus, cooperation would 
contribute to increase the common social welfare, as already mentioned. Wittily, one 
interviewee observed that to resolve institutional and legal disputes `right-holders 
settle lawyers’ professional fees twice´, either as right-holders and also as citizens. 
Then, right-holders were also aware that Common Properties and municipal 
respective competences are not mutually contrasting: on the one side Common 
Properties are private forest owners, on the other side Municipalities supervise the 
overall territorial planning. Thus, assumed that forest landscapes and the local living 
environment are public goods, right-holders, citizens and also new comers would 
benefit from a positive coordination among these entities. Thus, right-holders agreed 
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that Common Properties and Municipalities should define integrated territorial 
development strategies and projects, and share common objectives to be achieved 
through joint planning and managerial synergies. To better achieve these results, right-
holders would appreciate whether municipal and public technical offices provided 
Common Properties with administrative facilitation, so as to avoid bureaucratic delays 
and, generally speaking, to speed up procedures and processes. Stricter cooperation 
would also imply higher levels of human resources and technical skills availability to 
reach common targets. 
Finally, the current need to reduce public expenditure also stimulated institutional 
rearrangements: many small mountain Municipalities will have to compulsorily merge 
through the creation of Unions of Municipalities and the subsequent expected 
disappearance of the smallest public administrative units. As a result, some doubts 
were raised about the real capability of public administrations to deal with micro-scale 
environmental management issues (Gatto et al., 2012). Thus, Common Properties-
Municipalities cooperation and coordination would possibly mitigate even this 
problem.
 Table 11 – Third research step, summary results. 
Main issue Summary results 
Environmental 
management 
Frequent claim that forest management practices have bettered since Regole gained renewed direct control over local forest 
and pasture lands (`core business´ and main statutory scope; reinvestment rate >10% annual income). Main relevant 
mentioned activities: maintenance and new building of forest roads and investments to improve rangeland assets. 
Consciousness that restraining from an intensive harvesting does not equal low Common Property entrepreneurial ability. 
Even the mere prosecution of regular sylvicultural interventions can be considered more than `ordinary´ management.  
Some years to completely assume administrative and operative control over forest management after formal recognition 
following the regional law 26/1996 enforcement. Therefore, specific focus on forestry for almost a decade. 
The extensive body of environmental laws, and related administrative and bureaucratic duties, have been blamed. 
Juxtaposition between different democratic regimes, i.e. collective direct democracy vs. municipal representative democracy. 
The Common Assembly exerts high levels of technical control even for ordinary decisions compared to the municipal Town 
Council (Council members’ political positions). Common Properties prevent forest landscapes from suffering `speculative 
policy actions´, also thanks to variable quorum thresholds mechanisms. 
Economic development 
Timber selling activities more carefully planned; timber prices and revenues increased; the establishment of new local forest 
enterprises was facilitated; many rental contracts have been made more remunerative; new clauses introduced in the rental 
contracts of common alpine huts, permitting the tenants to organize new accommodating possibilities and establish 
agritourism services. 
Numerous activities that fall outside forest management practices. 
In some cases Regole act as `economic multipliers´ simply thanks to their private legal personality (e.g. when hydroelectric 
power plants or quarry sites are established on common lands); Common Properties can autonomously apply to Rural 
Development Program funding available only to private organizations. Appreciable degrees of coordination with 
Municipalities came to light, even though higher levels of Common Properties-Municipalities coordination would facilitate the 
achievement of comprehensive local economic development strategies. 
Tourism development 
Common Properties’ target and objective should consist of managing forest landscapes, rather than `promoting´ them 
through territorial marketing activities. By the way, forestry and pasture management implicitly stimulate forms of rural 
tourism (well-managed forest landscapes attract tourists). 
 Some respondents showed passive attitude toward local tourism: Common Properties simply `do not impede´ tourist events. 
Others: consciousness of the fact that Regole could actually strengthen their commitment toward tourist promotion (but: 
scarcity of human resources) 
Ad hoc interventions: maintenance of footpaths, creation of picnic areas and didactic boards placement, cultural activities,  
alpine hut restoration or refurbishment, and their reorganization for agritourism housing purposes. 
Common Properties consortia would be worth to be established, and Common Properties-Municipalities synergies to be 
reinforced as well.  
Social development 
Common Properties induce social increasing the community identity, of particular importance in small and isolated mountain 
villages. 
Proactivity in the organization of several events and public initiatives; subsidies to local associations; provision of social 
grants. 
Some benefits (e.g. wood fuel provision) or social grants are bestowed to non-right-holders too. New joint statutes (Common 
Consortia) extended benefit to non-right-holders, that single Common Property Statutes would exclude from. 
Some statutory renovation processes: lower number of years that non-right holders need to live locally before being possibly 
accepted as right-holders. Contrarily, sometimes resistances against possible statutory changes came to light; few Common 
Property representatives explicitly proposed male chauvinist considerations. 
Coordination with other 
Common Properties 
Horizontal communication between Common Properties can be distinguished from local (e.g. ARCFACO – Associazione Regole 
Comunioni Familiari Comelico) to national (e.g. Coordinamento Regionale del Veneto della Consulta Nazionale della Proprietà 
Collettiva) levels. 
On a smaller scale, adjacent Common Properties have recently began to organize themselves into associations: set up shared 
administrative structures in order to jointly manage land under common ownership. Single Common Properties maintain 
statutory autonomy, but the integration between single Common Properties has led to a progressive increase in management 
coordination. New statutes for associations led to the extension of certain benefits to non-right-holders that were excluded 
from individual statutes. 
Coordination with 
Municipalities 
Almost all Common Properties are represented in the local Town Councils: Councillors, Aldermen, often even the Major are 
also right-holders. Double institutional representativeness is rare, due to statutory limitations and convenience. 
The President is the main institutional spokesman. Informal communication broadly prevailing. More stable institutional 
coordination mechanisms are worth to be implemented: personal contrasts between their representatives (Majors, 
Presidents), revealed to be the heaviest coordination barriers. 
Consciousness that a sort of `compulsory coordination´ based on a top-down law prescription does not pose heavy limitations 
to the each one’s autonomy and ordinary management prevailed  
 Size and quality of some `returned´ forest assets led to legal disputes concerning rights to these resources, often triggered by 
cadastral inaccuracies. Recently, some pending legal issues were solved, with a progressive and significant bettering of the 
institutional relationships. Other institutional tensions exist, mainly concerning the allocation of institutional competences, 
e.g. duty/right to issue access permits for forest roads. Complaints about the fact that often the Common Properties-
Municipalities institutional relationship is simply reduced to a series of administrative procedures and bureaucratic 
requirements that Regole have to follow and fulfil.  
Forms of political interference between Common Properties and Municipalities have been revealed. 
Awareness that Common Properties and municipal respective competences are not mutually contrasting. Conviction that 
Common Properties and Municipalities should define integrated territorial development strategies and projects, and share 
common objectives to be achieved through joint planning and managerial synergies. Cooperation would contribute to 
increase the common social welfare too. 
 Figure 5 – Municipal representatives’ assigned rate to Common 
Property effectiveness in promoting social and economic 
development, tourist promotion and environmental management. 
 
Figure 6 – Occurrence of legal disputes and institutional contrasts 
between Municipalities and local Common Properties. 
 
Figure 7 – Self-evaluation of Common Property representatives of 
their own effectiveness in promoting social and economic 
development, tourist promotion and environmental management. 
 
Figure 8 – Perceived limitations to each one’s ordinary 
management ascribable to compulsory institutional coordination. 
 
 Figure 9 – Reported severity of institutional and social tensions 
(municipal representatives’ perception). 
 
Figure 10 – Opportunity to deal with Common Properties. 
 
Figure 11 – Commons’ integration with the local socio-economic environment 
(municipal representatives’ assessment). 
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4. Conclusions 
Trying to answer the initial research questions, and particularly whether the 
ongoing attempts at cooperation and reconciliation between roles and responsibilities 
of Common Properties and Municipalities are precursory to better coordination within 
the forestry sector, we found new evidence about the need to progressively improve 
coordination among these local level institutions. 
Polycentricity helps to understand, in this relatively simple analysis at the 
municipal administrative level, the degree to which relationships are being explored 
with local common property regimes, and the degree to which these relationships 
change dynamics of decision-making processes and the relative decision-making 
autonomy of actors within these processes. 
4.1. Horizontal linkages 
Both municipal and common representatives interviewed for the present study 
mentioned the need to reinforce not only the coordination between Municipalities and 
Common Properties, but also among different Common Properties, so that they could 
share fruitful ideas, solutions and experiences. 
Scaling out to create temporally stable associations of Common Properties had 
interesting results in terms of rule changes and new opportunities to participate in, or 
take control of management processes at a broader scale. 
Horizontal communication between Common Properties could be distinguished 
from local to national levels. Examples of these types of polycentric governance 
innovation do exist. Associations at local, regional, and national levels exist, with 
representative roles for individual Common Properties. Examples include the regional 
Directorate of the national association of common property regimes in the Veneto 
Region (Coordinamento Regionale del Veneto della Consulta Nazionale della Proprietà 
Collettiva), and ARCFACO (Associazione delle Regole e Comunioni Familiari del 
Comelico). Whereas the former aims to represent all the regional Common Properties 
at the regional and national level, the latter has a more specific geographical focus, as 
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it counts 16 Common Properties located in the northern part of the Veneto Region 
(Comelico area). 
Meetings between different Common Properties and the association of larger 
groups were found to play a symbolic role in the reproduction and reinforcement of 
values related to Commons management, and their continuity over time. 
Variability in awareness of the role (and sometimes the outright existence) of 
these associations has been identified, where some Common Properties had very weak 
or non-existent relationships with regional and national associations. 
Results gave evidence that, on a smaller scale, adjacent Common Properties have 
recently began to organize themselves into associations. Such associations have set up 
shared administrative structures in order to jointly manage lands under joint-in-
common ownership. Although single Common Properties maintain statutory 
autonomy, the integration between single Common Properties has led to a progressive 
increase in management coordination. In Cortina d’Ampezzo, for instance, such an 
organization comprises 11 Common Properties that share managerial responsibilities 
for a Regional Park (Parco Naturale Regionale delle Dolomiti d’Ampezzo) that extends 
over their commonly-held lands. In this case, the administrative structure shared 
among the various Regole (Comunanza) is also provided with its own statute. 
Similarly, four Common Properties in the Municipality of San Pietro di Cadore 
established a consortium defined by a new associative statute in order to better 
pursue common objectives, to mitigate administrative burdens on each single 
Common Property, and to jointly manage certain commonly-owned lands. These same 
four Common Properties, along with five others, jointly own common lands in the 
Visdende Valley. Each Common Property oversees management on its own lands, but 
because these lands have not been formally recognized in the official cadastre, 
landscape management needs to be discussed and agreed upon by all Common 
Properties involved. 
Though statutes of such associations or consortia must ultimately be compatible 
with those of each single Common Property, associations have revealed themselves to 
be a powerful means by which new constitutional and operational rules and 
regulations can be introduced into individual member Common Properties. In some 
cases new statutes for associations led to the extension of certain benefits to non-right 
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holders that were excluded from individual statutes. This is significant in that in some 
cases, Regole were able to overcome resistance to statutory changes from powerful 
actors. One representative stated that according to the statutes of his organization, 
only children of rights-holders were eligible to receive scholarships, however, rights to 
scholarships were extended to others thanks to decisions taken by the Consorzio (the 
association of Regole). 
Where there were no formal linkages between Common Properties (neither 
Comunanze nor other types of associations), often interview informants demonstrated 
their willingness to establish joint management arrangements with other contiguous 
Common Properties to address both for short term or long term priorities. Some 
informants expressed the need to communicate horizontally with other Common 
Properties on legal issues or constraints, although these may occur bilaterally between 
organizations in the absence of formal protocol dedicated to these types of 
interaction. 
Repeated interaction have been found between adjacent associations, between 
newly reconstituted Commons regimes, and between Common Properties that have 
experienced major episodes of historical discontinuity and Commons that could draw 
upon significant historical and recent experience. For example the Regole of Cortina, 
with their long uninterrupted history, are often consulted on a range of issues by other 
Common Property administrations, and often referred as an example to be followed. 
4.2. Vertical linkages 
In the Veneto Region, new legal frameworks gave traditional Commons 
institutions new meaning: the national law no. 97/1994 formally acknowledged Italian 
common property management systems as appropriate `tools´ to foster both 
environmental sustainability and socio-economic development of mountain areas. The 
Veneto Region undertook a set of initiatives to sustain the process of recognition of 
the role of Common Properties in rural development. As a consequence, some 
Common Properties managing forest landscapes have been restored when local 
citizens succeeded in providing evidence of their original land tenure regimes that 
were active before the Napoleonic land reforms and consecutive hostile legislative 
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initiatives. Where such reconstitution processes succeeded, a considerable change has 
occurred in the ownership structure, with large forest areas reverting from public to 
common property management. Yet the regional law of 1996 also regulates the 
coordination between Common Properties and public administrative bodies, 
prescribing that the latter should always actively inform and involve the former in an 
array of initiatives concerning local territorial development. In regional and national 
policy circles, the revalorization of Commons was encouraged by the argument that 
Commons regimes were recognized as successful forest managers 
Despite the Municipality is at a higher administrative level, yet both the 
Municipality and Common Properties can be considered to act at a local level, and 
sometimes responsibilities overlap, making for complex decision-making contexts. 
Results emerged from field surveys confirmed that the institutional conflicts 
among these institutions are frequent. Luckily, a mutual willingness to reach friendly 
agreements has recently prevailed. Resolution of litigations revealed to be a relevant 
driver for better cooperation and to establish more sound institutional relationships. 
Such resolutions should therefore definitely be pursued by both the contending 
parties. 
Institutional tensions, expressed in negative evaluation of relationships between 
Municipalities and Common Properties, were significantly more frequent than open 
legal disputes. In these case, there was no need for courts to resolve litigation in these 
cases: generally, mild legal aid was sufficient to reach friendly agreement and 
overcome the ongoing issues. 
In such cases, cooperation between municipal and common administrations 
decreased, affecting their whole institutional relationship, until they rid themselves of 
mutual tensions. In these circumstance, new joint actions or mutual administrative 
support can be hardly expected to developed. 
Interestingly, data collection has shown that Common Property 
representativeness within the municipal administration is not a discriminating feature 
in setting up positive or negative institutional relationships, even though it represents 
a positive integration of these two local Institutions. In fact, in every town council, at 
least one municipal representative (a Councillor, or even the Mayor) was also 
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discovered to be a Common Property member. However, not every Common Property 
in every Municipality was represented on council, for example, in cases where several 
Common Properties exist in the same Municipality, not all Common Properties were 
always represented. 
Generally, in the formal contacts between Common Properties and Municipalities, 
we found a higher level of collegiality in Common Property administrations compared 
to municipal ones, almost always represented by the Mayor: Common Property 
Presidents are normally supported by vice-President and other Common Property 
representatives. 
Rather, results suggested the importance of formal (and informal) contacts 
between these two bodies being carried out by more than just one municipal 
representative. Otherwise, if the institutional relationship is reduced to a matter of 
individual and personal contact (Major-President), the robustness of the whole 
institutional relationship may suffer from any worsening of this same `private´ contact. 
To this end, mechanisms to enforce stable, robust and enduring cooperation (e.g. 
joint declarations of interest, procedural and/or economic memoranda and 
agreements, etc.) are worthwhile. In this way, it would be possible also to overcome 
and prevent personal contrasts negatively affecting the institutional relationship. 
Informal relationships among municipal and common representatives have been 
found to play a relevant role in maintaining the institutional contacts between these 
Entities vital and properly working. Usually, in such circumstances, formal agreements 
are established only after reaching similar agreements in informal meetings 
Yet, also in this case peevish personal contacts between few institutional 
representatives might challenge the whole institutional coordination. 
Furthermore, where informal and personal contacts represent the main and/or 
most frequent institutional communication patterns, few information can be found 
concerning projects, activities and proposals that have not been implemented yet. 
Only oral information allow to maintain evidence of such hidden processes. 
The high frequency in the occurrence of institutional conflicts between Common 
Properties and Municipalities, concerning each one’s own administrative 
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competences, somehow mirrors the pretended sharp distinction between right-
holders and the whole local citizenry. Meaningfully, the presumption to have nothing 
to do with municipal managerial and policy life does not conciliate with some right-
holders’ willingness to be acknowledged as volunteers, acting for a comprehensive 
commonweal and deserving administrative support. 
Results suggest that Municipalities remain the primary institutional reference 
point for mountain territories, and they continue to play a central role in regulation of 
local-level socio-economic dynamics. Institutional tensions occurred when the 
presumption that Common Properties had nothing to do with Municipalities prevailed, 
although both play a role in managing overlapping territories. 
Tensions generally arose also when both Municipalities and Common Properties 
claimed administrative jurisdiction over specific tasks or roles, resulting in problems of 
institutional coordination. A rising level of debate with state administration concerning 
forest roads and `ordinary´ management practices is in line with some 
characterisations of the forest sector as a `highly regulated system´ (Pettenella and 
Secco, 2011), with little possibility for forest stakeholders to introduce new degrees of 
flexibility into local forest management. For this same reason, it is not a surprise that 
legislation is usually felt as interference, invoking resistance or apathy. 
On the other side, it seems recommendable that right-holders conceive Common 
Properties more as essential tools to ensure the involvement of right-holders in the 
local policy processes, rather than as a mere legal acknowledgement of ancient 
property rights. Significantly, this seems to be the interpretation implicitly 
recommended by the regional law, which empowered Common Properties with 
fundamental public responsibilities, but also established compulsory mutual 
institutional contacts between Common Properties and Municipalities. 
In the light of a (renewed) civil active role in the administrative life of the whole 
community, some institutional divergences would be probably also overcome. On the 
other side, an increased level of debate might be the price to be paid to increase 
participation in public life by local people. 
  
99 
4.3. Expectations on future institutional partnerships 
The need for more effective coordination was raised in several interviews because 
of overlap in statutory autonomy of Common Properties with municipal oversight of 
local environmental and urban planning, and social and economic development. The 
majority of Commons representatives interviewed felt that the statutory scopes of 
Common Properties were more specific to forest/pasture-related issues than the wide 
fields of competence that Municipalities were required to cover administratively. 
Some Common Property representatives claimed that their statutory and 
managerial autonomy was effectively kept separate from municipal responsibilities, 
such that they did not consider any further strengthening of coordination with 
Municipalities to be necessary. On the other hand, municipal representatives surveyed 
in Veneto were found to always look positively at this kind of coordination. This was 
found not only to be the case in terms of increasing coordination between 
Municipalities and Common Properties, but also in terms of a role for Municipalities in 
coordination of multiple local Common Properties falling within their jurisdiction. In 
one particular case, the issue at play was coordination among Common Properties for 
the maintenance of high trails and pasture systems to encourage tourists to visit a 
valley that was perceived to have poor connectivity to nearby popular tourism 
destinations. 
Municipal representatives were often confident that the institutional relationship 
with Common Properties would improve in the future too, both in terms of overall 
frequency and quality of institutional interaction. This belief was mainly based on 
three different considerations. The first was the progressive resolution of pending legal 
issues, and therefore the overcoming of past hostilities and tensions, including 
interpersonal friction. Secondly, both Municipalities and Common Properties needed 
to cooperate more closely in order to better cope with the ongoing process of 
institutional re-organization, which was not perceived to have favourable 
consequences in terms of local territorial development. The current massive cutbacks 
in public expenditure will probably facilitate, or even force, higher degrees of mutual 
integration between these two territorial institutions. 
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Surprisingly, Common Property representatives were not inclined to acknowledge 
Municipalities as cornerstone territorial institutions. Nevertheless, this opinion does 
not apply to their future expectations. In fact, both municipal and Common Property 
representatives demonstrated good confidence in a future, mutual stricter 
cooperation. Significantly, they mostly agreed on the mutual economic advantage and 
the need to cope with higher-level institutions and their legislative initiatives. 
Pleasantly, one right-holder summarized this issue with the following words: “when 
the water level reaches your throat, you have to swim not to drown”. 
Nonetheless, a long way still has to be gone through. In fact, whereas 
Municipalities would appreciate more cooperation on their welfare strategies, 
Common Properties would prefer stricter coordination on local economic activities 
implementation. Almost useless to be said, both these perspectives are worth to be 
jointly pursued. In fact, where the institutional overlapping between Common 
Properties and Municipalities has been found stricter, that is where usually joint 
actions are undertaken on both forest management and welfare-oriented initiatives, 
social and institutional contrasts were either less relevant or negligible, and higher 
levels of mutual and fruitful cooperation had been reached. 
4.4. Forest landscape management and supply of environmental services 
The Common Properties’ real commitment to the ambitious requests of the 
regional law has been investigated. Positive and negative evaluations of outcomes of 
linkages between Municipalities and Common Properties were expressed by 
interviewees in municipal administrative positions. This was frequently, but not always 
found to confirm differences in territorial management responsibilities, however, 
discontent can be understood to reflect desire for greater coordination between these 
organizational units over and above what is specified in the 1996 enabling regional 
law. 
Despite some differences in the opinions of the two groups of stakeholders, we 
found remarkable degrees of similarity between Common Properties and municipal 
representatives regarding the relevant role that Regole play in rural development. 
Above all, there is a general consensus that forest management has improved since 
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Common Properties newly gained control over local forest resources, probably 
because it represents their statutory and vocational core business. Common Property 
representatives proudly claimed their commitment to implement traditional forest 
management practices. 
Sometimes, municipal representatives stated that the renewed Common Property 
control over the forest resources also had the positive spin-off of relieving 
Municipalities of a difficult and time-consuming administrative burden. Furthermore, it 
also resulted in added confidence that no speculative action with detrimental social 
and environmental consequences would be carried out within the local forest 
landscape. 
It is interesting to note that right-holders retraced the theoretical discussion 
among several scholars on the commodification of nature (Costanza, 2006; McCauley, 
2006). Particularly, the belief that the environmental management should not be 
driven solely by, and evaluated only through, pure economic criteria, prevailed among 
Common Property representatives. 
However, the debate about the provision of environmental services, others than 
wood, remained marginal among the common interviewees: right-holders definitely 
focused on wood-oriented traditional forestry, considering other services as spill-
overs. 
Furthermore, right-holders clearly assigned priority to timber provision, though 
they consider environmental services not only compatible, but also embedded within 
their current forest management practices. 
Interviewees mainly perceived forest-related tourism as not really included in the 
existing forest management plans, and forest landscapes are simply thought to be the 
essential substratum needed for local tourism. Differently, no evident trade-offs 
between wood provision and carbon storage service appeared. Biodiversity was 
perceived as a sort of forest management spill-over, not necessary to be further 
proactively fostered through ad hoc interventions. On the one hand, soil protection 
appeared to be a sort of forest management pre-requisite, on the other, it was 
described as an implicit management side-line. 
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Results suggested that Common Properties are more committed to traditional 
forest management than Municipalities, thus the re-establishment of `new´ Common 
Properties may reinforce the main provisioning service, i.e. wood harvesting. However 
the dichotomy `Common Properties focussed on market-based activities vs. 
Municipalities focussed on provision of environmental services´ does not hold for at 
least two reasons: 
(i) in the highly regulated Italian forest sector, Municipalities tend to abandon or 
to make a more extensive use of their forests, actively managed for centuries 
and now ageing and thus increasingly vulnerable, resulting in a reduced 
provision of some environmental services. On the contrary, active Common 
Property forest management more oriented to wood production can indirectly 
support the provision of some environmental services (landscape conservation, 
carbon storage, soil stability); 
(ii) because of institutional arrangements and, especially, of constitutional rules of 
Common Properties, only 10% of profits deriving from forest management 
activities by Municipalities are reinvested in the forestry sector, while in the 
case of Common Properties almost all profits have to be reinvested in land 
resources improvements. 
In synthesis, these results suggest that Common Properties particularly address 
their activities to forestry and forest landscape management, whereas they are less 
committed toward other responsibilities that the regional law entrusts them with, i.e. 
social and economic development of mountain areas. This also explains the reason 
why they mentioned Municipalities as reference institutions less than half of the times, 
i.e. only 44.4% of cases. 
4.5. Economic development 
Common Property representatives demonstrated to be more careful than 
municipal ones in the appraisal of some specific income possibilities. Results also 
revealed relevant investments on common assets, indirectly stimulating various 
entrepreneurial activities at a local level, e.g. wood-working and road-building 
enterprises. 
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Nonetheless, it seems that Regole indirectly contribute to the economic 
development of mountain areas especially through their high commitment toward 
active forest management practices, rather than through specific managerial 
objectives. Such evidence has been further underpinned by some right-holders, 
convinced that `other´ aims and scopes, including economic development and tourism 
promotion, simply `follow´ forest management and Common Property welfare 
strategies (cascade effect). 
Tourism promotion seemed particularly suffering from this pre-eminence of forest 
landscape management over other aims and objectives, and not rarely right-holders 
admitted that they should commit themselves more toward this particular issue. In the 
past, Alpine Common Properties played a fundamental role in providing mountain 
populations with basic livelihood services, based on internal regulations and social 
rules. Meaningfully, in the ancient times Regole have never had to develop economic 
strategies for the development of tourism or other sectors. Nowadays many of them 
are facing this issue for the first time, in their efforts to adapt to the new modern 
social, environmental and economic stances. 
Definitely, it seems appropriate that an entrepreneurial logic closely tied just to 
forestry sensu stricto would be overcome. Yet, a decade ago Florian (2004) observed 
that such a positive process had already started, and this survey confirmed similar 
advances, but difficulties still persist and an entrepreneurial disposition of some 
Common Properties seems far from being fully realized. 
4.6. Inclusiveness and social development 
In the introduction, it has been speculated that if an overly powerful collective 
identity more anchored in the past than projected towards the future undesirably 
prevailed, the resulting situation might conflict with the ultimate scope of the national 
and regional law. 
As a driver of change of primary importance, people in the south-eastern Alps no 
longer rely on commonly-held lands for their livelihoods, and private economic 
activities at the household level have superseded the importance of benefits derived 
from Commons. Other important drivers include the increasing number of outsiders, 
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decreasing number of insiders, the changing economy of the forest sector, changing 
forest property regimes, changing expectations around who could participate in 
democratic society, and poor public and political awareness of this particular form of 
ownership. 
Ultimately, if Common Properties were unable to adapt to the new external and 
internal dynamics characterizing the Italian forest sector, the future survival of 
common properties could once again become uncertain and threatened. Yet, Gatto et 
al. (2011) hypothesized that past and traditional tools that Common Properties 
adopted to manage their resources might today not always be sufficient to adapt to 
external changes and disturbances, potentially leading to non-resilient socio-ecological 
systems. 
Results suggested that it is likely that new demographic trends will lead Common 
Properties to develop new rules and criteria to possibly accept new members within 
the Common Property Assembly. 
In fact, whereas the gender issue is being progressively solved or mitigated, even 
though there is still a long way to go (Zanderigo Rosolo, 2012), other social issues 
appear even more urgent. Among these, the exclusion of those not descended from 
ancient local inhabitants from the possibility of entering the common community, 
even if they have been living in the area for several decades and have demonstrated 
an interest in actively participating in the common resource management. 
In Italian Alpine Common Properties where membership is closed, right-holders 
are defined through both a blood-line constraint and a residence criterion, while only 
the latter is needed for open-membership commonly-held land (usi civici). Thus, in the 
case of closed Common Properties, only descendants of inhabitants with ancient local 
roots can be counted as members of the community. National legislation formally 
assigns the legal status of `private personality´ to Common Properties, shifting from 
the previous `public personality´ of the usi civici. The subsequent decrease in the 
number of people with rightful claims on the common assets may result in a reduction 
of the variety of interests to be considered in the forest governance processes and 
related management activities (Schurr, 2011). 
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The reasons that in the past led to the imposition of such `social barriers´, namely 
the increasing human pressure on scarce and essential forest resources, no longer 
appear to be justified. 
Our data suggest that Common Properties have been called on to address 
perceived closure of membership. Several interviewees stressed that the number of 
Common Property members dropped over time because of legal statutes restricting 
entrance possibilities. A reduction in levels of participation at assemblies and in rule-
making processes has also been noted as an outcome of these, and other related 
demographic processes, although efforts to get younger rights-holders involved have 
been observed. 
Nowadays an excessive closure could even threaten the same survival of some 
Common Properties, that shifted from struggling against the so-called `enclosure of 
Commons´ (Bravo and De Moor, 2008) to the opposite situation, i.e. the risk to 
downgrade to `common enclosures´. Unable to open up and adapt to extensive 
societal changes, Common Properties could even be exposed to the risk of extinction 
due to rapid demographic decline, in case they were unable to counteract these 
trends. 
This is the most worrisome issue tackling the future Common Properties’ survival 
in the Veneto Region, and it seems likely that Common Properties will have to re-think 
their intrinsic physiognomy. By doing so, historical and ancient traditions might be 
deeply shaken, e.g. membership rights only inherited by lineage. 
To this end, it seems desirable that innovative rules and criteria to possibly accept 
new members within the Common Property assembly are developed and validated 
through statute revisions, even though practical difficulties (i.e. minimum quorum 
thresholds in statute reform) or ideological hostilities may arise. 
Whereas a new open attitude recently began to prevail, Common Properties still 
remain quite effective in mainly catering for the interests of right-holders and 
protecting the status quo in forest land use. 
The most outstanding difference between the municipal representatives’ 
perception and the Common Property self-evaluation regarded the capability of local 
Regole to promote social development, with right-holders advancing vibrating claims 
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on their commitment toward such goal. Maybe, this deep divergence can be explained 
through the adoption of different perspectives, according to their respective social 
user base and social targets, i.e. right-holders versus the whole local inhabitants. 
Whatever the reason, in a changing mountain society with relevant immigrant 
newcomers flows (Steinicke et al., 2014), perhaps Common Properties should commit 
themselves to promote social models as inclusive as possible, and to more actively 
support Municipalities in their welfare strategies. 
To this point, it is clear that when rule-making autonomy is vested in local-level 
Common Properties, processes at higher levels are also formulated with the necessity 
of creating the appropriate linkages with the local level. However, the level of 
autonomy for local participants in polycentric system is often not clear. The level of 
voice or autonomy is often the issue of interest in giving effective direction to these 
systems. This current focuses on how institutional nesting affects polycentricity and 
how different levels and forms of autonomy can affect the trajectory of the overall 
system (Gruby and Basurto, 2014). In this context, it seems worth emphasizing the 
need to move beyond panaceas in supporting coordination in polycentric governance 
situations, i.e. there are no institutional designs and approaches that can lead to 
effective resource governance in all situations (Ostrom et al., 2007). In nested 
polycentric systems, governance re-arrangement has not meant replacement of one 
governance level with another, rather a process of negotiation of governance across 
scales is underway. This is also the case of the Common Properties in the Veneto 
Region. 
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Annex I – First step research questionnaire 
 
PART I – INTERVIEWEE: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION 
 Surveyed Municipality 
 Interviewee: basic information 
 Name and Surname 
 Role within the municipal Administration 
 Other personal data (e.g. age, education, etc.) 
 Why responsible for answering the questionnaire? 
 
 
PART II – MUNICIPALITY, COMMON PROPERTIES AND FOREST ASSETS 
1. How many and which Common Properties stand within the administrative municipal area, 
either completely or partially? 
 Full name 
 Year of recognition/reconstitution [if known] 
 
2. What is the total extension of agriculture and forest lands within the administrative 
municipal boundaries? [hectares] 
 
3. What is the extension of the tenure assets owned by local Common Properties? [hectares, 
at least approximately, if known] 
 
4. Does the Municipality still manage any agriculture and/or forest asset, or have they been 
all transferred to Common Properties, after their reconstitution? 
 Alpine huts 
 Agritourisms 
 Pastures and grasslands 
 Forests 
 Pit sites 
 Other assets [to be specified] 
ii 
 
5. If yes, what is the extension of this `residual´ portion? [hectares, at least approximately, if 
known] 
 
 
PART III – GRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRES 
6. Which of these situations [looking at the pictures, next page. CP-Regimes stands for 
`common property regimes´] better describes the existing and current institutional 
relationship between Regole and Municipality? 
 
Case A) Regole are not stably coordinated among themselves (few contacts), and neither 
with the Municipality. 
Case B) Regole are not stably coordinated among themselves, but they have single and 
consolidated contacts with the Municipality. 
[Further deepening whether the Municipality acts as an institutional mediator between 
different Regole]. 
Case C) Regole are stably coordinated among themselves, but they have few contacts with 
the Municipality – either singularly or jointly. 
Case D) Regole are both stably coordinated among themselves, and they also have single 
and consolidated institutional contacts with the Municipality. 
Case E) Regole are stably coordinated among themselves, and they have also consolidated 
institutional contacts with the Municipality. In the institutional relationship with the 
Municipality, Regole mainly coordinate their action. 
Case F) Regole are stably coordinated among themselves, and they have also consolidated 
institutional contacts with the Municipality. In the institutional relationship with the 
Municipality, Regole both coordinate their action and also maintain some singular and 
specific communication channels. 
Or various combination of former possibilities. 
[Further deepening on which Regole coordinate their action, and which ones do not – both 
with regards to the other Common Properties and with the Municipality]. 
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7. Does a Mountain Community exist? [Yes; No] 
 
 [if any] Which one? [full name] 
 
 [if any] Which of these situations [looking at the pictures, here below] better describes 
the currently existing institutional relationship patterns between Regole, the 
Municipality and the Mountain Community? 
 
Case A) Regole are only or mainly coordinated with the Municipality, and the 
Municipality is stably coordinated with the Mountain Community 
 
Case B) Regole are stably coordinated both with the Municipality and the Mountain 
Community, and these among themselves too. 
 
 
 
 
PART IV – INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATIVENESS AND `DOUBLE-REPRESENTATIVENESS´ 
8. Does a common-municipal `double institutional representativeness´ exist, i.e. does any 
municipal representative also represent the Common Property? 
 No cases of `double-representativeness´ 
 Yes, a `double-representativeness´ exist 
v 
[if any, the municipal organigram have been shown, and the interviewees have been asked to 
highlight such a peculiarity, linking one person and his role covered within the municipal 
administration with the his role within the Common Property administration] 
 
Role in the municipal administration 
 Major 
 Deputy Major 
 Municipal secretary 
 Aldermen [competences to be 
specified] 
 Town Councillor [majority or minority] 
 Technician, head of one specific [to be 
specified] 
 Other role [to be specified] 
 
Role in the Common Administration 
o President 
o Vice-President 
o Common Property Secretary 
o Economic auditor 
o Administrative Commission member 
o Member of other Common 
Commission [to be specified] 
o Only regoliere (right-holder) 
o Other role [to be specified] 
 
9. Who represents the formal and privileged spokesman between the Common Property and 
the Municipality? 
 
Role in the municipal administration 
 Major 
 Deputy Major 
 Municipal secretary 
 Aldermen [competences to be 
specified] 
 Town Councillor [majority or minority] 
 Technician, head of one specific [to be 
specified] 
 Other role [to be specified] 
 
Role in the Common Administration 
o President 
o Vice-President 
o Common Property Secretary 
o Economic auditor 
o Administrative Commission member 
o Member of other Common 
Commission [to be specified] 
o Only regoliere (right-holder) 
o Other role [to be specified] 
 
10. Who represents the privileged spokesman in the informal, personal, unofficial 
communications occurring between the Common Property and the municipal 
administration? 
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Role in the municipal administration 
 Major 
 Deputy Major 
 Municipal secretary 
 Aldermen [competences to be 
specified] 
 The municipal board, as a whole 
 The municipal councillorship, as a 
whole 
 Town Councillor [majority or minority] 
 Technician, head of one specific [to be 
specified] 
 Other role [to be specified] 
 
Role in the Common Administration 
o President 
o Vice-President 
o Common Property Secretary 
o Economic auditor 
o Administrative Commission member 
o Member of other Common 
Commission [to be specified] 
o Common Property members as a 
whole, as they are also municipal 
citizens 
o One `simple´ regoliere (right-holder) 
o Other role [to be specified] 
11. Who usually takes the formal initiative, when institutional relationships occur between the 
municipal and the common administration? 
 (Almost) always the Municipality 
 Both, but mainly the Municipality 
 [only if explicitly stated by the interviewee] Balanced situation, mutual neutrality 
 (Almost) always the Common Property 
 Both, but mainly the Common Property 
 Irregular, depending on the situations [further description] 
 
12. According to the real experience, how would you consider the municipal `position´ in 
terms of policy and administrative autonomy, with respect to the Common ones? 
 Passive: Often Municipality simply ratifies Common Property decisions, that are quite 
`binding´ 
 Passive openness: Municipality is inclined to ratify Common Property decisions, but 
these are not considered `binding´ 
 [only if explicitly stated by the interviewee] Balanced positioning, mutual neutrality 
 Pro-active openness: Common Properties are inclined to ratify municipal decisions, but 
these are not considered `binding´ 
 Active: often Common Properties simply ratify municipal decisions, that are quite 
`binding´ 
 Irregular, according to different situations [further description] 
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13. Do you think this is the optimal situation? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 [If no] what situation do you think could be considered optimal? [Open answer] 
 
14. Does any kind of written memorandum exist between the Regola/Regole and the 
Municipality, i.e. a signed document regulating their mutual relationships? [Yes; No; I don’t 
know] 
 [If any] what is its nature? 
 Programmatic [further open explanation] 
 Economic [further open explanation] 
 Procedural 
 Mechanisms of institutional relationship [further open explanation] 
 Allocation of operative roles [further open explanation] 
 Other [further open explanation] 
 
 [If no]: 
 The institutional relationship is mainly based on informal contacts 
 Different roles and competences are distinct and separate, therefore the 
institutional relationship is limited 
 Other [further open explanation] 
 
 
PART V – THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS ASSIGNED BY LAW TO THE COMMON PROPERTIES IN 
THE INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MUNICIPALITY 
Introduction to the 4 different topics that will be questioned the hereafter: 
a. Urban choices and local territorial development plans; 
b. Actions aimed to develop local economy 
c. Forest and environmental management actions 
d. Activities aimed to promote local culture and traditions 
 
15. In the last 5 years, has the Municipality ever formally involved Common Properties, pre-
emptively asking for their opinion, in projects and/or activities concerning urban choices 
and local territorial development strategies? 
 I don’t know 
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 No, there were no opportunities/situations/occasions 
 No, but they have been involved in an informal way 
 No, for other reasons [further open explanation] 
 Yes 
 In which occasion/situation? [further open explanation] 
  Common Properties gave written answers 
 Common Properties did not give written answers 
 Did the Assembly discuss the issue? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 In addition to the pre-emptive opinion (initiative or creation phase), did Common 
Properties also take active part in the project/activity promoted by the 
Municipality? 
  No 
  Yes …in the implementation phase  
…in the evaluation phase  
 Co-funding: Yes  No  
  
16. On the contrary, in the last 5 years, have Common Properties ever formally involved the 
Municipality, pre-emptively asking for its opinion, in projects and/or activities concerning 
urban choices and local territorial development strategies (on areas owned by 
themselves) 
 I don’t know 
  No, because this topic lays outside Common Property competences 
 No, because Common Properties preferred to take complete advantage of their own 
autonomy 
 No, there were no opportunities/situations/occasions 
 No, but the Municipality has been informally 
 No, for other reasons: [further open explanation] 
 Yes 
 In which occasion/situation? [further open explanation] 
  Common Properties gave written answers 
 Common Properties did not give written answers 
 Did the Assembly discuss the issue? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
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 In addition to the pre-emptive opinion (initiative or creation phase), did Common 
Properties also take active part in the project/activity promoted by the 
Municipality? 
  No 
  Yes …in the implementation phase  
…in the evaluation phase  
 Co-funding: Yes  No  
 
17. As for question no. 15, focussing on actions aimed to develop local economy 
18. As for question no. 16, focussing on actions aimed to develop local economy 
19. As for question no. 15, focussing on forest and environmental management actions. 
[The following option added]  Municipality delegated these functions to the Mountain 
Community 
 
20. As for question no. 16, focussing on forest and environmental management actions 
 
21. As for question no. 15, focussing on Activities aimed to promote local culture and 
traditions 
[either major and minor events considered] 
 
22. As for question no. 16, focussing on Activities aimed to promote local culture and 
traditions 
[either major and minor events considered] 
 
[The regional law states that Common Properties can delegate the management of their own 
properties to territorial Public Bodies, and vice versa.] 
23. Did the Municipality empowered Common Properties with the responsibility to manage 
some municipal property? 
 I don’t know  No 
 Yes. Which ones and through which mechanisms? [further open explanation] 
 
24. …and vice versa? [as for question no. 23] 
 I don’t know  No 
 Yes. Which ones and through which mechanisms? [further open explanation] 
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25. In the last 5 years, which other actions did the Municipality approve, implement or 
undergo in the last 5 years, that had something to do – directly or indirectly, with the local 
Common Properties? [open answer] 
 
26. …and vice-versa? [open answer] 
 
 
PART VI – ECONOMIC ISSUES 
 
27. In economic terms, how did the Common Property reconstitution affect the municipal 
financial resources? 
 [Alternatively, if the Common Property reconstitution dates back to a distant past] 
What would happen to the municipal financial resources if, just hypothetically, the 
common assets were moved under the municipal ownership and management? 
 
 There were no effects 
 I don’t know/It’s difficult to say because… [further open explanation] 
 It produced economic effects (either positive or negative) 
[code A] More burdens and expenditures (negative direct effect) 
[code B] Less revenues (negative indirect effect) 
[code C] Less burdens and expenditures (indirect positive effect) 
[code D] More income and revenues (direct positive effect) 
 
 Provision of a list of the effects, distinguishing case-codes A, B, C or D 
 Estimation of each effect 
 Description of each effect:  una tantum, in the past 
 una tantum, still currently 
 continuous, in the past 
 continuous, still currently 
 
28. How did the Municipality adapt to such changes? [OR: how would it adapt?] 
 3 most positive adjustments (if any) [open answer] 
 3 most negative adjustments (if any) [open answer] 
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29. Which were the consequences for the local community? Which adjustments occurred? 
[OR: what would they be?] 
 3 most positive consequences and/or adjustments (if any) [open answer] 
 3 most negative consequences and/or adjustments (if any) [open answer] 
 
30. Which was the reinvestment rate in agriculture, pasture and forest management activities, 
before land ownership was reinstated to Common Properties? 
 <10% 
 10% 
 >10% 
 I don’t know 
 
31. According to your opinion, how much positive might be (potentially) for the Municipality 
to have to deal with the Common Properties? 
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 
 
32. According to your real experience, how much positive is for the Municipality to have to 
deal with the Common Properties? 
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 
 
33. Describe the 3 most positive aspects for the Municipality of dealing with the Common 
Properties 
[open answer] 
 
34. Describe the 3 most negative aspects for the Municipality of dealing with the Common 
Properties 
[open answer] 
 
 
PART VII – THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS ASSIGNED BY LAW TO THE COMMON PROPERTIES 
IN THE COMMON INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
The national and regional laws recognize Common Properties as subjects concurring to the 
environmental protection and socio-economic development of mountain territories. 
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35. To what extent do you think that local Common Properties really promote/sustain: 
 Environmental protection  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 If the vote is negative (0-5) or poor (6), indicate the reason: 
 Common Properties’ disinterest 
 Low internal organizational ability (governance) 
 Ineffective Initiatives 
 Missing coordination with other Bodies 
 Other [open answer] 
 Social development   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 If the vote is negative (0-5) or poor (6), indicate the reason: 
 Common Properties’ disinterest 
 Low internal organizational ability (governance) 
 Ineffective Initiatives 
 Missing coordination with other Bodies 
 Other [open answer] 
 Mainly, with effects on: 
 Whole local (municipal) community 
 Right-holders’ community 
[Only if explicitly expressed]:  Balanced situation 
 Economic development  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 If the vote is negative (0-5) or poor (6), indicate the reason: 
 Common Properties’ disinterest 
 Low internal organizational ability (governance) 
 Ineffective Initiatives 
 Missing coordination with other Bodies 
 Other [open answer] 
 Mainly, with effects on: 
 Whole local (municipal) community 
 Right-holders’ community 
[Only if explicitly expressed]:  Balanced situation 
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 Tourism    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 If the vote is negative (0-5) or poor (6), indicate the reason: 
 Common Properties’ disinterest 
 Strong defence of their cultural identity from external influences. 
 Low internal organizational ability (governance) 
 Ineffective Initiatives 
 Missing coordination with other Bodies 
 Other [open answer] 
 
36. Have the Common Properties ever involved the Municipality, both directly or indirectly, in 
issues concerning their internal Common Property life, i.e. governance aspects? [Yes; No; I 
don’t know] 
 [If yes] in which circumstances? [open answer] 
 
37. How can the Municipality provide the Common Assembly with ideas, comments, 
suggestions, even though it is not formally involved? 
 I don’t know 
 It doesn’t give any suggestions, since it is not its competence 
 It doesn’t give any suggestions, since it is not interested 
 Through informal and personal contacts 
 Other [to be specified] 
 
38. In relation to the effectiveness of Common Property tasks and objectives, and according to 
your opinion, a stricter coordination between Common Properties and Municipality would 
be: 
 Positive. Why? [open answer] 
 Negative. Why? [open answer] 
 Useless. Why? [open answer] 
 I don’t know 
 
39. In relation to the effectiveness of Common Property tasks and objectives, and according to 
your opinion, a stricter coordination among different Common Properties would be: 
 Positive. Why? [open answer] 
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 Negative. Why? [open answer] 
 Useless. Why? [open answer] 
 I don’t know 
 
40. Do you think that the internal, decisional mechanisms of Common Properties somehow 
influence municipal decisions? 
 I don’t know  No  Yes. [further open answer]  
 
41. Do legal disputes exist between the Municipality and the Common Property, or did they 
exist in the past? 
 No, neither currently nor in the past 
 Yes, in the past, but currently solved 
 Yes, still in place 
 [If any], for which reason? [open answer] 
 How were they solved? Which evolution is foreseeable, and/or desirable? [open 
answer] 
 
42. Apart from legal disputes, in the last 5 years did you perceive divergences, frictions or 
contrasts in terms of institutional competences? 
 No, neither currently nor in the past 
 Yes, in the past, but currently solved 
 Yes, still in place 
 [If any], for which reason? [open answer] 
 How were they solved? Which evolution is foreseeable, and/or desirable? 
[open answer] 
 [If any], how much severe (magnitudo) do you think these contrasts was? 
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 
43. In the last 5 years, did you perceive divergences, frictions or contrasts from a social 
(community) point of view? 
 No cases 
 Yes, still ongoing 
 Yes, solved 
 [If yes] how much do you think they can be considered relevant? (magnitude) 
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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 [If yes] what was/is their reason? [open answer] 
 [If solved] in which way they have been solved? [open answer] 
 [If still pending] what evolution is foreseeable? [open answer] 
 
44. How do you think that the relationship between the Municipality and the Common 
Property(ies) will be in the future? 
 More continuous/close     Better 
 More sporadic      Worse 
 Stationary, unvaried     Unvaried 
 I don’t know      I don’t know 
 
45. According to your perception, to what extent do local non-right holders inhabitants 
perceive Regole as balanced and integrated institutions within the local territory? 
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 
 Which critiques are ascribed to local Common Properties? [open answer] 
 Which positive characteristics are bestowed to local Common Properties? [open 
answer] 
 
46. Which actions do you think that Regole would/should undergo in order to improve their 
ability to coordinate with other organizations and institutions, so as to make territorial 
returns higher? [open answer] 
 
 
PART VIII – OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
Eventually, further deepening of the following issues, and whatever other relevant issue come 
to light during the interview [open answer, explorative approach]: 
 Relationships between Regole and the neighbouring Municipalities 
 Relationships among different and/or neighbouring Regole 
 Nature and mechanisms underlying the informal contacts between the Municipality and 
Regole. Does the Municipality act as `mediator´ between different Regole? 
 Are some Common Property reconstitution processes still ongoing? What are the future 
expectations, both positive and/or negative, about such reconstitution processes? 
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Annex II – Third research phase questionnaire 
 
PART I – THE INTERVIEWEE AND THE COMMON PROPERTY: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION 
 Interviewee: basic information 
 Name and surname 
 Role within the Common administration 
 Other personal data (e.g. age, education, etc.) 
 
 Surveyed Common Property: basic information 
 Full name 
 Existence of common lands jointly owned by different Common Properties 
(promiscuità or comunanze), or other forms of aggregation among local Common 
Properties. 
 Geographical extension of common assets (including promiscuità, if any) 
 
 
PART II – THE COMMON PROPERTY RECONSTITUTION 
1. Year of Common Property reconstitution and formal recognition 
[alternatively]  The Common Property has been never dismantled, or similar situations 
 
2. Deepening of the following key-issues [open answers, highly explorative approach]: 
 Did the Common Property reconstitution process originate from a collective initiative, 
due to a `common-feeling´ broadly and well-rooted within the local community, or did 
few people stimulate such a process? 
 Prior to the reconstitution, to what extent were the local people still aware of being 
common right-holders?  
 Was there someone familiar with the administrative competences, essential to 
manage the Common Property administration ? How were such competences 
recovered, or newly developed? 
 Did any political pressure play a role in the purposefulness of reconstituting the local 
Common Property (with particular reference to the political movements advocating 
secessionist claims)? In which way, if any? 
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PART III – THE COMMON PROPERTY RECONSTITUTION 
3. Does a common-municipal `double institutional representativeness´ exist, i.e. does any 
municipal representative also represent the Common Property? 
 No cases of `double-representativeness´ 
 Yes, a `double-representativeness´ exist 
[if any, the municipal organigram have been shown, and the interviewees have been asked 
to highlight such a peculiarity, linking one person and his role covered within the municipal 
administration with the his role within the Common Property administration] 
 
Role in the municipal administration 
 Major 
 Deputy Major 
 Municipal secretary 
 Aldermen [competences to be 
specified] 
 Town Councillor [majority or minority] 
 Technician, head of one specific [to be 
specified] 
 Other role [to be specified] 
 
Role in the Common Property 
Administration 
o President 
o Vice-President 
o Common Property Secretary 
o Economic auditor 
o Administrative Commission member 
o Member of other Common 
Commission [to be specified] 
o Only regoliere (right-holder) 
o Other role [to be specified] 
 
4. What does the Common Property statute prescribe, on the `double representativeness´ 
issue? 
 The `double representativeness´ is not impeded 
 The `double representativeness´ is impeded 
 Other option or peculiarity [to be further specified]  
 
5. Did such statutory dispositions evolve over time? 
 In the past, forms of institutional `double representativeness´ were impeded/less 
tolerated 
 In the past, forms of institutional `double representativeness´ were more 
encouraged/tolerated 
 No relevant statutory changes concerned this issue over time 
 Other option or peculiarity [to be further specified]  
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6. Do you think this is the optimal situation? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 Why? [open answer] 
 [If no] what situation do you think could be considered optimal? [Open answer] 
 
7. Who represents the formal and privileged spokesman between the municipal and the 
Common administration? 
 
Role in the municipal administration 
 Major 
 Deputy Major 
 Municipal secretary 
 Aldermen [competences to be 
specified] 
 The municipal board, as a whole 
 The municipal councillorship, as a 
whole 
 Town Councillor [majority or minority] 
 Technician, head of one specific [to be 
specified] 
 Other role [to be specified] 
 
Role in the Common Property 
Administration 
o President 
o Vice-President 
o Common Property Secretary 
o Economic auditor 
o Administrative Commission member 
o Member of other Common 
Commission [to be specified] 
o Common Property members as a 
whole, as they are also municipal 
citizens 
o One `simple´ regoliere (right-holder) 
o Other role [to be specified] 
 
8. Who represents the privileged spokesman in the informal, personal, unofficial 
communications occurring between the Common Property and the municipal 
administration? [the same list above follows] 
 
 
PART IV – THE COMMON PROPERTY-MUNICIPALITY INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
9. With particular reference to the statutory objectives and tasks prescribed by law to the 
Common Properties, i.e. environmental conservation and management, social 
development, economic development of mountain areas, does the Municipality represent 
the local privileged and main institutional interlocutor? 
 Yes, completely 
 xx 
 Yes, but only for  Environmental conservation and management 
 Economic development 
 Social development 
 Not at all 
 
 Why? [open answer] 
 
10. Alternatively and/or subordinately, who represents the privileged interlocutor – not only 
in institutional terms? [open answer] 
 
11. Who usually takes the formal initiative, when institutional relationships occur between the 
municipal and the common administration? 
 (Almost) always the Municipality 
 Both, but mainly the Municipality 
 [only if explicitly stated by the interviewee] Balanced situation, mutual neutrality 
 (Almost) always the Common Property 
 Both, but mainly the Common Property 
 Irregular, depending on the situations [further description] 
 
12. To what extent do you think that Common Properties affect and limit the municipal policy 
and administrative autonomy? 
 The municipal administration is not constrained at all, with the obvious exception of 
whatever the Common Property is strictly responsible for. Sometimes, Regola simply 
ratifies the municipal decisions. 
 The municipal administration is not much constrained, and it maintains well degrees of 
autonomy on whatever the Common Property is strictly responsible for. 
 [only if explicitly stated by the interviewee] Balanced positioning. 
 The Municipality is considerably constrained in its autonomous administrative 
initiative, but it still maintains its own administrative autonomy. 
 The Municipality is highly constrained in its autonomous administrative initiative. 
Sometimes, the municipal administration simply ratifies the Common Property decisions, 
that are quite binding. 
 Irregular, according to situations [further open explanation required]. 
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13. And, reversely, to what extent do you think that the municipal administration affects and 
limits the Common autonomy? [the same list above is reported here, with the Common 
Property as a subject] 
 
14. Do you think that this is the optimal situation? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 If no, what situation do you think could be considered optimal? [Open answer] 
 
15. Does any kind of written memorandum exist between the Regola/Regole and the 
Municipality, i.e. a signed document regulating their mutual relationships? [Yes; No; I don’t 
know] 
 [If any] what is its nature? 
 Programmatic [further open explanation] 
 Economic [further open explanation] 
 Procedural 
 Mechanisms of institutional relationship [further open explanation] 
 Allocation of operative roles [further open explanation] 
 Other [further open explanation] 
 
 [If no]: 
 The institutional relationship is mainly based on informal contacts 
 Different roles and competences are distinct and separate, therefore the 
institutional relationship is limited 
 Other [further open explanation] 
 
 
PART V – THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS ASSIGNED BY LAW TO THE COMMON PROPERTIES IN 
THE INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MUNICIPALITY 
16. In the last 5 years, has the Municipality ever formally involved Common Properties, pre-
emptively asking for their opinion, in projects and/or activities concerning urban choices 
and local territorial development strategies? [open answer, explorative approach] 
  
17. On the contrary, in the last 5 years, has the Common Property ever formally involved the 
Municipality, pre-emptively asking for its opinion, in projects and/or activities concerning 
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urban choices and local territorial development strategies to be developed on common 
lands? [open answer, explorative approach] 
 
18. As for question no. 16, focussing on actions aimed to develop local economy 
 
19. As for question no. 17, focussing on actions aimed to develop local economy 
 
20. As for question no. 16, focussing on forest and environmental management actions. 
 
21. As for question no. 17, focussing on forest and environmental management actions 
 
22. As for question no. 16, focussing on the activities aimed to promote local culture and 
traditions [considering both major and minor events] 
 
23. As for question no. 17, focussing on the activities aimed to promote local culture and 
traditions [considering both major and minor events] 
 
 
PART VI – ECONOMIC ISSUES 
24. Which income sources can the Common Property rely upon? 
 Timber selling 
 Fuelwood selling 
 Leasing of pastures 
 Alpine huts (leasing) 
 Agritourism buildings 
 Mountain refuges 
 Ski facilities 
 Hydroelectric power plants 
 Pit sites 
 Camping 
 Parking 
 Entrance fees, tolls, etc. 
 Other activities [to be specified] 
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25. In the last years, which funding sources did the Regola benefit of? 
 Rural Development Plan 
 Regional funding, others than Rural Development Plan 
 Other CE funding possibilities 
 Funding from other subjects [to be specified] 
 Other sources [to be specified] 
 
 [for each of them] What was the aim/objective of such funding sources [open answer] 
 
26. Which new or different income sources or higher income revenues did the Common 
Property activate, compared to the (former) municipal management of forest assets? 
Which economies of scale did the Regola obtain? How did the Common Property obtain 
such results? [open answer] 
 
27. Which income sources did the Common Property lose, and/or which income revenues 
lowered? Which higher expenditures did the Common Property have to sustain, compared 
to the (former) municipal management of forest assets? Why? [Open answer] 
 
28. Compared with the (former) municipal management of forest assets, the Common 
Property reinvestment rate of forest-related incomes on forest assets… 
 Lowered 
 Unvaried 
 Increased 
 I don’t know 
 Which considerations does your opinion move from? [Open answer] 
 
29. Which economic effects did the municipal balance sheets experience after the Common 
Property(ies’) reconstitution, considering the whole set of higher and/or lower income 
sources/revenues? 
 The Municipality didn’t experience any economic effect 
 The Municipality mainly experienced positive economic effects [reasons to be listed] 
 The Municipality mainly experienced negative economic effects [reasons to be listed] 
 Negative and positive effects substantially equalled 
 I don’t know/difficult to be estimated 
 [For each of them] Can you provide at least a rough estimation [€; open answer] 
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30. How did the Municipality adapt to these economic changes? [open answer] 
 Positive adaptations 
 Negative adaptations 
 
31. Which consequences did such changes in the municipal economic balance sheet trigger 
within the local community? [open answer] 
 Positive adaptations 
 Negative adaptations 
 
 
PART VII – RELATIONSHIP PATTERNS BETWEEN COMMON PROPERTIES AND 
MUNICIPALITIES 
32. Do legal disputes exist between the Municipality and the Common Property, or did they 
exist in the past? 
 No, neither currently nor in the past 
 Yes, in the past, but currently solved 
 Yes, still in place 
 [If any], for which reason? [open answer] 
 How were they solved? Which evolution is foreseeable, and/or desirable? [open 
answer] 
 
33. Apart from legal disputes, in the last 5 years have you ever perceived divergences, frictions 
or contrasts in terms of institutional competences? 
 No, neither currently nor in the past 
 Yes, in the past, but currently solved 
 Yes, still in place 
 [If any], for which reason? [open answer] 
 How were they solved? Which evolution is foreseeable, and/or desirable? [open 
answer] 
 [If any], how much severe (magnitudo) do you think these contrasts was? 
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 
34. Did the Municipality empowered Common Properties with the responsibility to manage 
some municipal property? 
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 I don’t know  No 
 Yes. Which ones and through which mechanisms? [further open explanation] 
 
35. …and vice versa? [as for question no. 23] 
 I don’t know  No 
 Yes. Which ones and through which mechanisms? [further open explanation] 
 
36. How do you think that the relationship between the Municipality and the Common 
Property(ies) will be in the future? 
 More continuous/close     Better 
 More sporadic      Worse 
 Stationary, unvaried     Unvaried 
 I don’t know      I don’t know 
 
37. According to your opinion, how much positive might be (potentially) for the Common 
Property to have to deal with the Municipality? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 
38. And vice versa, for the Municipality? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 
39. According to the real experience, how much positive is for the Common Property(ies) to 
have to relate with the Municipality as main territorial and institutional interlocutor? 
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 
40. Describe the 3 most positive aspects [open answer] 
 
41. Describe the 3 most negative aspects [open answer] 
 
 
PART VIII – THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS ASSIGNED BY LAW TO THE COMMON PROPERTIES 
IN THE COMMON INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
 [Introduction: the national and regional laws recognize Common Properties as subjects 
concurring to the environmental protection and socio-economic development of mountain 
territories.] 
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42. To what extent do you think that local Common Properties, considered as a whole, really 
promote/sustain: 
 
 Environmental protection  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 …and what about your own Common Property, specifically? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 To this purpose, what are the main obstacles and difficulties that the Common 
Property has to cope with? [open answer] 
 
 Social development  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 …and what about your own Common Property, specifically? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 To this purpose, what are the main obstacles and difficulties that the Common 
Property has to cope with? [open answer] 
 The main effects of such efforts mainly affect: 
 Only the right-holders’ community 
 The whole local community (municipal level) 
 The whole local community, and even beyond 
[Only if explicitly recalled]  Balanced situations [further explanation required] 
 Particularly, which actions explicitly target the whole local community? [open 
answer] 
 
 Economic development  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 …and what about your own Common Property, specifically? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 To this purpose, what are the main obstacles and difficulties that the Common 
Property has to cope with? [open answer] 
 The main effects of such efforts mainly affect: 
 Only the right-holders’ community 
 The whole local community (municipal level) 
 The whole local community, and even beyond 
[Only if explicitly recalled]  Balanced situations [further explanation required] 
 Particularly, which actions explicitly target the whole local community? [open 
answer] 
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 Tourism development  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 …and what about your own Common Property, specifically? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 Mainly through which actions? [open answer] 
 To this purpose, what are the main obstacles and difficulties that the Common 
Property has to cope with? [open answer] 
 
43. Do you think that a strong protection of the Common cultural identity against external 
cultural pressures might obstacle the tourist promotion and the socio-economic 
development? 
[No; Yes; I don’t know] 
 Why? [open answer] 
 
 
PART IX – COORDINATION AMONG COMMON PROPERTIES, AND BETWEEN COMMON 
PROPERTIES AND OTHER LOCAL SUBJECTS 
44. According to your knowledge, does any subject responsible to represent and coordinate 
different local Common Properties exist? [No; Yes; I don’t know] 
 Who are they? [open answer] 
 Does your Common Property hold membership in such subject(s)? [open answer] 
 Does someone participate on behalf of your Common Property to the activities 
organized by such subject(s)? [open answer] 
 What do you think about their role and the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
activities? [open answer] 
 How would it possible to improve them? [open answers] 
 What’s your opinion about the relationship patterns, and the real partnerships set in 
place among different Regole? [open answer] 
 
45. Which actions would/should Common Properties undergo, in order to improve their ability 
to coordinate their own activities and policies with other organizations and institutions, to 
make territorial returns (sensu lato) higher? [open answer] 
 With other Common Properties 
 With the local Municipality and/or neighbouring Municipalities 
 With the Mountain Community 
 With other subjects [to be specified] 
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46. Specifically referring to the objectives and tasks assigned by law to the Common 
Properties, how would you consider a stricter coordination between Common Properties 
and Municipality? 
 Positive. 
 Why? [open answer] 
 Negative 
 Why? [open answer] 
 Useless 
 Why? [open answer] 
 I don’t know 
 
47. Specifically referring to the objectives and tasks assigned by law to the Common 
Properties, how would you consider a stricter coordination among different Common 
Properties? 
 Positive. 
 Why? [open answer] 
 Negative 
 Why? [open answer] 
 Useless 
 Why? [open answer] 
 I don’t know 
 
 
PART X – GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
47. Has the Common Property ever involved the Municipality, both directly or indirectly, in 
issues concerning the its internal life, i.e. governance aspects? [Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 If yes, in which circumstances? [open answer] 
 
48. How can the Municipality give ideas, comments, suggestions to the Common Assembly, 
even though it is not formally involved? 
 I don’t know 
 It doesn’t give any suggestions, since it is not its competence 
 It doesn’t give any suggestions, since it is not interested 
 Through informal and personal contacts 
 Other [open answer] 
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49. Do the internal, Common Property decisional mechanisms somehow influence the 
municipal decisions? 
[Yes; No; I don’t know] 
 [if yes] How? [further open answer] 
 
50. In the last 5 years, did you perceive divergences, frictions or contrasts from a social 
(community) point of view? 
 No cases 
 Yes, still ongoing 
 Yes, solved 
 [If yes] how much do you think they can be considered relevant? (magnitudo) 
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 [If yes] what was/is their reason? [open answer] 
 [If solved] in which way they have been solved? [open answer] 
 [If still pending] what evolution is foreseeable? [open answer] 
 
51. To what extend do the non-right-holder local inhabitants perceive Common Properties as 
institutions integrated within the local socio-economic local environment? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 
 Which critiques are ascribed to the local Common Properties? [open answer] 
 Which positive remarks are bestowed to the local Common Properties? [open answer] 
 
52. How many right-holders’ households currently exist? [no.] 
 
53. What is the current amount of individual right-holder members? [no.] 
 
54. Can you depict a historical trend? 
 Households Right-holders (members) 
 
Heavy drop   
 
Slight decrease   
 
Unvaried amount   
 
Slight increase   
 
Heavy increase   
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55. According to your opinion, do the local Common Properties risk to `shut themselves off´, 
either in cultural, economic and social terms? [open answer] 
 
56. According to your opinion, is the intergenerational turnover within the Common 
Properties sufficient to ensure their survival? [open answer] 
 What do young people, including non-right-holders, think about the Common 
Properties? [open answer] 
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